Decentralization, Democracy and Development : Examining the potential and limits of subnational empowerment by Shahid, Zubair
  
 
University of Trento, Italy 
School of Social Sciences 
Doctoral Program in Local Development and Global Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
Decentralization, Democracy and Development 
Examining the potential and limits of subnational empowerment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zubair Shahid 
XXVII Cycle 
Doctoral School of Local Development and Global Dynamics 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
 
     
Thesis developed under the supervision of:  
 
Dr. Paulus A. Blokker,  
Associate Professor, Charles University Prague  
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for PhD in Local Development and Global 
Dynamics.  
 
 
 
Review Commission 
 
Prof. Vincent Della Sala 
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento  
Adjunct Professor John Hopkins University 
 
Prof. Roberto Ricciuti  
Department of Economics, University of Verona 
 
 
 
Final Examination Commission  
 
Prof. Silvio Goglio 
Department of Economics and Management, 
University of Trento  
 
Prof. Gianna Claudia Giannelli 
Department of Economics and Business Sciences 
University of Florence 
 
Prof. Tullio Gregori 
Department of Political and Social Science 
University of Trieste  
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to the loving memories of my father 
 
Shahid Mahmood 
1956-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
CONTENTS  
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 
List of Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 
Chapter 1 Decentralization, Democracy and Development: Overview of the Research ........................................................ 7 
1.1 Conceptual and Analytical Overview ............................................................................................................................................... 9 
1.2 Key Focus of Enquiries ........................................................................................................................................................................ 23 
1.3 Rationale for choosing the case studies ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
1.4 Methodology and Analytical Framework ................................................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 2 Decentralization and Democratic Developmentalism .................................................................................................. 36 
2.1 Governance, State and Public Sector Reform: An Overview .............................................................................................. 36 
2.2 Conceptualizing a Developmental State ...................................................................................................................................... 45 
2.3 Building a Developmental State: Lessons from Theory and Policy ................................................................................. 50 
2.4 Democratic Developmentalism: Synergizing Democracy and Development ............................................................. 70 
2.5 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 86 
Chapter 3 Decentralization and Developmentalism in Bolivia ................................................................................................... 101 
3.1 Contextual Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 101 
3.2 LPP – The First Phase of Decentralization in Bolivia ................................................................................................................. 106 
3.3 The Second Phase of Decentralization in Bolivia ......................................................................................................................... 112 
3.4 Main Actors and Incentive Structures in Phase 2 of Decentralization ....................................................................... 115 
3.5 Consolidating Decentralization and Developmentalism in Bolivia .............................................................................. 119 
3.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 131 
Chapter 4 Federalism & Decentralization in Pakistan: Implications for Democracy and Development.................. 133 
4.1 Contextual Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 133 
4.2 Evolution of the State Structure in Pakistan .......................................................................................................................... 135 
4.3 Paradox of Subnational Democracy in Pakistan ................................................................................................................... 137 
4.4 Local Governance Ordinance 2001............................................................................................................................................. 140 
4.4Decentralization against the backdrop of 18th Amendment ............................................................................................ 144 
4.6 Democratic & Developmental implications of the 18th Amendment ........................................................................... 150 
4.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 157 
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Further Outlook ....................................................................................................................................... 159 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 162 
 
 
5 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
During the course of this research, I have had the pleasure of learning so much from so many. I would 
express my sincerest gratitude for the gracious support and able guidance of my research advisor, Prof. 
Paulus A. Blokker.  
I would also like to express my sincerest thanks to my internal examiners Prof. Della Sala and Prof. 
Ricciuti, for their patience, enriching discussions and making me think a lot harder about issues 
addressed in this thesis.   
I have always been a firm believer in the adage that education is a progressive realization of one’s own 
ignorance. The pursuit of this degree has reaffirmed my beliefs and continues to inspire me to 
continue questioning, exploring and learning. In my limited paddling around the woods of social 
science research and international development policy, I had the pleasure of coming across exceptional 
individuals; whose work, viewpoints and guidance has been an enormous privilege and highly 
enlightening: Dr. Akmal Hussain, Dr. Katja Hujo, Dr. Hafiz Pasha, Prof. Paul Blokker, Prof. Vincent 
Della Sala, Prof. Roberto Ricciuti, Prof. Kent Eaton, Prof. William (Bill) Easterly and Dr. Aaron 
Schneider, amongst many others. To them I give them all the credit for all that I know till now, and for 
inspiring me in their own ways to learn all that I do not know.  
I would also express my sincerest gratitude to Prof. Giuseppe Folloni, Mr. Davide Santuari and Ms. 
Nicole Bertotti and Mr. Mark Beittel for their guidance and support almost all through this program.  
Like many others before me, I too, underestimated the rigors of undertaking a Doctoral degree; the 
scant highs, frequent lows, and recurrent moments of self-doubt and inadequacy. My family has been a 
source of sanity, encouragement, and support during the daunting times, and a source of unconditional 
affection and inspiration during the good ones. While I cannot thank them enough, I hope that my 
pursuits enable me to bring joy, pride and happiness to their lives.  
It would also be criminal not to acknowledge the countless cups of coffee in the deep end of the 
nights.  
 
 
  
6 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES AND F IGURES 
 
Table 1 : Motivations for Decentralization Reforms – Selected Global Experiences  
Table 2: Varieties of State Fragility 
Table 3: Regional Level DRM and Growth Performance of Developing Countries 
Table 4: Intergovernmental Finance Distribution Pre- and Post LPP 1994 
Table 5: Fiscal Decentralization Indicators 2006-10 
Table 6: Departmental Share of Bolivian National GDP 
Table 7:  Departmental Revenue in US$/capita (2010) 
Table 8: Departmental Debt Portfolio Estimates (2010-11) 
Table 9 : Major Political Parties in Pakistan 
Table 10: Parties forming Provincial Governments 
Table 11 : Party Position on Decentralization and Local Governments 2013 General Elections 
Table 12: Functional Distribution across Government Tiers 
Table 13: Finance Decentralization under the 7th NFC Award 
Table 14: Functional Responsibilities under the 18th Amendment 
Table 15: Summary of Fiscal Decentralization under the 18th Amendment 
 
Figure 1: Mapping the Incentives of National and Subnational Actors 
Figure 2: Comparative Poverty and Inequality Statistics for Bolivia and Pakistan 
Figure 3: Comparative CPIA of Bolivia and Pakistan  
Figure 4: Transformation Trends in Pakistan  
Figure 5: Transformation Trends in Bolivia 
Figure 6: Growth variance according to Regime Types 
Figure 7: Typology of Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants 
Figure 8: Difference in the Sectoral Composition of Investment Post LPP 
7 
 
CHAPTER 1 
DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT:  
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
As the discourse on economic development has expanded its focus to a broader set of 
interrelated economic, social, and political variables, an important conclusion has been that 
sustainable and inclusive development requires not only economic and social policies, but also 
political empowerment to foster a deliberative and participatory development process. The 
state versus market led development debate has been increasingly conducive to the role of 
state since 1990s mainly due to the developmental state experiences in East Asia in particular, 
and the high social costs of pursuing market oriented reforms or Structural Adjustment 
Programs in many developing countries across Latin America, South Asia in particular under 
the Washington Consensus  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  (Williamson,  1990)1.  The growth 
spurts and the successive downturns delivered little on account of sustainable and inclusive 
growth. 
 
The nature of an ideal state, in contemporary times, can be argued to be developmental and 
democratic; characterized by redistributive growth, broad-based participation, pro-poor 
policies, and responsiveness of public policy to local needs (Robinson & White, 1998). 
Furthermore, given the intricacies of the contemporary world where Keynesian and neo-liberal 
values contest for space simultaneously, the (re)configuration of the role of the state while 
fostering democratization is an important dimension to consider. In this context, it is 
increasingly argued that subnational democracy2 is important in revitalizing and reinvigorating 
democratic systems, as well as promoting better public governance (Blokker, 2012). 
                                                             
1 While the impetus for structural reforms came against the backdrop of globalization and the fiscal crisis 
(mainly the Latin American), the nature and nomenclature of these reforms remained largely the domain of 
the multilateral institutions, led by the World Bank and the IMF. The SAPs and other similar market oriented 
reforms initiated in this period were more targeted at liberalizing and promoting efficiency of markets rather 
than initiate a public sector reform/ state reform. The resurgence of interest in the state’s role in the economy 
was reflected in the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report, where it stated that “the state is central to 
economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and 
facilitator” (p.1); and that “the determining factor behind...contrasting developments (among regions) is the 
effectiveness of the state”. The idea that subsequently took root was that reconciling the role of the state with its 
capacity to effectively deliver on its responsibilities (primarily through reinvigorating and reforming 
public institutions) was an important condition for sustained and inclusive socio-economic development. 
2 Subnational, in this research refers to both second (Provinces and Regions) and third (municipalities and local) 
tiers of governments.  
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Nurturing democratic governance at the subnational levels has long been advocated as a 
strategy to not only foster democratization but also improved public management primarily in 
the realms of public service delivery, responsiveness of the public policies to local needs and 
accountability structures. In the context of subnational democracy and bringing governance 
structures to subnational space, decentralization emerges as one of the key reforms that reduces 
the concentration of power in general, by “fragmenting central authority and fostering greater 
intergovernmental competition, accountability and participation to make the public governance 
more effective, efficient and responsive” (P. K. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006)3. The World 
Bank (2006), for instance, highlights the importance of ‘empowerment through participation’, 
and asserts that while participation is a desirable outcome in its own right, it can also promote 
more just and efficient development outcomes. This increasing relevance of decentralization of 
economic and political authority to subnational levels also finds its roots in the changing global 
dynamics. The changing nature of the central state vis-à-vis growing supranational linkages 
under the global governance mandate, has made the role of the central governments as the 
‘guardians of national sovereignty’ questionable and reinforced the democratic legitimacy of the 
subnational authorities (Kahler & Lake, 2012). 
 
Decentralization of governance has been a key reform agenda, especially in the developing 
economies since the 1980s. While the advocacy in favor of decentralizing governance and public 
decision space, extols the benefits reaped through greater responsiveness, accountability, 
efficiency and a deliberative institutional framework (Crook & Manor, 1998; Heller, 2001); the 
empirical evidence in support of it remains mixed, at best.4  
 
Amidst all the contrasting theories and results, the idea of decentralization as a key 
governance and public sector reform tool still dominates much of the academic and policy 
discourse. Given the ‘heterogeneity’ of form and impact surrounding decentralization and its 
                                                             
3 The main thrust is not to weaken central authority but to nurture subservient tiers government at local level 
that are more responsive to the needs of core constituents. Most of the arguments for decentralization focus on 
efficiency, especially on the comparative advantages of scale, information and accountability that come with 
having the proximity of the government to its constituents. 
4 For instance, decision-making competence and resources to the local levels has been recorded to result in 
“local predatory capture”, i.e. a strengthening of prevailing networks of corruption, patronage and the rule of 
local influential circles, thus weakening state capacity and inhibiting democratization (Blair, 2000; Migdal, 
1988). On the contrary, there are also instances where well-functioning local systems of governance have 
taken roots despite the structural adversities; infrastructural constraints, clientelism and corruption, low 
socio-economic development. (Ostrom, 1990, 2009; Tendler, 1998; Uphoff & Committee, 1986) 
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effect on facilitating a participatory development process (possessing both democratic as well as 
developmental attributes), this research aims to contribute to the debate by focusing on its 
political determinants by examining how the nature and content of the decentralization reform 
process, problems of incentive compatibility of the agents involved in the process, and the 
unique political, socio-economic and institutional factors in the design affect the scope for 
realizing effective decentralization to local tiers of government. 
The developmental and democratic dimensions can also be conceptually located in the much 
advocated notion of ‘participatory development’. In addition to exploring the theoretical 
constructs on decentralization and its nexus with a participatory development process that 
encapsulates both democratization as well as developmental aspects, this research also engages in 
an empirical analysis of these dimensions in two contexts, Bolivia and Pakistan. 
This chapter seeks to serve as an introduction to this research by putting forth a conceptual 
overview and the analytical parameters within which the research shall operate.  The first section 
deals exclusively with a brief overview of decentralization and the developmental potential of 
subnational empowerment, including the role of the political dynamics governing 
decentralization reforms.  
The second section pertains to the focus of enquiry of the dissertation, giving an expansive 
overview of the key questions this research endeavors to address, the sequential aspects of 
decentralization and the extent to which the ordinal prioritization of the forms change the 
nature of the reform outcomes. The ordinal prioritization deals with the fiscal, administrative 
and political forms of decentralization, and how these forms are ordered in succession as a 
consequence of interest articulation, contestation and bargaining procedures. In the analysis of 
the bargaining and contestation dynamics, a game theoretical model will be presented. 
The final section of this chapter deals with the contexts chosen for exclusive case analysis, 
the periods across which the reform trajectories will be studied and finally the broader research 
methodology. It would, however, be pertinent to mention that while the case analysis remains 
centered around two contexts to reap the advantage of a Small-N study setting, it would still 
include various other contexts in its scope of analysis, albeit to a limited detail. 
1.1 CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW 
Decentralization has lent itself to various conceptualizations and definitions, however, this 
research adopts its elucidation as “the process through which the central government transfers 
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responsibilities and political power to the state institutions closer to the population, granting 
them administrative independence and political legitimacy so that, with popular participation, the 
production of goods and services can be improved” (Oxhorn, Tulchin,& Selee, 2004). These 
policies have changed governance and political economy in fundamental ways, which amongst 
other examples is best manifested by an increasing share of subnational fiscal contribution 
around the world. This subnational allocation of fiscal resources and the discretion over their 
absorption has had a sizeable macroeconomic impact in some contexts5. This has also resulted in 
the delegation of key public services like education, health, social safety and poverty alleviation 
programs amongst others, to the subnational governments that are now responsible for their 
funding, delivery, management and quality (P. K. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Faguet, 1997). 
The most common advocacy in favor of decentralization reforms is that the proximity of the 
subnational governments (regional and local) to the broader citizenry enables greater 
responsiveness of service delivery and accountability; consistent with the ‘principle of 
subsidiarity’(Oates, 1999). There are various motivations behind the initiation of decentralization 
reforms that span across political, economic, social and in some cases even externally stipulated 
requisites. Table 1, provides an overview of some of the regions/countries undertaking 
these reforms and the underlying motivations.  
From a normative standpoint, decentralization also brings government closer to the 
people. The existence of local political arenas makes it easier for ordinary citizens to participate 
and exert influence (P. Bardhan, 2005; Blair, 2000; Manor, 1999). Furthermore, the proximity of 
the incumbents to the constituents ensures greater accountability in a counter democracy fashion 
(Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008); which pertains to a broader forum for the citizens for 
interest articulation and deliberation. Creating formal political forums in the local or more broadly 
subnational space, is also considered to be beneficial to pluralization of the political space and 
deconcentration of powers; a potent reform in the contexts characterized by elite capture 
(Hadenius, 2003). Decentralized governance structures are also argued to be more responsive to 
the local demands compared to a distant central level agency, which in most cases are central 
bureaucracies that may enjoy scale advantages but lack informational advantages. The scale 
                                                             
5 Calculations based on  IMF  Government Finance Statistics (GFS),  reveal  that  the  in  1980  the  share of 
subnational revenues and expenditures was 14.9% and 19% respectively. By 1999, the share of subnational 
revenues and expenditures had increased to 23% and 30% respectively. Dataset can be viewed at : 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm 
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advantage that centralized delivery of public services enjoy may make it more ‘productively’ 
efficient, but localized provision can have allocative efficiencies because of increased 
responsiveness to the needs and preferences of the local constituencies enabled by the 
information advantages. Another advantage of decentralized governance systems could be the 
potential of micro-level policy experimentation and innovation in individual subnational 
jurisdictions that could be potentially scaled up to national levels or just replicated horizontally 
across other subnational jurisdictions (Crook & Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Oates, 1999). 
Table 1 : Motivations for Decentralization Reforms – Selected Global Experiences 
Political and Economic Transformation Central and Eastern Europe, Russia 
Political Crisis due to ethnic conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, 
Sri Lanka, South Africa, Philippines 
Political Crisis due to regional conflicts Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, 
Mexico, Philippines 
Enhancing participation Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines 
Accessionary Conditionalities (EU) Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, Croatia 
Political Maneuvering Peru, Pakistan  
Fiscal Crisis Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan 
Improving Service Delivery Chile, Uganda, Cote D’Ivoire 
Shifting Deficits Downwards Eastern and Central Europe, Russia 
Shifting Responsibility for Unpopular Adjustment 
Programs 
Africa 
Prevent return to autocracy Latin America 
Preservation of Communist Institutional Legacy China 
Globalization and Information Revolution Most Countries 
Source: Shah and Thompson (2004) 
 
Regardless of what the guiding impulse may be, decentralization reforms remain critically 
dependent on the political and institutional environment of the context they are introduced in. 
The main impulses for decentralization include democratization, development, and public service 
delivery improvements (efficiency and equity oriented improvements). However, there are other 
context-specific political and institutional factors that are even more influential in the design and 
implementation of the reforms. This also happens to be a factor commonly acknowledged but not 
evaluated as critically as it beckons, in the existing literature. This research explores this void to 
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critically evaluate and study the role of political incentives and governing dynamics in the design 
and outcome of the decentralization. 
The recurring theme in most discussions and literature on decentralization is that it (like 
most generalized policy narratives) is no panacea for development policy. With a disaggregated 
governance and political structure, the political actors have a relatively diminished desire to pursue 
coherent and unified national policies, and find it of a greater providence to remain limited to 
their local constituencies. This has adverse implications on inter-regional equalization, uniform 
distribution of public services and uniform upholding of citizen rights – paradoxically, making a 
potent argument in favor of a greater centralization of political and administrative structures. 
From the governance perspective, there are various instances where decentralized state edifice has 
adversely affected an optimal exercise of political and administrative authority. 
For instance, in some cases in South Asia, where corruption, mismanagement and 
patronage has deepened simultaneously with localized politics (P. K. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 
2006). This adverse impact naturally has a similar bearing on the public sector efficiency, which in 
turn relays on the negative effects to the welfare of a country's citizens and also deepens 
clientelism. In the contexts already rife with clientelism, any attempt at decentralizing political or 
administrative functions would have a greater chance of inhibiting effective grass roots 
participation, and mostly replicate the ‘elite capture’ at the subnational levels (Hadenius, 1992; 
Hadenius & Teorell, 2007). As a consequence, the reforms deliver the exact contrary of what they 
are envisaged to – limiting democratic quality, weakening state capacity and reinforcing elite 
capture over the extended authority and resource pools. The idea of decentralization has also been 
a subject of intense debate on the structure and scope of the government at each level. This 
emanates mainly from the common criticism of an expanded centralized apparatus on the lines of 
inability, ineffectiveness, clientelism and political alienation, all considered “…as the natural by-
products of a bureaucracy distant in space and rendered insensitive, inefficient, and inflexible by 
its size” (Williamson, 1995). As specified earlier, there is considerable heterogeneity surrounding 
the concept of decentralization that spans across both the form as well as the impact it delivers. 
One main explanation of the heterogeneity of form, and thus impact, of decentralization reforms 
has been the lack of consistency between the envisaged public policy goals and the diverging 
objectives and/or incentives of the political and bureaucratic players (Kaiser, Eaton, & Smoke, 
2010).  
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This is largely due to the nature of the central governments who are responsible for the 
development and implementation of the decentralization reforms. Since they are not monolithic 
entities and often a coalition of different political parties, the homogeneity of their preferences 
and plurality of interests of the coalition members impairs the ability of the government to 
develop a policy mix and its consistent implementation. Furthermore, since the implementation of 
the reforms and their sequence remains largely a prerogative of the central authorities, it is 
imperative to consider what motivates the political actors at the central level to willingly relinquish 
and devolve their authorities to subnational levels which may or may not be conducive to their 
objectives. 
Based on a review of literature and existing debates on decentralization reforms that will be 
covered in detail in the later chapters, this research identifies two main determinants of the 
effectiveness and potential for decentralization reforms to deliver on the developmental and the 
democratic dimensions:  
1. Incentives of the Actors/ Agents involved  
2. Sequencing of the Decentralization Reform  
 
Incentives of Actors / Agents involved  
One of the ways to interpret and operationalize the incentives of the political actors is the  
Political Economy Analysis Framework developed by Kaiser, Eaton,& Smoke (2010), where three 
forms of incentives for the political actors are identified: i)Electoral, ii) Partisan, and iii) Institutional. 
While this framework puts these three incentives forward as the broad classifications, their incidence 
varies in extent and nature across the contexts. These incentives are not of uniform salience across all 
contexts and are rooted in the specific characteristics of the contexts as well. The importance of this 
framework in the context of this research is only to interpret and operationalize the main generalizable 
forms of incentives that exist for the actors involved in the design and implementation of the 
decentralization reforms.  
Electoral incentives, for instance, are of a higher significance in the contexts characterized by 
relatively consolidated democratic systems. Even in contexts not characterized by consolidation, but 
instead transition, the core impulse remains resorting to electoral mechanisms to determine 
incumbency of public office in subnational space. This makes it imperative to consider the central 
political agents’ incentives of using the subnational space to further their own strategic ambitions of 
securing/reinforcing gains at the centre. The introduction of electoral institutions in the local/ 
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subnational space finds its roots in Huntington’s ‘third wave of democracy’ (Huntington, 1991). The 
idea behind supporting a process of successive and regular sub-national elections remains the 
liberalization of political space in general while also enhancing the possibility of plurality (in terms of 
the variety of political parties that assume the offices) in the subnational and central governments. This 
is a critical factor as it reduces the prospective rent-seeking and perversion that accompanies a central 
tendency to retain sub-national appointments as its exclusive domain. 
As a product of these electoral systems, there is also an enhanced scope of the sub-national 
officials to utilize their individual mandates as well as pushing for a greater pool of resources and 
authority in a bottoms-up approach (Agarwal, 1999). Backed with electoral legitimacy, local 
governments can thus have a high influence over the traditional power structures at the 
local/subnational level (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999). Evidence of the aforementioned has been 
recorded in various cases. For example, in the case of Mexico, the plummeting public support of the 
incumbent political party (Institutional Reform Party|PRI) compelled it to acknowledge the of an 
opposition party (Party of Democratic Revolution|PRD) in the subnational elections in 1988. The 
PRD in turn used its newfound bargaining power to campaign for greater decentralization and winning 
the subsequent round of national elections due to a significantly higher consolidation of their voting 
base 6 . What this case also signifies is that with greater plurality and strong accountable regional 
governments, the central government may also be deterred in dominating the inter-governmental 
arrangements with the fear of ‘nonconformist’ potential that such regional governments hold.  
Another potential pitfall to local governance reforms remains the pervasive strategic gameplay 
by the central political agents in the local space, where the privileges of incumbency enable them to 
unfairly support their own candidates in the subnational electoral rounds. Such behavior by the central 
government deepens the sub-optimality of the governance structures and nullifying the ‘inclusive’ 
dimension of political decentralization by sustaining the elite networks and hegemony of the central 
actors. An example of this can be found, especially in the case of Bolivia and Pakistan amongst others. 
In Bolivia, the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement / Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) 
emerged victorious, albeit with a realization that their tenure would be short-lived because of a 
coalition presidency. Given its stable, significant support base and better organization at the 
                                                             
6  For more on the Mexican experience, see Beer, Caroline. 2004. “Electoral Competition and Fiscal 
Decentralization in Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America (eds.) Alfred P. Montero and David 
J.Samuel 
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subnational level, the MNR leaders endorsed a bold approach to decentralization under the 1994 Ley 
di Participación Popular (LPP)7.  
Even before elections (subnational and/or national) are held, the expectations of the political 
actors of the electoral outcomes modify their preferences related to decentralization reforms. These are 
of particular importance in the context of managed political transitions from limited to greater 
democracy where the final victors and losers remain uncertain (Smith, 2008). The incentive-
maximizing behavior then leads the political actors to evaluate their prospects ex-ante of the formal 
electoral rounds. Where a prior convention of competitive subnational elections existed, the central 
policy has been to roll it back and institute new electoral rounds under new rules or modalities that 
favor the incumbents in the centre. The guiding rationale remains rather intuitive: neutralize and dilute 
political opposition from the established interests at the subnational levels, and once this had been 
achieved, initiate a reform process that substantially empowers the subnational governments, most of 
whom comprise of actors with compatible interests to the centre. The case of Pakistan illustrates this 
trend. Every time an autocratic/ non-representative military regime overtook the government; major 
decentralization reforms were initiated to dislodge the entrenched support bases of the political parties. 
An interesting paradox that is thus observed in most developing countries is that authoritarian/ non-
democratic regimes can be the source of substantive decentralization reforms, even though they are 
high on administrative and fiscal, but low on the political decentralization. 
The next sets of incentives according to the PEA Framework are partisan incentives. Where 
political parties remain a primary platform to access any political office, the internal stance(s) of the 
party on such reforms is linked to the party structure as well as the nature and extent of competition 
within the party/(ies). Furthermore, one must also pay attention to whether the political capital of the 
involved parties is concentrated in specific subnational/ regional levels or distributed nationally. In the 
case of the former, decentralization may as well encourage or pose higher risks of ethnic conflict and 
secessionist tendencies (Brancati, 2006).  
Furthermore, to gauge the support in favor of decentralization it is important to see the nature 
of political parties and whether the national or the regional preferential outlook dominates their 
political stance(s). This is an important factor as the contexts where the legislators or members of a 
political party had a more subnational/regional orientation instead of a structurally guided support to 
the national party leadership, the support to decentralization reforms is much higher (Willis, Haggard, 
& Garman, 1999). The direction of authority flow within the party (upwards to a central party 
                                                             
7 Chapter 3 engages with this in a greater detail 
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leadership or downwards to the broader party base) as well as the nature of the political party 
(personality-dominated/patronage based or a more participatory one), are important points to consider 
to gauge the extent to which effective decentralization reforms will be pursued. In contexts where the 
political space is not too pluralized, and is dominated by a single party, the overarching objective of 
any decentralization reform is to predominantly secure the interests of central leadership, leaving less 
space for the regional and pluralized interest articulation or representation. A related factor may also be 
the existing institutional arrangements in terms of national/subnational functional and fiscal 
authority distribution. While this in itself is linked to some level of decentralization already existing in 
the constitutional or functional modalities of the state apparatus, it has strong implications for the 
structures of the political parties as well. If these institutional mechanisms and functional modalities 
envisage a stronger subnational state, there is thus a greater impulse for a more participatory structure 
within the political parties and a dilution of central leadership’s ability to coerce its own reinforcement 
from its party base. Sabatini (2003) presents an argument correlating (causually oriented) the degree of 
fiscal decentralization and the nature of the political parties across chosen contexts.  
The main argument posits that where there is a greater fiscal centralization, the party systems 
are also more centralized and where there is a greater fiscal decentralization, the party systems are also 
more participatory and pluralized. This is more recently partially observed in the case of Pakistan, 
where post 18th Constitutional Amendment the provinces have been devolved a greater share of the 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities, leading to a greater subnational/provincial bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the centre. However, this has still not resulted in any substantive and observable shift in the 
political party organization as the leading parties like the PML-N, PPP, JUI-F who continue to be 
minimally institutionalized and remain a subject to a narrow central party leadership. 
While the preceding discussion extoled the incentives present within the structure of a political 
party, there are also contrasting incentives in the broader political space and between the political 
parties. The discussion on how political parties deliberate and mediate with each other for/against 
decentralization is also an important variable in ascertaining how the envisaged decentralization 
reforms shall span out. Critical in this regard is to see the extent to which the political parties in a given 
political context vary in terms of their Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation (Kaiser, 
Eaton, & Smoke, 2010). Institutionalization refers to the extent to which a political party exists with an 
identity of its own instead of being subservient to an individual party leader, and is rooted in the 
society it seeks to represent. Polarization refers to ideological divides between parties and the extent to 
which each political party bases its courses of actions according to its own manifesto. Fragmentation 
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pertains to the plurality of the political space in terms of the number of formal political parties catering 
to heterogeneous social groups. Any analysis of the extent to which the inter-party negotiations over 
the design and implementation of reforms in general (and decentralization in particular) needs to 
consider all of these elements. 
The higher the fragmentation of the political space, the higher would the heterogeneity of 
political interests, and more so if there is a degree of polarization that also accompanies. In the 
contexts characterized by a higher degree of polarization, any consensus decision-making is arduous if 
each political party is credibly committed to its ideological stance. In the contexts characterized by 
greater fragmentation, the incentive maximization amid competition will be crucial in determining the 
design, rollout and implementation of the decentralization reforms, to ensure at the very least, a 
minimal common benefit. This can again be observed in the case of Pakistan, where decentralization 
reforms have frequently been a divisive issue between the political parties 2001 and 2012, and the delay 
in any further provincial to local decentralization can be largely attributed to the absence of a mutually 
beneficial arrangement between the political parties. In addition to the partisan and electoral dynamics, 
the PEA framework also identifies institutional incentives as major determinants of the trajectory and 
outcome of decentralization reforms.  
According to Kaiser, Eaton, & Smoke (2010), regardless of the nature of the regime 
(autocratic, partially democratic or effectively democratic), the central incumbents will have strong 
incentives to preserve the influence of the central institutions. This is not necessarily an unwarranted 
and villainous pursuit by the centre, since it has the mandate of being the guarantor of the constituent 
entities’ equality as well as being the unanimously agreed upon mediator of diverse subnational 
articulation. Not conceding too much of the central institutional influence and mandate to subnational 
levels remains an important imperative for a state resilience and cohesion. The problem is when such 
preservation is guided more by narrower political concerns by the central actors who may consider 
their ‘wings clipped’ with fewer instruments at their disposal to further their political agenda. 
 
Sequencing of Decentralization Reforms  
The second main determinant of potent and effective decentralization reforms is the 
sequencing. While this has also been highlighted in the framework discussed earlier, the importance 
of sequencing in decentralization was introduced by Falleti (2010), in a stark departure from the earlier 
norm of advocating a ‘big-bang’ decentralization reform that involved a rollout of all forms 
simultaneously or a form of decentralization (political, administrative, or fiscal) in a distinct and 
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disconnected manner. The sequential approach does not require the simultaneous approach to be 
applied across the three forms, necessarily. The sequencing patterns are the also of interest to political 
actors who are wary of relinquishing political control. The sequencing trajectories can be designed in 
any way; for example, instituting administrative decentralization in the absence of fiscal 
decentralization is bound to have limited success, or a political decentralization without any 
administrative and fiscal decentralization would largely be illusionary than anything else. There are 
cases when the central government does decentralize, albeit in a clientilistic manner and regional 
governments are elected in their own right, but these regional incumbents are constrained in the use of 
their incumbency e.g. Pakistan under the LGO 2001 during the Musharraf regime. Each of the 
possible trajectories results in the varying levels of regional government authority and autonomy.  
The main idea of this put forth by Falleti (2010) is that there are distinct sequential preferences 
of the national and subnational actors. These preferences are discussed in a greater detail in the 
subsequent section. The sequential theory of decentralization remains the central analytical framework 
for this research as it enables an analysis of which level’s interests (central or subnational) would 
dominate the decentralization reforms; thus helping explain the extent to which the decentralization 
reforms have actually yielded genuine subnational empowerment. 
The sequential theory of decentralization put forth by Falleti (2010) considers the three main 
forms of decentralization:  
a) Political:  
Constitutional or electoral reforms designed to decentralize political authority to subnational 
actors (regional/provincial and local/provincial), with the intent of enhancing political 
participation and formal subnational political institutions.  
b) Administrative:  
Devolution of service delivery obligations and functions to subnational governments  
c) Fiscal:  
Decentralization of financial resources and discretion over their use to subnational 
governments.  
 
How each of these types of decentralization fares individually and interactively can yield multiple 
degrees of empowerment for the subnational governments. Administrative decentralization can yield 
both positive and negative effects on the degree of subnational empowerment. If the decentralization 
of functions and responsibilities to subnational levels improves subnational administration, fosters skill 
and capacity building of local officials and bureaucracy once delivering expanded functional 
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responsibilities; it could improve the policy implementation and broader public governance. However, 
administrative decentralization alone would be of a limited effect if it is not accompanied by a 
corresponding devolution of fiscal resources and privileges. In the absence of additional fiscal 
resources to meet the enhanced functional responsibilities, the degree of subnational empowerment 
and autonomy would remain limited as the subnational governments would have to rely on the 
superior levels for fiscal transfers to perform the assigned functions. Furthermore, raising the requisite 
finance to deliver on their administrative obligations may also be met by soliciting debt finance for 
which the central government’s sponsorship is required.  
Similarly, fiscal decentralization can also go both ways. The outcome remains largely 
contingent on the ‘design of the fiscal decentralization’ policy (Falletti, 2010). If the fiscal 
decentralization involves handing down of guaranteed (scale and criteria of which is in turn dependent 
on inter-governmental institutional arrangements that take account of regional needs and their 
contributions to the central pool) transfers from the central exchequer, it would enhance the 
subnational autonomy over where they can allocate these resources, or in line with regionally 
responsive policies and priorities. This is also enabled as a result of them not participating in the 
process and costs of mobilizing those fiscal resources through taxes. The downside to decentralization 
of revenue collection or subnational resource mobilization functions is the lack of subnational 
administrative capacities. The revenue base for local/Subregional taxation is limited and to deliver on 
their obligations, the subnational governments have to seek central handouts or revenue transfers. This 
could also bolster inter-regional inequality as the relatively affluent (owing to mineral rents, 
geographical, and/or infrastructural advantages) subnational governments would find it much easier to 
mobilize the fiscal resources even if constrained by the administrative capacities, vis-à-vis other less 
affluent regions. This horizontal imbalance would have to be corrected either by vertical transfers 
(from the central government, which may have absorption conditionalities), or a horizontal 
redistribution mechanism (fiscal transfers from richer regions to poorer regions, which can be highly 
contentious). Of the three types, political decentralization will necessarily have a positive effect on 
empowering the subnational government, primarily because the subnational entities enhance their 
bargaining power in subsequent negotiations over further types of decentralization.  
Politically empowered subnational governments are likely to pressure for higher shares of 
subnational resources, or greater administrative discretion suiting the preferences of their respective 
constituencies. It must be noted that political decentralization transcends mere electoral processes at 
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the subnational level and also pertains to formal institutional support in the form of legal and 
constitutional provisions that support and foster genuine subnational empowerment.  
This sets the grounds for exploring another strand of argument - the nature and content of the 
decentralization reform is dictated at its outset by the territorial interests of its protagonists. This 
argument seeks to identify the social and political actors that form the decentralizing coalitions and 
subsequently classify these actors and the resulting coalitions according to their level (national or 
subnational) and partisan (ruling or opposition) interests. The preferences of the political actors at each 
level with regard to the type of decentralization result in distinct outcomes for subnational 
empowerment and autonomy. A summary of this is presented in Figure 1 below and subsequently 
discussed:  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mapping the Incentives of National and Subnational Actors 
Main Protagonist 
Causal Mechanism 
Self-Reinforcing Reactive 
National Level 
Hypothesized Degree of Change 
National Dominance Path       
(A->F->P)                           
HDC:Low 
Subnational Response Path  
(A->P ->F)                           
HDC:Medium 
Sub-National Level 
Hypothesized Degree of Change 
Subnational Dominance Path 
(P->F->A)                           
HDC:High 
National Response Path      (P-
>A ->F)                           
HDC:Low/Medium 
A: Administrative  Decentralization    F: Fiscal Decentralization       P: Political Decentralization  
Source: Falleti [2004, 2010] 
 
The sequential argument furthers the enquiry that most comparative studies of decentralization 
have not, as their focus remained on the bargaining process at the central level (Eaton, 2008; Garman, 
Haggard, & Willis, 2001; Kaiser, 2006). This research alludes to the incentive dynamics and preferential 
mix developed by Falleti (2010) and employs these as the main analytical framework in the subsequent 
chapters as well as the grounds for selecting the two contexts for case studies.  
As presented in Table 2, both tiers of the state governance, i.e. national and subnational 
(includes both regional/provincial and local/municipal governments), enter the policy discourse with a 
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view to preserve and/or expand their discretion over their specific jurisdictions. The preferences that 
each of the two tiers of the state has, is a function of which form of resources enable them to have a 
greater bargaining power in the post-reform scenario. As per Falleti (2010), central actors place the 
foremost preference on administrative decentralization, followed by fiscal and least preferred being 
political decentralization. The underlying idea is that the central government would choose to devolve 
functions and administrative responsibilities to the subnational levels, and in the event of a subsequent 
round of reform devolve finances to the subnational levels to deliver on their functional obligations. 
The fiscal decentralization is resisted in the primary preference mix because the fiscal instruments are 
used as a bargaining tool to keep the subnational policies consistent with the priorities of the central 
government. Political decentralization is the least preferred sequence to enable the central actors to 
retain greater political control over the subnational governments. 
Looking at the flip side, the subnational preference set, according to Falleti (2010) is Political, 
Fiscal and Administrative. The subnational actors prioritize political decentralization for enhanced 
autonomy and bargaining power in the subsequent reform rounds. Greater political autonomy of 
subnational governments enables them to pursue issues and concerns of their respective territorial 
jurisdictions without any preference articulation, distortion, or credible threat of punitive action(s) 
from the central levels. The secondary preference of the subnational actors remains fiscal 
decentralization as they would demand access to an expanded fiscal pool at their disposal to deliver on 
their mandate, contrary to the ‘finance to follow function’ advocacies. An expanded fiscal pool will 
also enable the subnational governments to be in a better position when choosing which functional 
responsibilities and service delivery obligations to assume, and build up local delivery capacities in 
advance of additional functional allocation. It must also be noted that pursuing access to an expanded 
fiscal pool is not devoid of rent-seeking impulses of the subnational political actors and officials, 
however, this research keeps this consideration extraneous to the current scope of analysis. 
With regard to the dominance and reactive paths as highlighted by the sequential theory, the 
idea is that the tier (national or subnational) whose interests dominate the first round of reforms will 
have implications on the subsequent reforms and the preference articulations of all participating actors. 
The distortive effect of the level dominating the first round of the reform, shall lead to a reactive 
strategy by the one losing whereby the agenda shall be to wither continue articulating its initial 
preference sequence or choose the second best strategy. The dominant tier shall continue to pursue 
same preferential sequence in the subsequent rounds. This is consistent with the ‘ratchet effect’ –
continued support to the initial direction/sequence/modalities of a reform as it remains an incentive 
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maximizing strategy to do so (Huber & Stephens, 2001). Going back to Falleti (2010) framework 
summarized in Figure 1, sub-national preference domination will deliver political decentralization 
reform at first. The resulting enhancement in their bargaining power and greater relative autonomy in 
policy development and implementation shall enable them to pursue access to additional fiscal 
resources (in line with their ordinal reform preferences). The degree of influence that the subnational 
actors will have in defining the scale and modalities of the fiscal decentralization shall also be greater, 
in addition to framing the parameters of administrative (functional) decentralization. The preference 
mix under the Falleti framework for the central actors is the reverse of the subnational mix discussed 
above. The first preference of the central actors is, according to this framework, administrative 
decentralization. The underlying motivations could be that transferring functional responsibilities to 
subnational levels could yield advantages that localized provision yields (e.g. responsiveness, 
effectiveness, etc), as well as the central impulse to devolve functional responsibilities as a conditioning 
mechanism for subsequent fiscal decentralization.  
In a de-facto sense, the central government has the privilege of stipulating or enacting any 
structural and institutional change, regardless of where the roots of the primary reform articulation lie. 
When in addition to this, the central levels also enforce their preference set in the first round of 
reforms, the logical recourse for subnational actors remains the articulation for greater fiscal resources 
to deliver on the functional responsibilities assigned to them in the first round. Thus, the primary 
preference of the subnational agents of gaining greater political autonomy gets relegated to a last 
pursuit. Political decentralization, when instituted, will not be of any substantive benefit for the 
subnational levels since most of their institutional capacities and bargaining power has already been 
tweaked in the preceding reform rounds. However, there is also an element of non-conformity that 
must be considered, whereby a reactive course by the ‘losers’ of the first round of reform would 
continue to articulate its primary preferences instead of situationally imperative compliance with the 
preferences of the ‘winners’ of the first round. Put in the context of the framework, if the central 
interests dominate the first round and administrative decentralization occurs, the subnational reactive 
strategy would not be an adjustment of its preferences in the subsequent round but instead, a 
continuing articulation of their primary preference mix, i.e. Political, Fiscal, and Administrative. 
Contrarily, if the subnational preferences dominate in the first round, the reactive trajectory available 
to the central actors could be one of compliance (as covered above, in the context of subnational 
dominance) or that of non-compliance (continue pursuing its preferences regardless of the outcomes 
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of the first round). Considering the latter, the central actors shall continue articulating their most 
preferred form of decentralization – administrative decentralization. 
Going back to what was earlier discussed as a central privilege; the central agents retain a 
considerably higher degree of leverage in articulating their preferences even if they were not successful 
in the first round of reform. Not deviating from their primary preference set, the central actors will 
articulate for administrative decentralization, so that they can condition the subsequent 
decentralization of the fiscal resources upon the functions devolved to the subnational levels. The 
degree to which it would substantively alter the inter-governmental balance of power would be limited 
at best.  
In the context of this research, the main focus shall be on the distinct dominance paths as they 
necessarily have the greatest effect, to either direction, on subnational empowerment. 
1.2 KEY FOCUS OF ENQUIRIES 
 
Building upon the importance of the stakeholder incentives and the sequential theory of 
decentralization, this research explores two main arguments: 
1. The substantiveness of subnational empowerment is dependent on the form of 
decentralization being pursued and how the reform was sequenced, subject to all incentive 
maximization and preference articulations of the stakeholders involved. The content and 
quality of the overall decentralization reform remains a function of which tier dominates the 
initial articulation for reform. Regardless of the system of government, reform processes that 
follow subnational dominance trajectories have a greater degree of effectiveness and 
sustainability.  
2. The experiences of successful developmental states in East/South East Asia illustrate 
characteristics contrary to those of a decentralized democratic polity. However, 
decentralization reforms can be genuinely conducive and reinforcing to the establishment of a 
‘Democratic Developmental State’.   
1.3 RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING THE CASE STUDIES 
While this research endeavors to draw the connections across multiple contexts globally that 
have undergone some form(s) of decentralization, the overarching focus will be placed on two 
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contexts; Bolivia and Pakistan. The primary reason for the choice of these two contexts is because they 
enable an analysis of the two distinct typologies of subnational and national dominance (in the context 
of the reform sequencing), and how they affect the final outcomes of the reform process. The case of 
Bolivia presents an example of subnational domination in the interest articulation and reform design, 
whereas the case of Pakistan presents the case of dominance of central interests and preference 
articulations.  
Both countries have different state structure, with Bolivia being a Unitary State and Pakistan 
being a Federation. This on one hand enables the broader study of decentralization and its implications 
for democracy and development across two systems of government and state-structure, but at the 
same time enables the analysis of an interesting paradox. The structure of the state in Pakistan has 
been Federal in its form, but unitary in function up until the constitutional reform of 2009 following 
which it has been making leaps towards being federal in function as well. The structure of the Bolivian 
state has been unitary both in form and in function, and continues to be so after the promulgation of 
the new constitution in 2009. However, with the departments getting more autonomy vis-à-vis the 
centre, and a greater space for preference articulation in the decision-making space in the now 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, it is often considered as emerging federation8. This will be examined in 
detail in the relevant chapters.  
Bolivia and Pakistan are comparable countries not just in their political dimensions but also in 
their socio-economic dimensions. Both countries are classified as lower middle income countries by 
the World Bank, with a high but decreasing poverty headcount (as per national poverty lines), a high 
level of inequality (regional, urban-rural and income), and public management inadequacies. Moreover, 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments 9  of the two countries also exhibit comparable 
attributes and trends. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, drawn from the World Development 
Indicators, below:  
 
 
                                                             
8 For details see, Faguet, J.P (2013) Can Subnational Autonomy strengthen Democracy in Bolivia? 
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/05/09/publius.pjt020.full.pdf+html 
9 Based on World Bank – World Development Indicators. CPIA is a rating of countries against a set of 16 criteria 
grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and 
public sector management and institutions. 
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Data Source: WDI 
 
Data Source: WDI 
 
 Both Bolivia and Pakistan have had considerably long periods of authoritarian rules and are at 
relatively nascent stages of democratic consolidation and in pursuit of a stable equilibrium in terms of 
state management and governance following the political and institutional reforms. The 
decentralization reforms, particularly the recent ones, in both the countries have also been rather 
radical yet sustainable in terms of the institutional and constitutional cover that they are accompanied 
with. 
Owing to the economic crises of the 1980’s, and what is referred to as a ‘Lost Decade for Latin 
America’10 waves of decentralization and democratic movements have significantly altered the political 
landscape of Latin America including demands for a greater efficiency, effectiveness and 
                                                             
10 Bértola and Ocampo (2013)  
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responsiveness of the state. These changes in the political space compelled the governments to pursue 
governance reforms and renegotiate the centre-subnational arrangements on issues of taxation, 
revenue-sharing, accountability, discretion, and service delivery. Bolivia also witnessed a similar series 
of transitions. The first main decentralization reform in Bolivia was the 1994 Ley de Participación Popular 
(LPP) or the Law of Popular Participation which was promulgated as a part of the neo-liberal reform 
strategy of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Faguet, 2002). While this reform was massively 
criticized by the opposition and simultaneously lauded by international development agencies, it was 
aimed at incorporating the marginalized indigenous groups into the political and economic 
development processes. 
Before this reform was introduced, Bolivia was amongst the most centralized states of Latin 
America and had no subnational governance structure or institutions in place. The public service 
delivery functions were mainly the discretion of the central government. With the introduction of the 
LPP, there was a significant transformation in the state structure primarily through the establishment 
of subnational governance structures and the assignment of functional responsibilities to the 
subnational level. A radical reform that it was, it involved the decentralization of the some public 
services more suitable for local provision (primary education, health, basic infrastructure, sanitation 
etc) as well as decentralization of 20% of all national tax proceeds to 311 newly created 
municipalities(Faguet, 2002).  
The developmental implications of the decentralization reform were also profound as the 
national public investment patterns witnessed a shift from economic production to human capital 
development, efficiency improvements in public service delivery and capacity enhancement of 
subnational public service delivery systems, and mitigating regional inequalities (Faguet, 2002). In 
addition, the local governance institutions also illustrated a higher degree of responsiveness as 
compared to the central executive in sectors including education, agriculture, water and sanitation, 
health, urban development, and transport (Faguet, 2002).  
The 1990s saw an increasing mobilization of indigenous groups and social movements that 
challenged the status-quo or the ‘coalition of elites’ (in terms of North, 1990) for failing to respond to 
the genuine needs and demands of the citizenry. The LPP was seen as an administrative 
decentralization, and the strong momentum of the indigenous movement at the subnational level all 
through the 1990s continued to articulate the need for greater political and fiscal autonomy. Between 
the years 2000 and 2005, the political climate worsened with massive protests and social mobilization 
which saw the end of tenures of Presidents Lozada (in 2003) and Mesa (in 2005) respectively. In the 
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subsequent round of elections, the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) head Evo 
Morales established himself as the common representative of all the dissenting groups. 
Given the rise of the MAS party from subnational political space to the central level, the main 
political mandate of the new Morales regime was to initiate a process of substantive political change 
that at its outset focused on forging a new constitution and state structure. An important point to note 
here is that the preference and order of decentralization reforms pursued by the MAS government 
were totally reflective of the Subnational Self-reinforcing nature as elucidated in the Sequential Theory, 
primarily because all these preferences were developed and amply articulated by MAS at the 
subnational level before they assumed the national stage.  Therefore, this round of decentralization 
reforms will be considered by this research as following a subnational dominance path. Political 
decentralization was the top of the agenda of the Bolivian decentralization following 2006, with even 
greater pressure coming from the subnational level for greater autonomy11. The subnational political 
space has, since the first election of MAS to the central government in 2005, became the most vibrant 
arena for political contestation and preference articulation.  
The referendum of 2006 was held for greater regional autonomy, against the backdrop of the 
Bolivian Constituent Assembly deliberating over a new model of regional autonomy that was 
subsequently incorporated into the new national constitution in 2009/10. However, even after the 
introduction of the new constitution that involved a substantial relocation of functions and authority 
to the subnational levels, there continues to be a high degree of contestation on the nature and extent 
of regional autonomy, especially in the area of fiscal resource distribution. An ongoing agenda since, is 
the establishment of a fiscal pact that maximizes regional equalities and that distinctly stipulates inter-
governmental revenue sharing mechanisms, particularly the distribution of mineral and hydrocarbon 
rents (envisaged under the Hydrocarbon Nationalization Law). Other contentious agendas include the 
functional responsibilities at each administrative tier, local revenue generation, subnational debt and 
fiscal responsibility. 
Finally, the case analysis of Bolivia affirms the subnational dominance trajectory as a 
subnational dominance path even though the centre remained the protagonist of the initial reform, and 
the consolidation of the decentralization exercise hinges on the fiscal dimensions (in accordance with 
the sequentialism of subnational dominance).  
                                                             
11 Along with issues of land distribution, indigenous rights, distribution and use of hydrocarbons revenue, the 
issue of greater regional autonomy was the key element of this new social contract in Bolivia. 
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The second country of analysis is Pakistan, where the decentralization reforms have been 
significantly different in terms of the trajectory, but similar with the Bolivian case especially in terms of 
negotiated bargains between established political elites12. The main difference being that in case of 
Pakistan, paradoxically most of the decentralization reforms were initiated during autocratic regimes. 
The incentive of the protagonists was the further centralization of powers in the non-representative 
centre, which was also amongst the reasons they were rolled back by the democratically elected 
incumbents. There have been multiple substantive attempts at decentralization in Pakistan since its 
independence in 1947, primarily through the different administrative structures of the government; 
national to provincial, national to local, and provincial to local. While all these three manifestations 
differ with each other, the main similarity between each of them remained in the underlying 
motivation. The first three attempts at governance reform through decentralization had been made by 
a non-representative, autocratic, unelected centre whereas the current reform process (though still in 
evolution) is the first one to be instituted under elected governments. The irony, as stated earlier, 
surrounding the local governance reforms in Pakistan is that the three military regimes directly in 
government for 34 years, have actively pursued decentralization and devolution of power, whereas all 
elected governments have deliberately subdued subnational politics and governance. This paradoxical 
situation between authoritarian and democratic politics in Pakistan, presents an interesting avenue for 
research not only in terms of decentralization and local governance but also in terms of the bargaining 
strategies employed by the ruling elite13.   
The most comprehensive decentralization reform process was the 2001 as it involved changes 
in the “administrative level of decision-making, the accountability of the decision-making authority 
(political or bureaucratic), and the nature and amounts of the available fiscal pool’’ (Cheema, Khawaja 
and Qadir, 2005). This reform was a radical one, under an autocratic regime, and without an adequate 
constitutional cover. It also involved a great deal of decentralization of provincial powers to local 
levels, without any decentralization of the federal powers to the lower tiers. As a consequence, the 
sustainability of these reforms was low despite yielding delivering service delivery improvements and 
empowerment to local governments 14 . In 2008, this arrangement was rolled back following a 
‘democratic transition’ as the Pakistan People’s Party assumed the government. While very important 
                                                             
12 For more on this, see Hussain, A and Hussain, S (2009), Poverty, Power and Local Government in Pakistan. In 
‘Economic Democracy through pro-poor growth’ Wignaraja, Sirivardana, Hussain (eds).  
13 More details can be found in Aslam, G (2010) 
14 Aslam, G. and Yilmaz, S. (2011), Impact of decentralization reforms in Pakistan on service delivery—an 
empirical study. Public Administration and Development  31: 159–171. doi:10.1002/pad.591 
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constitutional changes were passed in 2009 and 2010, primarily dealing with the fiscal and 
administrative decentralization from the centre to the provincial level, the grassroots governance 
infrastructure remained ignored. Currently, there is a massive process of contestation and bargaining 
underway for a revival of the decentralization reforms that empowers the municipalities and follows a 
‘grassroots’ approach. Owing to the inadequate quality of public policy response to the citizen 
demands, the 2013 elections (historical elections as it was the first time a transition between two 
elected governments took place following a completion of mandated tenure) saw the reinvigoration of 
the local governance as one of the popular electoral slogans. However, the electoral slogans actually 
lacked the ‘credible commitment’ attribute and actual local governance elections and structures were not 
established until 2015 and 2016 despite commitments to do so much sooner. The cause of this delay 
was that major political parties were engaged in a process of bargaining to save their respective 
‘support bases’ and secure their positions against any threat of dislodging.  
Finally, the case of Pakistan illustrates the National Dominance Path with the ‘intra-elite 
bargaining’ at the centre (in both representative and non-representative incumbencies) precede the 
citizen interest articulation. As a consequence, the process of reform design and its implementation 
turns out to be a self-reinforcing mechanism that affects not only the institutional evolution, but also 
affects the democratization and developmental indicators.  
Considering the comparability of both these cases, it would also be important to look at their 
transformation experiences across the variables identified by the Bertelsmann Transformation Indices 
for the periods preceding the last rounds of decentralization reforms and trace the progress to 2015.   
Figures 4 and 5 below illustrate the transformation trends exhibited by both Bolivia and Pakistan in the 
areas of Democracy, Economy and Public Management15.   
                                                             
15 Details on the methodology and the variables employed under each of the dimensions can be accessed at 
http://www.bti-project.org/en/index/methodology/ 
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Figure 4: Transformation Trends Pakistan 
              
Figure 5: Transformation Trends Bolivia 
Source: Compiled and generated from the Bertelsmann Transformation Indices 2016  
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Reviewing the transformation trends across both the countries, it can be seen that they have 
been more favorable for Bolivia than for Pakistan especially in the realms of Democracy and 
Management Performance. While the factors contributing to these will be discussed in a greater detail 
in the relevant chapters, this can be considered as a support to the main argument made in the 
preceding section. Finally, the choice of these two contexts is also rooted in my own first-hand 
exposure to them, and to an extent that allows a more in-depth and contextually specific analysis.  
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This research has engaged in a mixed-method approach in identifying and developing the main 
research arguments, data collection and interpretation. This has included an extensive review of 
secondary literature, databases, reports and journal articles. Most of the primary research was carried 
out in the form of interviews and in depth unstructured interviews with various thematic experts as 
well as country experts which was aimed at validating the questions identified and getting an insight 
into the context specific dynamics that would otherwise be difficult to generate from the secondary 
sources detailed earlier. These included respondents that have served in research and international 
organizations monitoring and advising on these reforms, officials of Ministries and Task Forces of the 
two countries chosen for case studies, various independent experts and members of the civil societies 
from both the countries16.  Owing to the nature of the solicited inputs, questionnaires and written 
responses to the enquiries could not be sought primarily because of attribution concerns of those 
interviewed. 
In terms of formal research methodology, and given the scope of the enquiry finding a single 
model or approach that could offer the purpose of explaining the complexities involved in interest 
articulation, empirical analysis, and a tenable explanation for the events and mechanisms of relevance 
was difficult. Following on some of the related works notably Falleti (2010) and Eaton et al (2010), two 
mutually reinforcing frameworks were identified to operationalize the research questions and guide the 
analysis. The Political Economy Framework (Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke, 2010) was used to identify the 
types of incentives that political stakeholders face in the design and implementation of decentralization 
reforms. The framework presented in the Sequential Theory of Decentralization (Faletti, 2010) enabled 
                                                             
16 Of particular importance was my research mobility at the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Geneva where I had a chance to work on a project that dealt with the Politics of Domestic 
Resource Mobilization and another one that dealt with financing social policies in developing countries. By 
virtue of this engagement, I had the opportunity to interact and solicit inputs from some of the key actors in the 
decentralization reforms in Bolivia and other thematic experts.  
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a structured approach to distinguish between subnational and national level incentives and preference 
mix. Given these mutually reinforcing analytical frameworks, looking at the sequential aspects of 
decentralization and their impact on the reform outcome required the use of an in-depth review of 
secondary literature, online articles, policy reviews and news items to trace the processes, analyze the 
context and identify mechanisms that led to the outcomes or the stage of the reforms in each country 
chosen for analysis (Falleti & Lynch, 2009; James Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2000). The process 
tracing technique implicit in the broader sequential analysis methodology enables the reconciliation of 
the theoretical constructs on incentive maximization, interest articulation and bargaining, with the 
actual stages of the reform and the associated causal mechanisms. Identification of causal factors 
within each reform context was also enabled by tracing the processes involved in the prelude and the 
rollout of the reforms and help explain the ‘sources of variance in the outcomes of interest’ 
(Blanchard, 2011). Proceeding with the context analysis by reviewing each reform stage and the 
corresponding interests of the participating actors, enables the identification of the ‘winners’ of each 
round of reform and how the outcomes of one round affect the subsequent ones. In the detailed 
contextual analysis, the relatively temporally stretched structural and institutional constraints that shape 
the contents of decentralization policies (e.g. those derived from the distinct historical evolutions of 
the political system in Bolivia, or the patronage politics in Pakistan) are also brought under 
consideration. Furthermore, the comparative sequential methodology also offers a reconciled 
explanation of the ‘macro-social comparative historical discourse’ with the relatively micro-oriented 
process, which is a potent tool of analysis for the kind of enquiry this research seeks to embark upon.  
While the historical context and the distinct dynamics are influential in developing an 
explaining the reforms and the associated processes, there was also a need to identify a theoretically 
grounded interpretive tool which could help in explaining a sustainable institutionalization of 
decentralization reforms in the presence of an impulse of the involved stakeholders in maximizing 
their divergent interests. To this effect, using a game theoretical model to explain the interaction and 
bargaining of the stakeholders to rationally maximize their own interests when framing the subsequent 
course of the reform, was employed.  This is of particular importance in analyzing the impulses of 
national and the subnational actors for power acquisition/retrenchment (James Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2000; Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 2004).  
One of the game-theoretical models applied here follows Aslam (2010), where a bargaining 
process was postulated as a way of ensuring regime survival by a dictator. However, its application here 
differs from that in Aslam (2010) as it is not about a dictator and citizens, but between the centre and 
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the subnational agents. This model can also incorporate bargaining practices, particularly cooptation 
and consociational bargaining, either by the CG or at a lateral level amongst the regions to enhance 
their collective bargaining. It is presented as follows:  
 
Model 1: Basic Bargaining Dynamics between National and Subnational Political Agents 
 
This model presents a basic dictatorship game to analyse the incentives and interest articulation 
processes underlying decentralization reforms. An analytical proxy of a ‘dictator’ shall be applied to the 
‘status-quo’ preceding the reform at t=0. The objective is to frame the analysis operating on Schelling’s 
idea of free activity in a strategic interaction context; the dynamics of “bargaining, of arriving at 
understandings and misunderstandings, for accommodation and co-operation and for conjectures 
about each other’s decision processes, value systems and information” (Schelling, 1961). Following on 
Aslam (2010), the analytical focus is on how the surplus is divided, what strategies are employed to 
secure preferred outcomes, critical factors behind their bargaining power and the exogenous factors 
that have a bearing on the outcome.  
In particular, the strategies analyzed and linked to the design and implementation of 
decentralization reforms would be; a) changing opponent’s payoffs (co-optation), b) explicit signaling 
by a participant to signal credible intent about the future action, and c) ‘brinkmanship’/ repression 
strategies (Aslam, 2010)17. The basic setup of the game is as follows:  
• A group of regions yield a total product, a proportion of which is taxed by the Central 
Government who exercises full discretion over its use for redistribution or retention. In the 
status quo the tax rate is 0 < 𝑇 < 1. 
• The total income generated for this tax rate is 𝑌.  
• The total tax revenue that the CG receives equals 𝑇𝑌, while the disposable income of the 
regions collectively is 𝑌(1 − T).    
                                                             
17 More detailed version of this model can be seen in Aslam, G., Dictatorship as a Bargaining Process. George 
Mason University Doctoral Student Working Paper Series: 
(https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0ahUKEwjI3-
r4md7JAhVDuhQKHcj5CMMQFgg9MAY&url=http%3A%2F%2Febot.gmu.edu%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F192
0%2F5697%2FAslam_Dictatorship%2520Paper%2520Feb%25202010.doc%3Fsequence%3D1%26isAllowed
%3Dy&usg=AFQjCNHCaUbSfkq22BoCtYBdKtp7kkwozg&sig2=gU2XnKVfWeUc0jv_FfHoSw&cad=rja) 
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• In each period, the CG has two strategies. It either maintains the status quo, which means that 
the tax rate does not change or it can retaliate by increasing the tax rate to T𝑛𝑝 so that T𝑛𝑝 >
𝑇.    
• For the tax rate T𝑛𝑝, the income generated is Y𝑛𝑝 and the disposable surplus/income of the 
regions is Y𝑛𝑝(1 − T𝑛𝑝 ).  
 
From the perspective of the regions, they have two strategies. They can either concede to the 
tax rate proposed by the CG or they can retaliate and demand for T𝑝 such that  
0<T𝑝 < 𝑇 < T𝑛𝑝 < 1. 
The total income generated for this tax rate is Y𝑝. At all times, the cost of retaliation of the 
regions is µ, where 0 < 𝜇 < 1 , whereas the cost of increasing T for the CG is r where 0<r<1 A one 
off game would play out as follows:  
    Central Government  
 
 Increases T              Maintains Status-quo 
 
 
  
 
               Retaliate   Concede  Retaliate      Concede 
      𝑇𝑝𝑌𝑝 − 𝑟, 𝑌𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑝) − 𝜇         𝑇𝑛𝑝𝑌𝑛𝑝 − 𝑟, 𝑌𝑛𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑛𝑝) − 𝜇     𝑇𝑝𝑌𝑝, 𝑌𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑝) − 𝜇            𝑇𝑌, 𝑌(1 − 𝑇) 
 
Based on the costs of repression by the CG and the costs of retaliation by the regions, the 
threat of retaliation shall persist as long as the following inequalities hold:  
i. 𝜇 < 𝑌𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑝) −  𝑌𝑛𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑛𝑝)     
ii. 𝑌𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑝) − 𝜇 >  𝑌𝑛𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑛𝑝)      
iii.  𝜇 < 𝑌𝑝(1 − 𝑇𝑝) −  𝑌(1 − 𝑇)  
iv. 𝑟 < 𝑇𝑛𝑝𝑌𝑛𝑝 − 𝑇𝑌 
The regions will only retaliate if the cost of retaliation is less than the loss in their collective 
share of the surplus when a higher tax is imposed by the CG. Similarly, the CG would continue to 
Regions 
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retaliate until the point as long as the cost of repression is less than the additional income made from 
imposing higher taxes.    
In order to bring in bargaining into this model, lets assume that every region has its own share 
of contribution to the total disposable income individually given by  ∅(𝑌 − 𝑌𝑇) where 0 < ∅ < 1. In 
the previous setup, it was assumed that at t=0, all regions operate collectively and no contestation over 
individual shares exists. However, if there is a disparate contribution of the regions to the collective 
output yield Y, then there are different constraints that face individual regions in their bargaining 
processes with the CG. The higher the ∅, the greater would be the bargaining power with the CG as 
the potential increase in surplus due to favorable bargaining results would still be higher than the cost 
of retaliation 𝜇. 
This model will be subsequently developed in a greater, more specific detail in the case studies 
to illustrate the different bargaining scenarios and interest articulation by the CG or the regions within 
the chosen cases.  
Finally, the sources for statistical data and other quantitative ratings are predominantly 
secondary and includes World Development Indicators, IMF Article IVs, World Governance 
Indicators (WGI), Polity IV, Bertelsmann Transformation Index and national social and economic 
surveys. The modalities and parameters of their usage will be explained once and where employed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTALISM 
 
2.1 GOVERNANCE, STATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM: AN OVERVIEW  
 
Public sector reform, and more importantly, governance reform in developing economies has 
been a dominant agenda item in the global development narrative. The existence and persistence of 
dysfunctional and ineffective public institutions coupled with weak governance mechanisms have been 
the main constraints to socio-economic development in developing contexts. During the 1980s-1990s, 
international donors and development agencies witnessed the failure of potentially high benefit 
projects in poor policy environments which in turn were a product of inadequate public institutional 
effectiveness and poor public governance (World Bank, 2000). Thus, fostering effective, efficient, 
responsive and accountable public institutions is arguably the main challenge for making any inroads 
into sustained socioeconomic development. 
Globally, the public sectors witnessed a significant expansion (albeit to varying extents) 
between 1945 to 1980s despite the plurality of economic structures and development stages. With 
increased global integration, economic growth and varying levels of socio-political modernization, the 
conventional role of the state in the socio-economic and political management became more complex. 
In a way, the growth in the public sector was also motivated by the conceived benchmarks of the 
nature of the society that the governments envisaged. For example, post 1945 the commitment of the 
OECD countries (European countries in particular) to welfare regimes and macroeconomic stability 
paved a way for the acceptance of the state as a central institution for income redistribution, support to 
vulnerable groups and a stimulant for aggregate demand (World Bank, 2008). The developing countries 
followed a similar suit, many of them emerging after the decolonization and nationalist movements, in 
their efforts to promote social cohesion and establishing growth trajectories. The emergence of 
parastatals (especially in Africa) in the realm of poverty alleviation, health service delivery and other 
public service delivery sectors, was also witnessed owing to the absence of requisite incentives for 
private enterprise in the provision of these services and engagement in the preferred sectors of the 
economy. 
The notions of participation, accountability, representation and responsiveness remained 
secondary concerns in most countries for a major part of the 20th century, with the exception of some 
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states where democratic norms and market structures were already well developed. The major 
transformation in the understanding of the role of the state occurred in the 1980s and 1990s especially 
in the developing countries, that put forth an alternative view of creating a ‘market-friendly, 
transnational, decentralized, citizen oriented and democratic state’ (World Bank, 2008). Dichotomous 
imperatives subsequently came to surface where the concerns included efficient use of economic 
resources, making economic structures and institutional mechanisms more conducive to markets, on 
one hand, and notions of public accountability, representation, equity and responsive service delivery, 
on the other. 
Not disavowing the importance of the technical dimensions of reform design, ensuring suitable 
institutionalization and maximizing public welfare requires a ‘factoring in’ of the pressures the reform 
brings upon those tasked with public service delivery and those administering them. In order to foster 
a ‘stakeholder’ spirit amongst the citizenry, the issues of representation and accountability at national 
and subnational levels are critically important. In ‘principal agent’ theory terms, the result of accountable 
and representative structures will be that the principal (citizens) will be effectively empowered to 
reward or penalize the agent (the government and state institutions) by revealing their preferences 
either through fiscal cooperation or through electoral mechanisms. This chapter aims to provide an 
overview of the broader public sector reform narrative, how the role of the state can be reconfigured 
to yield development conducive outcomes, the notion of developmental state and its interplay with 
democratization, and finally how decentralization reforms can be designed such that the democratic 
developmentalism can be instituted for a broad-based inclusive process of development. 
While the preceding chapter covered the centrality of political processes to decentralization, 
this section outlines their role in the broader public sector reform processes (which include, but are not 
limited to, decentralization). Public sector reforms (hereon referred to as PSR), shall be of limited 
utility and effectiveness if the political actors (agents) and the broader citizenry (principal) have not 
established a clear framework for the distribution of public authority and power to achieve a ‘minimum 
consensus’ on the public policies. This is most pertinent in cases where there is either a high level of 
contestation or/and a related yet distinct aspect of regime instability918. Instituting these reforms in 
such contexts makes them more of an imposition or a technocratic exercise rather than an organic and 
                                                             
18 Most of the developing economies are also faced with either transitionary or limited democracy, which is 
most often rooted in the ‘limited access social order’ or an at best, procedural nature of democracy. When 
coupled with ethnic plurality, disparate socio-economic development or endemic poverty, an inference about 
the extent of contestation (even if it is latent because of inadequate articulation mechanisms) can be made. An 
elaborate account of this limited democracy can be found in Robinson and White, 1998. 
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deliberative process. As a consequence, the sustainability of the reform is questionable in the wake of 
opposition, rollback in case of regime change, or implementation inconsistencies. 
Public sector reforms can be diverse in terms of forms, however, the common objective 
remains improving public sector effectiveness and efficiency, accountability to the citizenry, and 
broader macroeconomic stability. Reforms geared towards the capacity enhancement of state and state 
institutions mandated for Public Service Delivery (PSD) remain largely a concern for the developing 
economies primarily due to donor advocacy across Latin America, South Asia and Africa. The main 
purview of such reforms is enhancing the technical capabilities of the bureaucracy in terms of serviced 
delivery design and delivery, managing recurrent public expenditure and remunerative reforms. PSR 
dedicated to enhancing public accountability are geared towards participatory and transparent public 
policy and service delivery. Such reforms also consider issues related to political (and hence, 
parliamentary/legislative) plurality, independent media, social mobilization and independent judicial 
systems. In contexts that are multi-ethnic or where state cohesiveness is weak, such governance 
reforms are also geared towards promoting greater plurality and equitable participation in the central 
institutions of the government or the distribution of authority to lower levels of the government 
through decentralization reforms. As covered in the prior chapter, decentralization in itself is targeted 
at pluralizing political space and preventing power consolidation, and the reforms have predominantly 
been undertaken at the behest of the donor agencies.  
The Narrative on State-led Development 
From 1950s to the mid of 1980s, most developing countries followed a state intensive 
development policy. As a result, there was an expansion in the size and mandate of the public sector 
whereby state policy encouraged private investment while also engaging in the sectors that held limited 
incentive for private sector operations. Success thereof, remained constrained (in the developing 
economies in particular) by the limited state capacity. The question that arises is what does ‘state 
capacity’ connote? A review of literature reveals the subjective nature of this concept, however there 
are common denominators across most definitions of state capacity, that include the ability of the state 
to rectify market failures, domestic resource mobilization, effective and efficient absorption of state 
resources to productive sectors, develop conducive institutional and enforcement mechanisms, higher 
social cohesiveness, stable fiscal management, and deliver public services and social benefit 
programmes (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999; Fukuyama, 2004; Huang, 2008a; Leibfried & Zürn, 
2005). Other attributes have also been provided, albeit with less consensus, one that is most relevant to 
the purview of this research is the ability of the state to extend its writ across the territory; negotiate, 
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enforce and credibly commit to political settlements with (sub) national actors in the subnational arena, 
all the while creating a developmentally oriented public policy and welfare enhancing public 
institutional framework.  
However, these settlements may vary across contexts primarily depending on the nature of the 
political setup; democratic or autocratic19. The state led growth and development model, drew its 
criticism not only from the dominant assertions of the Neo-classical framework but more on the 
structural and institutional capacity of the states to act as agents of development in the developing 
contexts. While there is a considerable thematic breadth in the literature on public sector reforms and 
role of the state in particular, this section shall engage with two of the recurrent themes. The broader 
notions overlap but given the heterogeneity of experience in diverse regional contexts, there is a 
corresponding plurality in the theoretical positions that have emerged. The first one emanates from the 
international development assistance across the global spectrum during the 1950s and 1960s, whereby 
the role of the public administration was considered to be of limited utility in growth and development 
(Eaton, 2008; Ferguson, 1990).  
The main argument in this case was based on the role of the public sector institutions and 
bureaucracies being engaged with stable incremental reforms and stability rather than pursuing deeper 
structural reforms hence being anti-developmental and inhibitive to private entrepreneurial activity. 
Another argument extolled the fallacy of ‘rational bureaucracy’ as the bureaucratic service was 
considered subservient and aligned to particular vested interests that were contextually unique. The 
second one has been rooted mainly in the experience of developing countries, primarily across Sub 
Saharan Africa and Asia, arguing that where the state institutional structures are ‘weak’, state has low 
legitimacy and laden with patriarchal political norms; the capacity of policy enforcement and 
sustainable reform remains limited. These attributes were considered typical of contexts with autocratic 
political regimes, lack of social cohesion and an exploitative policy framework. 
 
Structural Adjustment and the role of state under Neoliberalism 
Towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, an international recession in the 
backdrop fueled further by the Latin American debt crisis and exploitative autocratic regimes in Africa, 
promoted the skepticism of the developmental narrative as well as the role of the state. As a 
consequence, two dominant ways of thinking came into the narrative; the Developmentalism in newly 
industrializing states in Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, China, South Korea), and neoliberalism 
                                                             
19 The nature of political setup is not defined in binary terms but implies a spectrum that lies between the two. 
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championed by the US and the UK amongst others. The East Asian developmental policy illustrated a 
significant departure from the narrative of the radical leftist thinking, by showing that developing 
economies at the lower end of the income quintiles could manage sustainable inclusive growth without 
disengaging from the international economy. This developmental policy was also a significant 
departure from the neoclassical narrative that extolled the inhibitive nature of state activity on 
economic growth and development. The developmental model put forth by the East Asian economies 
was characterized by a state led institutional framework that had necessary functional authority, 
responsiveness and capacity to steer market development. This approach is cited in the literature as a 
‘governed market’ (Wade, 1990). In another addition to the development policy narrative, it was argued 
that such a framework may be of good utility in managing relatively closed economies it cannot be 
sustained in a context of ‘global liberalization of financial and capital markets’ (Flynn, 2007a). This 
argument was further substantiated with the East Asian financial crisis in the later part of the 1990s 
that was caused primarily by the instability of capital flows. 
The consistent critique of the state led development model was that in the absence of certain 
requisites of state capacity and context specific conditions, there existed a latent tendency of the state 
to become ‘predatory’; rent-seeking, patrimonial, and fostering a limited access order. However, the 
neo-liberal paradigm harbored a greater skepticism of the state capacity to actively pursue a 
developmental policy under any circumstances (Friedman, 1993; Friedman & Friedman, 1962; 
Leibfried & Zürn, 2005). The main impetus for the neoliberal resurgence found its roots in the oil 
crisis of the 1970s occurring in the developed economies like the UK and the USA before being 
mainstreamed into the global development narrative 20 . The United Kingdom was in effect the 
protagonist of implementing neoliberal reforms when it undertook its structural adjustment program 
as part of a financing agreement with the International Monetary Fund, after consistently posting low 
investment rate and, fiscal and trade deficits. Under this SAP, the UK government had to slash public 
expenditure and divest its stake in the Public Sector Enterprises to regain fiscal space, while also 
enacting a floating exchange rate regime and a contractionary monetary policy. These strategies then 
evolved into the standard SAP policy milieu that was subsequently applied across the globe including 
                                                             
20 The United Kingdom was in effect the protagonist of implementing neoliberal reforms when it undertook its 
structural adjustment program as part of a financing agreement with the International Monetary Fund, after 
consistently posting low investment rate and, fiscal and trade deficits. Under this SAP, the UK government had 
to slash public expenditure and divest its stake in the Public Sector Enterprises to regain fiscal space, while also 
enacting a floating exchange rate regime and a contractionary monetary policy. These strategies then evolved 
into the standard SAP policy milieu that was subsequently applied across the globe including mainly the 
developing economies and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Source: Grindle (2004) 
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mainly the developing economies and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The imperatives 
of the economic liberalization led many of the developing economies into macroeconomic imbalances 
primarily in terms of inflation, debt management, fiscal and trade balances. In order to deal with these 
imbalances, they had to solicit IFI support for which the World Bank and the IMF were the primary 
resort. The policy mix pushed through as part of these financing and stabilization programs included 
fiscal austerity, divesting public stake through privatization of PSEs, and broader structural adjustment 
and economic liberalization. 
This advocated policy milieu was also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’21. A few common 
denominators can be identified with public sector reforms and structural adjustment in developing 
contexts. The first among these is the question of ownership which deals with the protagonists and 
executors of the reform process. In the case of advanced economies of the developed world (mainly 
the high income OECD countries), the reform processes were tailored and phased consistent to the 
local imperatives and compliance of the local constituencies. In the case of the developing countries, 
the adjustment and sectoral reforms has been a product of donor agendas thereby limiting their 
legitimacy and sustainability in the absence of corresponding mandates. The PSR agenda consisted, 
more or less, a uniform agenda that involved withdrawal of the state through privatization, divestment 
and functional readjustment mechanisms.  
Given the widely divergent outcomes of the economic liberalization, primarily from the PSR 
viewpoint, the international reform agenda witnessed significant modifications in the later part of the 
1990s which are still ongoing, to focus simultaneously on seemingly opposing pursuits of poverty 
alleviation and efficiency, and building state capacity while also fostering market development. The 
objective of this realignment of the development narrative was initially brought on in the form of 
augmented policy frameworks that squared on the enactment of social safety and support mechanisms 
for the groups adversely affected by the liberalization reforms. By the end of the 90s, an explicit focus 
on the poverty alleviation (at least in the context of (HIPCs) led the donor assistance and the 
supported governments to coordinate the development policy through agreed international 
development targets, like the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, as well as 
comprehensive development frameworks. These comprehensive development frameworks included 
the oft cited imperatives of securing development assistance such as the country specific ‘Poverty 
                                                             
21 Based on review and notes from World , B. (2008). Development Economics through the Decades. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
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Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs), that were nationally devised comprehensive development strategy 
papers that gave the borrowing economies some degree of ownership over the economic policy.  
The main departure from the neo-liberal paradigm in the international development policy 
narrative came in the form of recognition from the IFIs that market development and poverty 
alleviation depended on effective and capable states. The World Bank articulated this change in the 
policy narrative first in the 1997 World Development Report titled ‘State in a Changing World’, stating 
that ‘State-dominated development has failed, but so will stateless development’ (Bank, World 
Development Report 1997 : The State in a Changing World, 1997). This was subsequently reiterated 
thematically in the subsequent reports by the World Bank in 2000, 2001 and 2004.   
The new development agenda from 2000 onwards, especially in the aftermath of the Monterrey 
Consensus 2002 reinvigorated the role of state in the development policy narrative22. In the Section II 
(A) of the Monterrey Communique, Paras 10-16 detail the imperatives of state activity that span 
governance reforms, public policy formulation that is growth stimulating and redistributive, and a 
reform of public service delivery on grounds of efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness (See Box 
1). State operations in the economy can be detrimental and inhibitive to economic development 
(through markets), nevertheless the state has a critically important role to play in the process of 
economic development and structural transformations. In some contexts, especially in South Asia and 
Sub Saharan Africa, the lack of economic development and erratic growth patterns can also be 
attributed to the inhibited government capacity to formulate policy, perform basic administrative 
functions, synergize with private and semi-public sectors, and ensuring the provision of basic physical 
infrastructure and public services. This is what is also known as the ‘too much state and too little state’ 
dichotomy (George, 1999).  
Under the fold of the ‘Good Governance’ narrative that emerged as an influential subset of the 
new development paradigm in the 2000s, a major departure from the narrative of two decades of 
reducing the role of the government occurred that highlighted the importance of strengthening the 
governments. This can be attributed mainly as a consequence of the failure of the Structural 
Adjustment regime under the broader neoliberal agenda. While the first half of these structural 
liberalization reforms during the 1980s and the greater part of the 1990s were articulated, designed and 
                                                             
22 Representatives of all countries of the world gathered in Monterrey, Mexico, on 21 and 22 March 2002, 
with resolve to address the challenges of financing for development around the world, particularly in 
developing countries. The objective was primarily to evaluate the demand and supply of financial resources 
to pursue the globally agreed development goals of poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and 
economic development, and fostering an inclusive and equitable global economic system. 
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implemented by a ‘technocratic élite’, the second round that began in the later part of the 1990s and 
continues till now gave a lot more attention to the transformation of institutions that structure political 
and economic activities in the reformed context (Bank, 2005; Chatterjee, 2004). The premise of this 
stance was on creating an institutional framework that ensured rule of law, safeguarding property 
rights, mitigate adverse exploitation and corruption, and enhancing regulatory quality(North, 1990). 
These policies also led to the development of the ‘good governance’ agenda that dominated much of 
the policy reform advocacy since the mid-1990s onwards. 
Box 1 : Section II (A) Monterrey Consensus Communique - United Nations 2003
23 
10. In our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to 
ensure the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private, sustaining 
adequate levels of productive investment and increasing human capacity. A crucial task is to enhance the efficacy, 
coherence and consistency of macroeconomic policies. An enabling domestic environment is vital for mobilizing 
domestic resources, increasing productivity, reducing capital flight, encouraging the private sector, and attracting 
and making effective use of international investment and assistance. Efforts to create such an environment should 
be supported by the international community. 
 
11. Good governance is essential for sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid democratic 
institutions responsive to the needs of the people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic 
growth, poverty eradication and employment creation. Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for 
human rights, including the right to development, and the rule of law, gender equality, market-oriented policies, and 
an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing. 
 
12. We will pursue appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks at our respective national levels and in a manner 
consistent with national laws to encourage public and private initiatives, including at the local level, and foster a 
dynamic and well-functioning business sector, while improving income growth and distribution, raising productivity, 
empowering women and protecting labour rights and the environment. We recognize that the appropriate role of 
government in market-oriented economies will vary from country to country. 
 
13. Fighting corruption at all levels is a priority. Corruption is a serious barrier to effective resource mobilization and 
allocation, and diverts resources away from activities that are vital for poverty eradication and economic and 
sustainable development.  
 
14. We recognize the need to pursue sound macroeconomic policies aimed at sustaining high rates of economic 
growth, full employment, poverty eradication, price stability and sustainable fiscal and external balances to ensure 
that the benefits of growth reach all people, especially the poor. Governments should attach priority to avoiding 
inflationary distortions and abrupt economic fluctuations that negatively affect income distribution and resource 
allocation. Along with prudent fiscal and monetary policies, an appropriate exchange rate regime is required. 
 
15. An effective, efficient, transparent and accountable system for mobilizing public resources and managing their 
use by Governments is essential. We recognize the need to secure fiscal sustainability, along with equitable and 
efficient tax systems and administration, as well as improvements in public spending that do not crowd out 
productive private investment. We also recognize the contribution that medium-term fiscal frameworks can make in 
that respect. 
                                                             
23 Excerpt taken verbatim from the Monterrey Communique 2003 
Source: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf 
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16. Investments in basic economic and social infrastructure, social services and social protection, including 
education, health, nutrition, shelter and social security programmes, which take special care of children and older 
persons and are gender sensitive and fully inclusive of the rural sector and all disadvantaged communities, are vital 
for enabling people, especially people living in poverty, to better adapt to and benefit from changing economic 
conditions and opportunities. Active labour market policies, including worker training, can help to increase 
employment and improve working conditions. The coverage and scope of social protection needs to be further 
strengthened. Economic crises also underscore the importance of effective social safety nets. 
 
While this new paradigm greatly downplayed the anti-statist approach of the liberalization and 
structural adjustment agenda, it did however lead to a spillover of the liberalism agenda into the 
process of governance. The preceding agenda was dominated by the reversal of government/public 
sector growth, liberalizing the regulatory frameworks and divesting state stakes in enterprises, this new 
development paradigm considers liberalization of governance, including public sector management and 
public service delivery. Intertwined with the broader notion of ‘good governance’ was a new 
approach to public sector reforms, mainly managerial reforms that promoted market principles in 
governance of the public sector, known as the ‘New Public Management’. The main premise of the 
NPM is to revisit public administration frameworks characterized by centralized procurement, 
provisioning and policy formulation, in favor of more decentralized, responsive management. These 
reforms can be considered as ‘market enhancing governance reforms’, given their accountability, 
efficiency and participation enhancing attributes, they cannot necessarily yield sustained growth or 
improvement in the state capacity to produce equitable socio-economic results. However, if we 
evaluate the growth and welfare strategies that were adapted as part of the growth and welfare 
enhancing strategies adapted by the early industrializers as well as the successful developmental 
regimes, their public management approaches were significantly different.   
While this chapter shall engage in a greater detail with the notion of developmentalism, 
NPM and decentralization in the subsequent sections, the constructs find their base in the following 
assertions: 
a) The contexts that have been successful in managing a high growth trajectory along with a 
structural change did not have the requisite capacity at the outset of the reform process. This 
capacity building process is organic and temporal; 
b) Coercive recourses are insufficient in building effective state capacity even where the nature of 
the political system is authoritarian, apart from being unsustainable. Building state capacity in 
this course deems imperative the state’s ability to deliver broad-based and efficient, effective 
and responsive services; 
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c) Enhancing DRM in order to foster greater policy autonomy by the developing countries in 
establishing development targets and the modalities to achieve them, foster greater 
accountability and responsiveness, and (re)align the strategies of economic and social 
stakeholders with the national development agendas; 
Section 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter analyze the notion of a developmental state, its imperatives and 
nexus with democratization in the establishment of a democratic developmental state. These sections 
while outlying the theoretical constructs also engage in analyzing the experiences of the highly 
successful and less successful states in three main capacity realms: political, domestic resource 
mobilization, and allocative and enforcement. Section 5 examines the prospects of the compatibility of 
decentralization reforms with the establishment of a democratic developmental state.  
2.2 CONCEPTUALIZING A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE  
As the preceding section has exhibited, there is significant ongoing contestation about the 
ambit of the state and the way it is structured. The debate on the scope of state authority finds itself 
oscillating between two extremes – the minimalist one that requires the state to limit its action to a 
limited set of functions that cannot be performed by any other entity but the state, and the other view 
places argues for the state taking a lead role in improving the economic and social development of its 
citizens. This research engages with the latter end and its overarching focus remains on fostering a 
democratic developmental state, of which decentralization is an important requisite. This section puts 
forward a conceptualization of the developmental state and its interplay with democracy, the notion of 
good governance, and the attributes essential for the creation of a democratic developmental state.  
The notion of a democratic developmental state has been considered as ‘a rare bird on the 
developmental scene’ (Robinson & White, 1998), which leads to the arguments of incompatibility of 
developmentalism and democracy. The arguments against the notion of a Democratic Developmental 
state extol the mutual incompatibility of the key features of the individual constructs of democracy and 
Developmentalism; e.g. autonomy of policy making is critical to developmental policy and 
accountability is a critical requirement of democratic norms, but under a DDS making the policy 
framework accountable may compromise the autonomy of developing one. For the sake of a cogent 
analysis, it would be best to examine the concepts of developmentalism and its democratic variant 
independently before analyzing the connection points. The notion of democratic developmental state 
will be discussed in exclusive detail in Section IV, and this section and the subsequent one shall engage 
with the concepts, requisites and experiences of developmentalism. 
46 
 
Developmental state has, like decentralization, enjoys a significant heterogeneity in its 
conceptualizations. One definition considers a developmental state as one that: 
 
‘..puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design 
effective (policy) instruments to promote such a goal’ (Bagchi, 2000). 
 
Bagchi’s conceptualization as a broad definition does justice, but in terms of the attributes a 
developmental state eschews, Leftwich argues that a developmental state: 
 
‘concentrates sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and 
promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a 
varying combination of both’ (Leftwich, 1996). 
 
The pioneering conceptualization of a developmental state was presented by Johnson (1982) in his 
analysis of the rise of industrial Japan. The main premise of his arguments therein was that the 
Japanese success in catching up with the West in terms of its technological endowment as well as the 
economic wealth was rooted in a strong, capable and merit oriented state bureaucracy coupled with the 
state’s policies on export promotion, policy consistency regardless of the change in the government 
incumbency, domestic growth orientation and a strategically oriented industrial coordination policy 
where the state acted as a guiding and coordinating agency. The Japanese policy framework, at least in 
principle, was subsequently adopted by most of the South East Asian economies whose sustained 
growth and industrial advancement was attributed to the developmental stance of their respective 
governments and the establishment of a developmental public institutional framework (Ayres & Freire, 
2012; Ferguson, 1990; Joshi, 2012; Robinson & White, 1998; Wylde, 2012). The DS model has had 
limited success in being a mainstream strategy in the international economic policy narrative, primarily 
because of the dominance of the neoliberalism as the core model of economic organization and 
development for the 21st century (Lee & Han, 2006; Stubbs, 2009). Owing to this dominance, an 
argument can also be made that in the context of developing countries where domestic resource 
mobilization and the fiscal resource pools are strained, there is a reliance on donor or international 
bilateral assistance to bridge the resource gaps and since the donor policy mix acts in consistency with 
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the neoliberal paradigm, the scope for establishing a DS in such contexts can be a daunting task. While 
this argument is quite valid, a contrasting argument can be made on the grounds of ‘agency’.  
Even though the exigencies of the international strategic and economic order may pose a structural 
constraint to the policy choices imperative for a developmental path, the implementing agencies in the 
local context (primarily the government and the political elites in the domestic sphere) continue to 
command a high degree of autonomy that can also be used to pursue a developmental trajectory as a 
key prerogative (Burki et al., 1999; Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Fukuyama, 2004). Another feature of a 
developmental state has been the ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state and the primacy of strategically 
oriented targeted intervention of the state (Evans P., 1995). In Evans’ (2012) view the notion of 
embeddedness implies that the governments or the state authorities cannot venture into economic 
matters without incorporating the information obtained from the non-government actors in that 
particular polity. The notion of autonomy implies the independence or non-reliance of the state on 
private interests in the undertaking of any economic policy. Considering these two constructs together 
highlights legitimacy aspects and the integration of the populace in the public policy-making that keeps 
the broader interests of the constituents in mind instead of being held hostage to narrower private 
incentives of a select few. An associated attribute of a DS is the state’s ability to regulate agencies 
(private or in some cases public) that do not conform to the imperatives of the socio-economic 
development envisaged, while also limiting the influence of elite groups or vested interests to 
manipulate the political process to secure their own gains. Doing this deems imperative that the state 
be in possession of a capacity that is adequate enough to neutralize the influence of the entrenched 
interest groups, mostly feudal in the context of developing economies (Migdal, 1988).  
Such a capacity can only be acquired if the state enjoys a thorough control over the resource 
mobilization, allocation and assimilation that takes place through a politically insulated bureaucratic 
structure. A developmental state can thus, in the presence of these attributes be able to exercise a 
considerable leverage over the endowed classes as well as the flow of international capital in the 
economy. It must be noted that inspite of having a greater role of the state, the DS model does not 
advocate state exclusivity in economic operations as in the planned economy systems. The DS model 
that has been seen during the 1980s and 90s in South and South East Asia presents quite a contrary 
picture i.e. state and market agencies operating simultaneously. Significantly different from the polar 
systems of economic organization at the time, the Asian development model presented a centrist 
approach that seemed more pragmatic and sustainable than that on the extremes. The arguments for 
the DS model argued that such a state would, in its ideal conduct, ‘combine authoritarian technocracy 
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with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth’ as it bridled (with rational confines) 
instead of outright suppression of the private enterprise or the profit driven market impulses (Radice, 
2008). 
Contrary to the neoliberal discourse that argues for the market forces’ command of the social 
organization and economic affairs, a developmental state has more of a ‘neo-mercantalist approach to 
economic relations’, both internationally and within the national confines (Ghani, 2005). Furthermore, 
such a state is also characterized by the primacy of political realms and the state in command of the 
domestic social structures targeted at bridling both the civil society as well as the elite influences 
subservient to the whims or the writ of the state (Leftwich, 2001). Another feature central to the idea 
of a DS is that in addition to the institutional and political framework, it also derives its ‘legitimacy’ 
from a strong ideological component that has at its core nationalism (Bagchi, 2000), a collective belief 
in the ‘development urgency’(Leftwich,1996), and confidence in the state’s role in ensuring the well-
being of its constituents.  
In the course of establishing a DS, the state must possess the ‘determination and ability to 
stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the domestic private sector and arrange or supervise 
mutually acceptable deals with foreign interests’ (Leftwich, 2001). A synthesis of the conceptualizations 
and definitions of a developmental state can be that a DS is committed to a national development 
agenda that has at its core capacity and outreach, and geared towards an inclusive growth trajectory 
that targets poverty alleviation and, effective and efficient public service delivery. Furthermore, the 
recent literature on the notion of developmental states also places a great attention on the state’s 
infrastructural power and political commitment to the developmental objectives. According to Ghani 
(2005), a developmental state ought to be essentially characterized, at the very least, by the following 
two attributes: 
a) The state must have the capacity to have an established writ in a significant majority of its 
territorial boundaries that enables the formulation and implementation of public policy 
frameworks. 
b) The developmental vision must entail greater outreach and inclusiveness, whereby the vision is 
targeted at long term objectives that are not limited to one political tenure/regime or have 
limited political ownership. 
 
With these conceptualization and attributes of the DS, one must also acknowledge that the 
developmental policy stances can be quite heterogeneous in terms of what they seek to pursue. Joshi 
49 
 
(2012), identified three specific varieties of developmental states: Human Developmental State, 
Resource Developmental State, and Social Developmental State. This disaggregation by Joshi (2012) is 
especially relevant to the purview of this dissertation as it enables a consideration of the DS concept as 
a broader policy orientation of the state instead of a narrow set of bureaucratic or policy initiatives, to 
foster an inclusive process of socio-economic development. This is also different from most of the 
existing conceptualizations of the DS that generally extol the growth orientation of a policy regime that 
operates in a close collaboration of the political incumbents and the state bureaucracy. 
A ‘Human Developmental State’ is considered as one that engages in the human capital 
emancipation for its constituents. This model has been evident in the East Asian developmental 
experience, whereby there was significant public investment in universalizing primary education and 
subsequent levels to develop the ‘human capital’ necessary for the economic and sectoral development 
as envisaged. Given that most of the East Asian countries had a low natural resource base (particularly 
Japan and South Korea), the impetus for economic development comes through a knowledge base that 
comprises of high technical expertise, innovation, skills and training of their constituents.  
A Resource Developmental State (RDS) is one that bases its development agenda on the 
exploitation of its natural resource capital. States in the Middle East (UAE, Saudi Arabia, to some 
extent Libya), Africa (Uganda, Zimbabwe, Botswana), and Latin America (Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Guatemala) are prime examples of an RDS where the states’ developmental orientation is grounded in 
the exploitation of their ‘natural capital’ to generate the wealth. Creating wealth or economic progress, 
in the absence of a domestic capacity (both technological and human resource), have a dependence on 
external partners (states, as well as enterprises) in the resource exploitation process. Once the fiscal 
resource base of the state expands to a sizeable degree, the reinvestment of the gains from the  
resource exploitation is made into social welfare and human development areas.  
The third of Joshi (2012)’s conceptualization of a DS is the Social Development State (SDS). Such 
states are oriented toward an active pursuit of promoting ‘cross-class coordination, mutual trust, and 
social cooperation without necessarily exploiting an abundance of natural resources or investing 
heavily in human capital’ (Joshi, 2012). The orientation for socio-economic egalitarianism through 
public investments and redistributive policy regimes are the hallmark of an SDS, and unlike the RDS 
and HDS, an SDS also actively fosters an inclusive political space. Viewing in a purely economic 
context, distinguishing between growth and development mirrors the difference between the 
orientation of the ‘laissez-faire’ orientation of profit maximization and free markets, and a rational 
judgement of its potential pitfalls for serious shocks resulting from market naturalism. While the 
50 
 
former considers any incoming action from beyond the realms of the market inhibitive to growth (and 
by extrapolation, development), the latter pertains to establishing corrective mechanisms for the 
predictable and inherent shocks as a consequence of market naturalism through a regulatory or active 
agency role of the state in the economic ensemble. This regulatory, oversight or productive functions 
of public policy comes as a consequence of predominantly institutional and political responses to the 
market dysfunctions.  
Wrapping up the conceptualization that this section has endeavored to deliver, 
developmentalism implies, by virtue of the ‘ism’ suffix: a process of progression and development with 
a social dimension instead of narrow economic dimensions, generating historical paradigms and 
configurations. Setting the perimeters of the notion minimally, it can be associated with the theme of 
heterodox economic organization or what is broadly considered the capitalist periphery. It can thus, be 
considered as a process of deep social transformation, rationally operated against a politically 
committed state, to bridge the economic and social progress gaps. Extrapolating from this premise, 
developmentalism finds an ideal context in chronic structural and distributive imbalances whereby its 
transformative conduct needs to be systematic, socially oriented and politically sustained change. 
2.3 BUILDING A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: LESSONS FROM THEORY AND POLICY 
Given the purview of this dissertation, the following section identifies and explains the key 
imperatives for the establishment of a developmental state. Having gleaned the findings from most of 
the available literature on the notion of DS, this research puts forth three key attributes that must be 
the objective of any public reform geared towards the establishment of a DS (particularly in the 
developing countries context), going beyond what has previously been identified. These are: 
a) State Resilience and Social Cohesion 
b) Enhancing the Allocative and Enforcement Capacity of the State 
c) Enhancing capacity for resource mobilization 
 
State Resilience and Social Cohesion 
Perhaps the most important aspect in establishing a successful developmental state is the 
notion of state resilience, which is inextricably linked to the notion of social cohesion, as the former 
operates as an aggregation of the latter. State resilience happens to be a highly subjective concept that 
finds its roots in the notion of ‘state building’ and spans social, political and economic realms. While 
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the economic dimension of state resilience is better expressed in the context of resource mobilization 
(both domestic and external), this section would deal predominantly with the socio-political aspects.  
Social cohesion is ‘the nexus of vertical and horizontal social capital and the balance of 
bonding and bridging social capital’ (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). Social capital, being a fairly subjective 
concept, enjoys considerable heterogeneity in terms of its definitions and conceptualization. However, 
for the purpose of the current endeavor, Putnam’s definition of social capital as ‘networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’, is the most consistent 
(Putnam, 1993). ‘Bonding’ social capital implies the intra-group linkages and the ‘bridging’ capital 
refers to inter-group links. While there is no concrete evidence on whether social cohesion and the 
extent of state resilience are correlated positively or adversely, given that both are not easily 
quantifiable and neither is an independent analysis of the other factors that could have an impact on 
state resilience. Nevertheless, there is a strong consensus on the notion that social cohesion is an 
important determinant of state resilience in the policy and academic debates (Kaplan, 2008; Marc, 
Willman, Aslam, Rebosio, & Balasuriya, 2013; GIZ, 2012; Easterly, 2000).  
With the role of social cohesion as an influential factor for fostering state resilience established, 
attention shall now be devoted to a more intermediary factor that succeeds the former and precedes 
the latter: the notion of state building. Most of the contemporary states, especially in the developing 
world, find themselves engaged in the state-building process in either post-colonial or newly 
autonomous contexts. This is an important fact that needs to be taken into cognizance because the 
context of each state engaged in the state-building process is instrumental in framing the social 
expectations. For instance, under colonial regimes most of the pre-existing relationships between the 
state and the citizens were dismantled. Consequently, post-colonial transitions were marred by fissures, 
violence and most commonly a systematic elite capture. In many such contexts, the process of state-
building involved sidelining ethnic or religious identities, and coerced compliance to the institutional 
order promulgated by a non-representative at worst and a non-responsive elite or a coalition of the 
elite (Latour, 2005; North, 1990; Pierson, 2004; Robinson & White, 1998). 
It can thus be argued that there will be heterogeneity of both the expectations as well as the 
experiences of the constituents with the state. Hence, for any analysis on the state resilience, an 
analysis of the processes of reconciling societal expectations with the state functioning and state 
capacity is imperative. Therefore, the discussion from here on shall focus on an approach to state 
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resilience that focuses on the processes for articulating and reconciling this ‘capacity expectation’24 gap 
that can also be considered a conceptual equivalent of negotiating a new ‘social contract’. It is the 
degree of inclusiveness and the strength of this articulation and reconciliation process that shall 
determine the extent to which the state improves its responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and 
cohesiveness and resilience. Inorder to examine this articulation process, it would be more analytically 
convenient to employ a reverse induction approach to the notion of state resilience by looking at state 
fragility instead.  
Approaching it this way not only entitles the analysis to be more expansive but it also has a 
greater explanatory power with respect to the two cases this dissertation seeks to examine in the next 
chapters; Bolivia and Pakistan. The notion of ‘state fragility’ is a polar opposite of a resilient state, and 
is said to arise amid the “state’s ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing 
public goods and raising revenues”; or when “political violence either in the form of repression or civil 
conflict”; or a simultaneous existence of both (Besley and Persson, 2011: 373).   
While a detailed analysis and review of the notion of state fragility is beyond the scope of this 
research, the analysis shall be limited to secondary conceptualizations such as the following 
disaggregated into five distinct forms presented below: 
 
Table 2: Varieties of State Fragility 
Types of Fragility Characterized by 
Weak States Low level of administrative control either across the entire 
territory or in sections 
Divided States Substantial ethnic, religious and/or social cleavages 
Post Conflict States Experienced protracted periods of violence 
Semi-authoritarian States Imposition of order through coercion, lack of legitimacy 
Collapsed States Core national institutions such as defence, parliament, 
judiciary and the executive, do not function at all 
Source: Call& Wyeth (2008) 
 
Building upon this conceptualization, one can also consider highly authoritarian states as an 
addition to those provided by Call & Wyeth (2008). Furthermore, while the aforementioned have been 
considered as categorizations of state fragility, this research considers them as attributes or 
                                                             
24 It must also be noted that when considering the citizen expectations with the state, one must acknowledge 
that the importance of retrospection. A retrospective citizen or group shall frame its expectations in accordance 
with the experience of interaction with the state. For instance, in contexts where the state is characterized by 
non-responsive service orientation, exploitation through coercion and over-taxation, the citizen perception of 
the state would most likely be that of a distant, non-responsive entity which would have its implications 
(neutral at best, but most likely adverse) on their compliance with the state’s promulgations.  
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characteristics that may not be distinct and can also occur simultaneously in a particular context25. 
Moreover, these attributes or dimensions can also considered as a spectrum whereby states do not 
exclusively rest on these conditions but instead have degrees of division, weakness and 
authoritarianism. Given that various interacting factors, operating independently or in tandem, have a 
bearing on the nature of the social contract, it is not an easy endeavor to stipulate a framework to see 
which contexts can deepen the fragility or which may see it being mitigated. While the importance of 
the ‘expectation and capacity’ gap in the articulation and deliberation of a new social contract have 
been outlined earlier, attention will now be devoted to the procedural dimensions, primarily the 
political processes in place through which the state-society bargaining takes place and is 
institutionalized. Of a critical importance to the political processes are two factors; a ‘credible commitment’ 
of the domestic elite networks to channel the state resources and capacity for meeting the constituents’ 
expectations, and the legitimacy of the state or the incumbent political regime in participating or 
initiating the political processes. The legitimacy of the incumbent regime or the state manifests in 
various domestic forms that may be distinct and non-mutually enforcing; it could be embedded or 
residual (rooted in historical events or bequests of a preceding system), or procedural legitimacy (often 
a scenario found in procedurally democratic contexts that will be discussed in length in the country 
analysis of Pakistan in the subsequent chapters). In addition to the domestic forms, legitimacy of the 
incumbents may also stem from the external/international arena in the form of recognition or 
reinforcement from multilateral agencies or even states. 
Consistent and continuing negotiations between the state and the society positively refine and 
institutionalize the social contract, and a dynamic equilibrium in this regard is an important requisite of 
fostering state resilience. Therefore, resilience can be considered as the ability of the state to bridge the 
expectation-capacity gap, changes in the nature of its legitimacy as well as its functional effectiveness. 
The question that now arises is, how can state resilience be achieved in the contexts characterized by 
weak political processes that are inadequate in a dynamic negotiation of the state-society contract? This 
research identifies two main strategies to foster state resilience discussed as follows: 
 
 
                                                             
25 In a context where the state institutions find themselves limited in their ability to exercise their writ over the 
entire territory or geographical scope of the state, one can also find ethnic, social or religious groups that 
challenge the state’s legitimacy which may result in semi-authoritarian practices to reinforce the state’s which 
in turn adversely affects the nature of the state-society contract. The classifications need to be considered as 
illustrative of a non-binary continuum. 
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I. Reforming the Political Processes 
One of the ways forward in this regard is a reform of the exigent political processes. The most 
important political processes in the context of state fragility or resilience are the nature of competition 
in the domestic political space, and the degree and/or nature of mechanisms enforced for the state’s/ 
incumbent executive’s accountability. This assertion is substantiated by the findings of Goldstone, et 
al.. (2005) study, that where the political space is more factionalized, restricted or repressed the 
vulnerability to fragility and instability is high. The reason is that the political parties’ failure to mediate 
conflicts between different social groups primarily because their legitimacy and support base is linked 
to these divisions, and as a consequence amplify rather than exacerbate the differences.  
Legitimacy is also enhanced by making the political processes more inclusive, deliberative and 
participatory. The participatory and deliberative aspects pertain to the consultative mechanisms 
embedded in the political process that put forth a forum to negotiate and articulate diverse interests. 
These consultative mechanisms, especially when done at the elite levels of a socio-political order, 
enables the incorporation of the previously excluded groups into the political space and interest 
articulation by these groups thereby making them active stakeholders than mere subjects. This brings 
into the spotlight an associated stream of literature on the theme of state resilience, the role of elite 
pacts in a context characterized by a political transition (more specifically between an autocratic to a 
democratic regime). Negotiated contracts between the elites and their subject social groups, in the 
absence of a broader harmonization of concessions across the entire national constituency can result in 
generating contradictory outcomes that could also result in polarizing the political space.  
This is especially true in contexts where the elites or a coalition of elites, are benefitted by retaining 
their focus on their traditional constituencies. Inorder to grapple with this problem, there ought to an 
institutional mechanism that incentivizes elite coalitions and the development of a common agenda 
that is not rooted squarely in their own constituencies but transcends into a broader socio-political 
priorities of the polity. An example of this can be found in the case of Nigeria, where the political 
parties need to have their executive bodies comprising of 2/3rd of the country’s regions with no 
allowance for any regional or social preferences in their political campaigns. In addition to a stipulated 
regional representation in their executive councils, the political parties are also required to have their 
membership base of at least a 1000 individuals in 2/3rd of the districts and municipalities. 
(Edigheji,2005).  
Another way to institute political reforms is to establish accountability mechanisms for the 
incumbent governments’ and their exercise of their executive authorities. The key institution in this 
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case, especially in the absence of decentralized governance, would be the judiciary and its autonomous 
conduct to uphold the rule of law. However, judicial empowerment alone cannot be an adequate 
guarantor of sustainable and strong accountability mechanism, and the decentralization of governance 
will be a strong guarantor of the executive’s decisions. 
II. Fostering Democratization and Economic Progress 
Globally there has been an enhanced focus on democratization, especially so in the developing 
countries that have historically been host to either authoritarian regimes or an imperfect democracy at 
best. Owing to internal and external pressures for a more inclusive domestic political space in non-
democratic or quasi-democratic states, the notion of hybrid regimes has taken roots (Ottaway, 2003). 
Hybrid regimes are those political regimes that are attributed by some procedural democratic norms 
but fall short on the substantive requisites of liberal democratic ideals. It must also be noted that the 
hybrid regimes cannot be considered as distinctive absolutes as they are characterized by varying levels 
of democracy and autocracy, so at best, they can be considered as ‘transitionary’ polities. While the 
hybrid regimes have been existing in a lot of contexts in the developing world and have exhibited a fair 
degree of stability, they are also characterized by a significant latent instability (Mansfield & Snyder, 
2002). Hence, any attempt to foster democratization in such contexts involves intense contestation 
across the social groups as well as in the process of interest articulation. 
Furthermore, in the contexts where there is a paucity of institutions that can potently manage 
mass participation, mobilization and political competition, there is an incentive for the established elite 
networks in the domestic context can resort to their conventional strategies to retain their influence. 
Thus, for a democratization initiative to succeed, it is imperative that not only should the reform 
process be accompanied by credible commitment of the existing institutional framework but also be 
credibly directed towards the establishment of strong democratic organizations. This is again a notion 
that will be discussed in the section on decentralization and its interplay with democratization. Such a 
credible commitment and direction ought to come from state institutions committed to uphold the 
rule of law, impartial judiciary and electoral commissions, active civil society and a competent 
bureaucracy acting as an executor of the executive’s policies. 
Finally, a key imperative for promoting state resilience is stable and progressive economic 
performance ideally with a democratization process in the backdrop. While the empirical data on the 
connection between democracy and economic development (including the direction of causality) 
remains mixed at best (as discussed in Chapter 1), there are quite a few normative advocacies that extol 
the importance of the economic performance on the government’s legitimacy and the extent of socio-
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political inclusion; both of which are important determinants of state resilience. When characterized by 
poor economic performance, both at the macro level and also in terms of the ‘pro-poor’ dimensions of 
economic growth, autocratic regimes can confront weaker legitimacy and growing pressures for a 
democratic transition (Arab Spring being a case in point). However, the transition to a more 
democratic regime has a similar latent instability and can find its legitimacy depreciating in the wake of 
poor economic performance (Ghani, 2005). According to Prezworski (2002), democratic norms as well 
as the sustainability of a democratic system is more frequently found in economically developed 
contexts, not because democracies are more likely to emerge as a consequence of economic 
development but because their sustainability is defined by the economic performance. Furthermore, 
democratization comes in various forms and manifestations, but once a democratic transition has been 
made its survival is inextricably linked to the economic development.  
Going back to the ‘state capacity-citizen expectation’ dynamic equilibrium as a key determinant 
of state resilience as presented earlier, one can observe that with a greater democratization comes a 
greater citizen expectation of what the state must deliver to its constituents, and if the expectations are 
not adequately matched then the resulting instability can make the state’s resilience a distant dream.  
 
Enhancing Allocative and Enforcement Capacity of the State 
A key feature of an effective developmental state is its capability to deliver responsive and 
effective public services, for which its capacity for allocating resources for PSD and establishing potent 
enforcement mechanisms are important (Radice, 2008). The allocation and enforcement functions of 
state policy remain the prerogative of the executive, of which the bureaucratic edifice remains a key 
agency as it is responsible for the policy implementation. This section shall engage firstly with a 
normative discussion on how the nature and orientation of the bureaucratic institutions need to be 
reformed, followed by an analysis of the policies adapted across different contexts in this regard.  
The establishment of a DS in general, takes us back to the concept of a ‘rational bureaucracy’ 
and the tenets of the New Public Management discourse, and this research contends that enhancing 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the bureaucracy can be brought about through a selective 
amalgamation of their attributes instead of an expansive and exclusive subscription to either of them. 
However, this research engages at a greater length with the NPM concept and how it can be instituted 
in developing contexts, with the Weberian rational principles only serving to define the normative 
character of the bureaucratic structures. This approach is chosen primarily because the contemporary 
discourse in both the policy and academic discourse on reinventing governments for greater public 
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effectiveness and efficiency, extols the NPM as a means of putting the tenets of the good governance 
agenda into action (Blair, 2000; Fukuyama, 2004; Grindle, 2004, 2011; Oxhorn, Tulchin, & Selee, 2004; 
Turner & Hulme, 1997). Before dwelling on the NPM and its relevance in the establishment of a 
developmental state, it is important to briefly examine the notion of ‘rational bureaucracy’ rooted in 
the Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy (Weber, 1990). Weber argued that a rational 
bureaucracy is one that is organized according to rational principles characterized by: a) Hierarchy of 
authority; b) Impersonality; c) Formal and established rules of conduct; d) Merit oriented progression 
of the incumbents; e) Specialized division of labor and resources; f) Efficiency. Following on his 
conceptualization, bureaucracies can be taken as goal directed organizations designed on rational 
principles for the efficient attainment of the assigned goals. A hierarchical bureaucratic structure allows 
for an upward mobility of information and a downward mobility of directives and orders.  
The operations and conduct of the mandated activities are guided by formally established and 
written rules that clearly demarcate the responsibilities and functional aspects of exercising authority by 
the incumbents. The appointments in the structure are based on specialization of the appointees rather 
than an ‘ascription criteria’ whereby appointments are made on the basis of the candidates’ association 
with a particular social group, political party or ideology. All of these characteristics are guided towards 
the efficient attainment of the goals assigned. The point to be noted, however, is that the Weberian 
conceptualization did not disavow the latent propensity of dysfunctionality of these structures, and 
aimed to present an ‘ideal type’ bureaucracy26. Most of the criticisms of the Weberian bureaucratic 
model were based on its rigidity, excessive rule-compliance, lack of public accountability, cost 
inefficiency of elaborate bureaucratic structures and the lack of responsiveness as the public services 
ended up being ‘provider-dominated’(Ferguson, 1990; Flynn, 2007a; Zamor, 1985; Pollitt & Summa, 
1997). With this in the backdrop, the 1980s witnessed a new wave of public sector reforms that since 
then have been at the core of the public sector organization in developed, transitionary and developing 
countries alike. As the neo-liberal economic doctrine took roots in the global economic policy, the role 
and the institutional form of the state and its operations faced the need to be more market oriented in 
outlook, and private sector-oriented in their organization (George, 1999). This was initially witnessed 
in the developed OECD countries, and later in the developing countries that were collaborating with 
the IFIs (World Bank and the IMF, and others) in financial arrangements or structural adjustment 
programs. This revisit of the role of the state and public sector organization also finds its roots in the 
                                                             
26 The Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy has often been misconstrued as one that considers 
bureaucracy as an ideal form of organization. There have been other criticisms of his conceptualization that the 
real world bureaucratic structures are incapable of fitting well with his ‘ideal’ characteristics. 
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fiscal crises witnessed in the 1970s and the 1980s, and more recently post 2008 whereby the scope and 
size of the public sector and bureaucratic operations were considered for a scale-down. The 
contemporary discourse on public sector organization and management focuses on incorporating 
private enterprise styled management techniques and mechanisms in the public service delivery, given 
that PSD in the contemporary state has gone beyond the state’s exclusive jurisdiction especially with 
the emergence of CSOs and para-statal organizations (Burki et al., 1999; Leibfried & Zürn,2005; 
Oxhorn et al., 2004).  
This is considered as the New Public Management or neo-managerialism in the public 
administration literature ( (Pollitt & Summa, 1997).  While a consensus on what the elements of NPM 
need to be have so far evaded a consensus, a common denominator identifiable from all the 
conceptualizations surrounding the notion has been the introduction or emulation of the performance 
incentives and organizational design of the market-oriented agencies, in those realms of public service 
that exclusively remain in the public-provisioning domain. Table 2 outlines few of these oft cited 
conceptualizations of NPM. A common denominator across all advocacies in favor of the NPM 
oriented PSRs has been that exposing the public sector operations to the market dynamics and a more 
private-sector styled orientation to service delivery shall result in improved efficiency and 
effectiveness27. The discussion will instead be directed to a brief overview of the critique that the 
superior effectiveness and efficiency yield advocated by the NPM advocates has received. One of the 
most seminal works in this regard is by Bately (1996), who studied the introduction of competitive 
norms and private provisioning of public services across a pool of 6 developing countries and 
concluded that this remains a ‘presumption’ that can only be ‘partially supported by evidence’ (Batley, 
1996).  
Bolstering efficiency of service may result in an increased focus on cost efficiency, which could 
undermine the state capacity in pursuing a long term perspective on issues such as education, health 
and technology, in the interest of those with short term gains such as infrastructural development. 
Amongst other critiques of the NPM agenda, it has been argued that it may result in promoting self-
interest as the public agencies may favor outsourcing or privatization due to higher opportunities of 
rent seeking. This is particularly in the developing countries, with well entrenched systems of 
patronage and limited accountability, and the discretionary space that the NPM strategies allow the 
public agents are susceptible to abuse. Furthermore, with a greater ‘fragmentation’ of public service 
                                                             
27 While a more substantive elaboration of this remains beyond the purview of this dissertation, support of the 
efficiency and effectiveness improvements can be found in the works of Pfiffner (2004), Stewart and Walsh 
(1992), Walsh (1995), Flynn (1993). 
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delivery channels, monitoring and accountability challenges may end up adding to the transaction cost 
of the service provision. While, NPM has significant potential merits in the realm of public sector 
reform, it can by no means be considered as a panacea. This line of argument also dominates the 
decentralization debate, and the response also remains similar – there is no specific set of reforms that 
can be implemented in all contexts, and can at best be selectively applied after taking stock of the local 
dynamics of the reform context.   
Given the main critiques in the preceding paragraphs and the oft-cited attributes/components 
of NPM, this research identifies some of these components that could be of essence in enhancing 
bureaucratic effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness in line with the requisites of establishing a 
democratic developmental state. Given that the purview of this dissertation spans the realm of 
governance decentralization as well, the analysis from hereon shall be focused on the decentralization 
of public service delivery that pertains to the fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralization 
from a broader lens of ‘managerialism’ as envisaged by the NPM conceptualization. When the 
administrative and fiscal decentralizations exist in a context of effective political decentralization to the 
local levels, it would also enhance the accountability in addition to the responsiveness, effectiveness 
and efficiency (REE) dimensions. It would further facilitate, if not ensure, the Weberian ‘rationality’ in 
the bureaucracy. In the following discussion on the decentralization28 of public service delivery, aspects 
pertaining to enhancing the bureaucratic quality (including REE) include:  
a) Disaggregation of ‘monolithic’ bureaucratic structures into specialized agencies: 
Traditionally large and monolithic, both in functional scope as well as size, public 
bureaucracy needs to be scaled down in size as well as functional domain through 
functional outsourcing, and division into smaller and specialized role executive 
agencies. Evidence of this can be found in most of the developed contexts in the 
OECD countries, but also increasingly in the developing world albeit to a varying 
degree (George, 1999;Pollitt & Summa, 1997; Pfiffner, 2004). This entails the 
functional a separation of the policy development and the implementing/operational 
aspects of the service delivery and design process. The greater operational autonomy as 
well as distinctly drawn ambits enable these specialized agencies to operate with 
synergies instead of abiding by traditional hierarchical structure. While this remains the 
theoretical elaboration of the arrangement, the policy response ought to be a structural 
                                                             
28 Decentralization in this discussion deals exclusively to the managerial dimensions instead of the broader 
governance decentralization. 
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reorientation of the government towards a leaner hierarchical model. The proponents 
of the executive agency model have extoled the enhanced operational flexibility of 
these specialized agencies in terms of resource allocation and distinctive role 
specification attributes to positively reinforce the accountability of these agencies 
(Jervis & Richards, 1995). The development of specialized agencies from a prior 
centralized framework of governance also enables the insulation of the bureaucratic 
agencies from the political contestation and preferential political interest articulation. 
b) Devolution of Fiscal Resources and Budgeting to Local Levels: 
A complementary requisite to the establishment of the executive agencies is the fiscal 
devolution to these specialized agencies. Though more of a procedural aspect in terms 
of creating budgeting and financial control with these agencies, the more substantive 
dimension to the fiscal devolution is the fiscal resource allocation corresponding to 
discretionary authority to the subnational tiers. While the fiscal devolution at the 
local/regional governmental level shall be dealt in a greater detail in the subsequent 
section, the allocation of devolved fiscal pool to these executive agencies shall be 
accountability and efficiency enhancing. 
d) Segregation of Production and Provision Functions 
The separation of the service provision function from the production functions is also 
imperative to quality enhancement. This functional demarcation enables the creation of 
quasi-markets within the PSD space, whereby the central policy institutions are 
mandated with the production and design of the public services whereas the 
provisioning can be done through either the executive agencies or through an 
outsourcing to parastatals organizations. Evidence of this form of managerialism can 
be found in the case of the UK, which admittedly is not a good example in the 
developmental context but is considered here from the REE perspective, whereby the 
central agency responsible for health services NHS and its subservient District Health 
Authorities act as financiers and producers of the services that are delivered through 
autonomous hospitals act as a providers (Lacey, 1997). 
 
Of all the components of NPM, those consistent with the management decentralization hold 
the greatest promise given the underlying objective of a decentralized and democratic developmental 
state. However, for this managerial dimension to complement the overall governance decentralization, 
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democratization and developmental objectives, these must also be accompanied by more potent 
accountability systems. Drawing on the experience of developing economies where some form of PSR 
has been conducted on these lines and where accountability controls were weak and inadequate, 
managerialistic reforms may end up reinforcing arbitrary and corrupt behavior (Bank, World 
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, 1997). This issue will be addressed in a 
much greater detail in the section on decentralization.   
 
With this in the background, one ought to evaluate the policy-side experience in enhancing the 
state capacity on allocative and enforcement themes. The establishment or improvement in the 
enforcement and allocation capacities of the state requires, firstly, the state developing incentives for 
directing capital flows to priority industries. The experience of the developmental regimes in the East 
Asian countries substantiates this assertion, however holding that kind of coercive influence over the 
capital flow in contemporary times is not plausible, which is why the state needs to create incentives in 
the form of tax rebates on capital gains made in preferred sectors, higher interest rates amongst others. 
At the onset of the developmental policy regime in South Korea, for instance, most of the banks and 
Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFIs) were state owned which enabled the state to coordinate 
investment flows in consistency with its industrial and sectoral development priorities(Huang, 2008b; 
Joshi, 2012). This was in stark contradiction to the liberalized credit-based financial systems in the 
European economies and the US, and most of the East Asian developmental states (South Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and China) used a subsidized credit regime in addition to other policy instruments 
such as concessionary tax incentives, export subsidies, and protectionist policies to reshape the 
incentive framework for the private economic agents operating in their economic space. Prior to the 
introduction of the neoliberal reforms and the SAPs, most of the developing economies of the world 
had instituted various growth enhancing policies which had a quite a few commonalities with the 
others. In terms of the policy orientations, the main commonalities found across most of the 
developing economies were that the developmental interventions by the state focused on enhanced 
growth allocation that was targeted at preferred growth sectors, and to foster expertise in these areas 
through incentivized directives.  
Examining the policy regimes instituted by the East Asian developmental regimes, one can find 
evidence of the creation of ‘nodal agencies’, that were mandated to gather sector specific research and 
information that was subsequently used for national development plans. The idea behind the 
establishment of these agencies is also complemented with insulating them of the influence of vested 
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interests and enabling a ‘national character’ and impersonal institutional status, a feature critical to the 
effective functioning of these agencies and the genuine developmental orientation of the bureaucracy 
(Bahl & Wallace ,2005). However, the efficacy of such institutions and their inputs in framing the 
national development strategies has been quite varied, with the exception of some East Asian States, in 
most of the developing countries that pursued a quasi-developmental agenda. This is attributable to 
various reasons of which inadequate political capacity, technical expertise, information asymmetries 
and rent seeking. For instance, in the case of India, the state’s industrial subsidization strategy along 
with other protectionist policies during the 1970s to the early 1990s was widely hailed by the industrial 
constituencies but they vehemently opposed a strong Planning Commission that could monitor and 
enforce the directives. As a consequence, the state found it hard to meet the targets not only in the 
industrial development but also in the realm of the social policy imperatives. The inadequacy of 
political will, capacity and rent seeking was witnessed in Pakistan where the recurring phases of land 
reforms were promulgated by the central government and mandated to regional governments in the 
1960s and 1970s, where the feudal interests dominated the legislatures and maximized their rent and 
endowment acquisition from the state’s divestiture and distribution of land policy.  
Finally, the enforcement as well as allocative capacities can be improved by instituting 
deliberative mechanisms in the political space e.g. giving space to the civil society organizations, citizen 
committees and locally embedded civic agencies, in the policy development processes. At the core of 
such deliberative mechanisms lies transparency and information disclosure, that can enable public 
accountability and reducing the costs of public resource allocation and policy enforcement. The oft-
cited case of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Allegre, Brazil is one example of such deliberative 
mechanisms, which involved a range of CSOs, citizen committees and locally embedded civic actors to 
deliberate with the state officials (at the local level) on resource allocation. Not only has this policy 
experiment attracted a lot of policy and academic attention on democratic and deliberative grounds, 
but it has also been of positive effect to the responsiveness of public service design and delivery, and, 
effective and efficient public resource allocation.  
 
Enhancing Domestic Resource Mobilization 
The capacity of a state to mobilize resources is of critical importance to its success in 
establishing a developmental regime. Though an emerging field in both policy and academic discourse, 
resource mobilization, of which domestic resource mobilization is the key, not only enhances the 
state’s ability to define its agendas due to greater sovereignty over policy development as well as its 
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ability to implement its vision. As necessary for any strategy with such a potential, resource 
mobilization tends to be the most political economic strategy given that a lot of contestation takes 
place over the type, amount and source of resource generation as well as the allocation of the resources 
across the state’s jurisdiction, both social as well as economic (in sectoral terms). Therefore, the state’s 
policy orientation alone is a necessary but an insufficient condition to realize the resource mobilization 
targets, and their equitable and effective allocation for socioeconomic development(Leftwich, 2001; 
Hinojosa, Bebbington, Barrientos, & Addison, 2008;). This section shall outline how the resource 
mobilization capacity of the state can be enhanced and how the context specific issues determining the 
nature of the state-society relations affects the state’s capacity of resource mobilization for its 
developmental objectives. When considering the resource mobilization, it must be noted that a 
country’s resource mobilization can come in two distinct forms; international (fiscal resource flows 
from external bilateral or multilateral sources) and domestic (mainly through indigenous mobilization 
of fiscal resources through taxation, natural resource mobilization, and domestic savings). Given the 
overarching theme of this chapter, a greater focus shall be placed on the domestic resource 
mobilization since that is a key determinant of state resilience as well as the sustainability of a 
developmental policy (Bahl & Wallace, 2005; Latin American Program, 2012; Pierson, 2004; Robinson 
& White, 1998; Stein, Talvi, & Grisanti, 1998; Wylde, 2012). 
In the analysis that follows, three main strategies of enhancing domestic resource mobilization 
have been considered: 
i. Mobilizing domestic savings  
ii. Fostering state-society relationship through Fiscal Reforms 
iii. Mobilizing Natural Resource Base 
 
i. Mobilizing Savings 
Going back to the basics of endogenous growth theory, an economy’s long run growth rate 
depends on its domestic savings rate as the savings enable capital accumulation that can subsequently 
be devoted to investment into technological progress and innovation. While a detailed critical analysis 
of these growth theories, including the AK model, the Romer innovation theory, Lucas model (dealing 
more with the accumulation of human capital than physical capital formation), amongst others are 
beyond the current scope of discussion, the idea is to merely illustrate the theoretical significance of 
domestic savings as a key to economic growth. This research assumes the causal relationship of the 
savings to economic growth and long term development as positive and bi-directional in line with the 
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findings of Deaton (1999), and views the domestic savings mobilizations through the domestic 
resource mobilization lens exclusively. Inorder to cogently explain the savings in the backdrop of 
resource mobilization for developmental objectives, this section will deal with the experience and 
strategies employed by the developmental states in DRM and the success it enabled for their 
developmental goals. 
If one views comparatively the resource mobilization trends exhibited by the developing countries 
from the mid-1980s till date, it can be spotted that inspite of commonalities in the regional fiscal 
efforts (often assumed as the main strategy for DRM, and expressed here in terms of Tax-GDP ratio), 
the savings rates varied greatly across the spectrum and so did their rates of economic growth. Table 3, 
presents an overview of the DRM and growth comparisons of the developing economies from a 
regional perspective. It can be seen that the trend rate of the fiscal effort has been fairly consistent 
across the developing countries in all these regions, but the main difference in the growth rates of all 
the other regions and the East Asian states (which were actively pursuing a developmental regime 
through the 1980s, 1990s and somewhat liberally during the 2000s) can be attributed to the high 
savings rate. The East Asia and Pacific region posted an average savings rate of almost double that of 
all other regions during the 1980s and 1990s, and while it continued to maintain a growth in an already 
high savings rate the South Asian average savings rate during the 2000s increased phenomenally. 
Although the South Asian economic regimes, primarily in Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan were more on 
the neo-liberal lines, the growth in savings can be attributed to the overall economic growth in the 
region, which is an illustration of a counter-argument on the direction of the savings-economic growth 
causality put forth by Aghion, Comin, Howitt, & Tecu(2009). Furthermore, it must be noted that the 
gross rate of savings in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1960-1980 increased from 18% in 1960 to 
26% in 1980, before plummeting in the 1980s and 1990s due to the SAP regimes in their countries that 
not only resulted in a growth slowdown but also in the purchasing power and hence the income 
remaining post consumption for most of the constiutents (Bank, World Development Report: 
Attacking Poverty, 2000).  
 
Table 3: Regional Level DRM and Growth Performance of Developing Countries 
Regions 
Per-capita GDP Growth Tax - GDP Percentage Gross Savings as GDP (%) 
1985-2000 2000 - 2015 1985 - 2000 2000 - 2015 1980 - 2000 2000 - 2015 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 2.3 19 16.46 13.2 18.02 
South Asia  3.3 5.4 12.5 9.58 15.1 34.8 
East Asia and Pacific 6.1 8.7 15.3 11.2 31.2 48.15 
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Latin America 0.8 2.2 15.5 11.7 20.3 18.75 
Source: Own calculations based on World Development Indicators and IMF GFS 
 
With this in the backdrop, it would be important to see how the East Asian states managed to 
bolster their domestic savings. The main strategy employed by the East Asian states was the 
incentivizing and coercively induction of a higher savings pool in through restricted credit, fiscal 
austerity, compulsory ex-ante contributions (pension funds or EOBIs), and encouraging savings 
through greater interest commitment by the state financial institutions. For instance, in South Korea a 
policy of multiple interest rates on government bonds held by the public was introduced that gave a 
higher yield to savers and lesser to those who had debt or credit obligations. The case of Taiwan is 
perhaps, an even more pertinent case, as it financed most of its industrialization related investments 
from the domestic savings pool rather than seeking external credit lines for investment (Huang, 
2008a). 
Most of the East Asian contexts during their developmental regimes had relatively or fully 
authoritarian political dispensations, thus not only were they able to be autonomous in policy 
formulation, insulate the policy formulation and implementation from the ‘special interest’ groups, but 
also in enforcing incentives or coercive mechanisms to achieve the designated targets. This could lead 
the debate into another associated realm – would the state ability to mobilize private domestic savings 
still be high in democratic contexts? The answer would be in a conditional affirmative, because 
contextual dynamics may play a far greater role than the regime nature. The key determinants of the 
success of savings mobilization in democratic contexts would include on the incumbent regime’s 
stability, broad support, economic situation (in a slow growing, highly inflationary context savings 
mobilization policies might create further adverse effects on the budget constraints), and the 
availability of adequate savings instruments in the domestic financial markets.  
b) Building state-citizen relations through taxation 
Regardless of the nature of the political regime, one of the key requisites of effective domestic 
resource mobilization is the ability of the state to foster effective state-citizen relations. While the 
socio-political dynamics of state-society relations have been discussed in the earlier section of state 
resilience, the economic (primarily fiscal) dynamics of state society relations depend on the fiscal 
regime including not only the taxation but also the assimilation and allocation of the revenue pool to 
socially beneficial projects. The notion of taxation as a determinant of the resilience of the state-society 
finds its roots in the fiscal sociology literature, and though an expansive overview of the literature and 
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the concepts lies beyond the current scope, this section will outline some of the key facets of this 
approach before engaging with the strategies that could yield such improvements. 
The notion of ‘fiscal sociology’ pertains to the ‘..sociological aspects of taxation and public 
finances’ (Campbell, 1993). Another key conceptualization of the notion was put forth by Schumpeter, 
[1991 (1918)], who considered it as a ‘macro-historical paradigm that captured, embodied, and laid bare 
the dominant drivers of societal, political and economic change’ (Moore, 2004). There is a considerable 
body of literature in the realm of fiscal sociology as well as public finance literature, where the role of 
taxation in state-building, socio-economic development and developmental capacity has been well-
established (See for instance, Call & Wyeth (2008), Ghani (2005), Bahl & Wallace, (2005) and Latin 
American Program (2012 )). The role of fiscal instruments, like taxation, and fiscal reforms is central to 
the enhancement of the state capacity as well as ‘state-building for various reasons. Given the critical 
role of state capacity in the establishment of a developmental state, these become all the more 
important. Consolidating fiscal space has tax revenues as its most important component in order to 
ensure a sustainable access to resources imperative for allocations and investments in socio-economic 
development programs. Furthermore, taxation is also a key element of the state linkage with the 
citizenry not only because it provides the state with a ‘mandate to deliver’ public goods and be 
accountable to its constituents, but also acts as a platform upon which different interest groups contest 
for their interests. Also, the effectiveness of the state can also be gauged by the breadth of the fiscal 
base which illustrates the state’s engagement with competing regional and sectoral interests, as the 
nature and extent of the state’s response to these contestations indicates the extent of its authority and 
legitimacy (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, Moore, & (eds.), 2008). Legitimacy, it must be noted, transcends the 
procedural dimension of electoral outcomes, as they go only so far as to enable the citizens to 
articulate their interests. The other half of the legitimacy equation is to meet the demands of the 
citizenry for which resource mobilization, allocation and effective provision of the public services are 
the main requisites.  
Based on the above, it can be ascertained that the ‘supply side’ of state resilience (inextricably 
intertwined with the state-society relation or the social contract as discussed in Section 3.1) composes 
of the state’s capacity to mobilize the resources to meet the citizen demands effectively. Resource 
mobilization, in this case, can be considered as revenue (tax) collection capacities and can serve as a 
potent indicator of where a certain polity can be positioned on the fragility and resilience spectrum (Di 
John (2010), Lieberman, (2002)). Therefore, the analysis from here on shall focus on the components 
of state revenue collection that improves the resilience of the state and its relations with its citizenry. 
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The primary component in this context is the state’s monopoly over public revenue collection, and 
partly for the same reason as the state’s exclusive monopoly over the violence. Inhibiting the capacity 
of non-state actors to extract rents from the citizenry that may in turn be used to challenge the writ of 
the state over territorial boundaries as well as inhibiting the state’s capacity to deliver the mandated 
public services. Rent oriented exploitation of local populations, often through the threat of violence, 
has been witnessed in various contexts in the developing economies and sometimes in the recent 
history of the developed polities as well (e.g. the role of the Mafia in sections of Southern Italy). Given 
that such non-state actors and their rent exploitation in return of ‘protection’ commitments induce the 
same kind of compliance from the local groups of citizens as the state would mandate thereby 
shrinking the influence or a ‘sense of obligation’ to the state. Therefore, when communities, local 
groups of citizens or even enterprises are coerced into an exploitative compliance from organized 
political groups (that may be political, as in the case of Baloch insurgents in Pakistan, numerous cases 
of civil conflict in Africa and the Middle East) that challenge the writ of the state, there is a great 
potential for a conflict to arise. This conflict can, in addition to the sociopolitical distortions, can also 
inflict substantial damage to the state resilience. 
The next important component of the fiscal regime and revenue allocation to foster resilience 
finds its roots in the levels of tax collection as well as the breadth of the tax net. Considering the 
revenue collection levels, it is a fairly intuitive notion that the greater the levels of the fiscal pool (not 
disavowing the constraints outlined by the Laffer curve), the greater would be the ability of the state to 
institute broad-based service delivery and social welfare programs would also have a bearing on state 
resilience. The other part of this equation is the breadth of the tax base, i.e. the sources of the state’s 
tax revenue. This can also be considered in terms of the nature of the fiscal regime; progressive or 
regressive. This is an important aspect to consider when looking for the state’s capacity expansion as 
well as the state-society resilience. The state can have its revenue from sources other than taxation too, 
e.g. in the case of the mineral resource rich countries most of the state revenue stems from the 
domestic extractive industries. The state finds itself unaccountable to the public because most of these 
revenues channel directly into the exchequer without the state having to go through the bargaining 
processes with the socio-economic groups. This will be dealt with in a greater detail in the subsequent 
sub-section. Indirect taxation policies, most notably VAT, as well as various trade taxes may be of 
limited prospects amid the pressures of globalization and liberalization (Fund, 2013). 
Direct taxation, perhaps the most common source of state revenue in terms of personal 
income tax and corporate taxation, has a significant bearing on the extent of state resilience. This is 
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where the progressive or regressive nature of the tax regime plays an important role. In most of the 
developing contexts that are also characterized by what North (1990) considers as ‘elite capture’, the 
policy making institutions (executive and the legislature) are biased in their taxation policy to the elite 
sectoral interests. Evaluation of the quality of any fiscal system needs to take into account the 
efficiency and equity dimensions. While the former deals with the distortionary (both positive and 
negative) effects of fiscal directives on economic decisions, the latter is of a greater concern in the 
context of this discussion. The equity dimension of a fiscal system is further disaggregated into 
horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity pertains to treating taxable sources possessing similar 
attributes equally i.e. any given level of income needs to be taxed at the same rate, regardless of 
whether the source of income was labor or capital. The vertical dimension of equity argues the 
converse i.e. disparate levels of income must be matched by disparate tax rates in accordance with the 
taxpayers ability to pay. Table 4 presents an overview of the tax instruments that the state has at its 
disposal and their implications on the efficiency and equity dimensions of the fiscal system.  
Evidence of taxation as a tool to improve state-society relationship in line with the discussion 
above, can be found in the case of the Mauritian developmental regime. Based on the findings of 
Bräutigam et.al (2008), who present the case of the Mauritian government’s taxation on its sugar 
industry which is a key source of the country’s exports, it can be seen that it not only had significant 
improvements in the state-society relations but also enhanced the productive capacity of the sugar 
industry. Imposition of the tax on the sugar industry greatly increased the size of the revenue pool, as a 
result of which the government reduced personal income taxes and used these revenue flows for 
redistributive expenditures. Furthermore, a section of the fiscal flows from this tax were devoted to the 
R&D, infrastructural development and marketing purposes that enhanced the productivity of the sugar 
industry. Second, the revenue mobilized was absorbed in financing R&D, infrastructure development, 
and commercial capacity building that had positive contributions to the growth of the sugar sector. 
This fiscal tool also yielded huge solidarity gains in terms of the state’s ability to exercise its writ over 
its territorial expanse since the taxation affected the main source of employment in the rural areas. 
While such a tax imposition could be considered detrimental to the sectoral employment, it was not so 
in this case and the state ended up fostering a mutually beneficial rights and obligation arrangement 
with the farming community. Perhaps, the most notable point that distinguishes the Mauritian 
experience from other similar experiences, is that it was done in a democratic context that allowed for 
contestation, articulation and bargaining from all stakeholders. 
c) Mobilizing Domestic Natural Resource Base 
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The extraction of natural resources such as mineral and hydrocarbon deposits has become a 
large (and for many still growing) part of developing countries’ economies in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. In terms of the resource mobilization capacity, states that have a natural resource base can 
also be considered to have a higher capacity for domestic resource mobilization and effective 
developmental capacity. A wide body of literature on the resource rich economies, developing and 
developed alike, extols the ‘resource curse’ which pertains to the correlation of natural resource 
abundance and a set of negative economic and socio-political consequences [Sachs & Warner (1997), 
Collier & Hoeffler (2005), Moore (2004), Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier (2002),Bellamy & Clark (2004)]. 
Nevertheless, there is also a significant evidence in the literature to the contrary as there are numerous 
resource rich states that did not exhibit these symptoms and thus opening the debate to what accounts 
for such variations. It is in this emerging avenue of research that this section operates as it examines 
the economic, social and political dynamics that underlie the ‘natural resource led development paths’ 
and the extent to which socio-economic developmental objectives are realized. 
Most of the developing countries possessing an exploitable natural resource base, exhibit that the 
share of the natural resource rents constitute a major and growing section of the state’s aggregate 
fiscal pool (IMF, 2013). These rents may come in the form of direct revenue flows to the exchequer 
incase of nationalized resource exploitation, or taxation or in terms of resource royalties. In either of 
these possible channels of resource rents flowing into the state’s fiscal pool, there exists a great 
potential for the state to design and deliver social-welfare oriented public services in addition to the 
economic development prospects. Therefore, to realize these prospects and to build state 
developmental capacity using the mineral resource base, several requisites must be met. 
 
One such requisite is the state’s ability to avoid falling into what is known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ 
(DD). The possible ways of building state aversion to the DD include macroeconomic policy 
development that mitigates or at least counteracts the inflationary pressures that the huge foreign 
exchange inflows that the natural resource mobilization brings in, that not only affect the 
macroeconomic stability but also the competitiveness of the non-mineral production of the country 
(mainly manufacturing, and to some extent agricultural commodities). A review of the literature 
reveals that the mineral rich economies such as Norway, Chile, Botswana and Indonesia have 
emerged as successful examples of averting the Dutch Disease through a combination of various 
economic policy regimes.  Most of the resource rents were channeled towards public debt 
settlements, foreign exchange accumulation, stabilization funds, social security funds, as well as 
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controls on the capital flows in the economy to ensure their absorption to productive sectors instead 
of speculative pursuits. And while the economic and developmental policy aspects of these countries 
can be considered similar in terms of the trajectories not the extent, their progress in the political 
liberalization or democratization has been disparate (Radice, 2008). In the case of Latin American 
economies like Bolivia, Venezuela and Chile, or the South East Asian economies like Malaysia and 
Indonesia, or the African economies like Zimbabwe and Uganda, ended up in entrenching the non- 
representative and non-responsive authoritarian regimes. All of these economies either had 
dictatorial regimes or factual (not substantial) democracies that revolved around single party rules 
that designed socio-economic policies only to benefit and legitimize their incumbencies. 
 
Another facet of mobilizing domestic resource rents in particular, and DRM in general, is their 
utilization for social development policies, which is the crosscutting theme in this dissertation when 
considering the notion of development. An effective and targeted social development policy is not 
only  imperative  for  broad-based  development  but  depends  critically  on  the  amount  of  public 
resource allocation in the social policy which take the form of fiscal, policy prioritization and 
administrative effectiveness. However, the extent of public resource allocation (primarily fiscal) 
cannot be considered, apriori, as a proxy for actual incidence of expenditure and the extent to which 
they have actually yielded the desired objectives. It must be noted that while social policy remains a 
policy variable, the allocation and assimilation of the public resources is a function of the underlying 
economic and socio-economic landscape of the context in question. 
 
 
2.4 DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTALISM: SYNERGIZING DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
At the core of the developmental state lies an establishment of “..its principle of legitimacy its ability 
to promote sustained development and structural change in the productive system.” (Castells, 1992).The resurgence 
of the developmental state idea in the development policy and academic debate, and in line with the 
emerging global dynamics, there is an emerging tendency towards giving developmentalism, 
democratic credentials as well. There are contrasting arguments, keeping the developmental   state   
requisites   in   mind,   on   whether   economic   development   fosters democratization and 
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democratic consolidation29, or fostering state resilience and reconciling state autonomy through 
democratic participation enables the state to pursue a developmental policy orientation that yields 
socio-economic development. Based on this this, a more appropriate conceptualization of a 
democratic developmental state (hereon referred to as DDS), is that such a state: 
 
“..not only has the institutional attributes of a classical developmental state, i.e. being autonomous and coherent, 
but also takes on board the attributes of procedural democracy”. Edigheji (2005) 
 
This research considers this conceptualization to guide the subsequent analysis, while taking 
exception to the exclusively ‘procedural’ attributes and expanding the purview to include more 
substantive democracy attributes as well. The connection between the notions of democracy and 
developmental state is still a debated subject, especially when viewing the precedents established by 
the East Asian developmental states. Most of these East Asian states witnessed substantial economic 
gains under authoritarian regimes, with the exception of Japan where procedural electoral democracy 
was instituted in the aftermath of World War 2, but the authoritarian legacies remained for some time. 
The coercive and enforcement capabilities of the state have also been credited with the enhanced 
capacities of the East Asian countries [Evans (2012); Leenders (2007)], which then brings the 
compatibility of democratic norms with the developmental stance into question. Leenders 
(2007)argues that the case of the East Asian developmental model, in particular, illustrates the 
incompatibility of developmental policy framework pluralized politics where a multitude of groups 
have the ability to participate and articulate their interests in an unrestricted manner with the state. 
 
Contrary to this viewpoint, it can be seen that the developmental policy orientations have also 
taken roots under democratic contexts. Agreeably, there are fairly intuitive reasons to accede to the 
former, given that formulating and instituting a growth and development strategy deems imperative 
a cohesive and disciplined state, a feature that can get undermined in a pluralistic democratic context 
given the heterogeneity of demands, articulation mechanisms and agents. However, if the whole 
debate on developmentalism has to be taken as a serious strategy for a more global application, it 
must be taken into account that while economic growth is an important goal in its own right, it may 
conflict with other development imperative such as income redistribution, social development, and 
extrapolating into the greater notion of state cohesion and resilience. Opening up the contestation 
and articulation spaces may influence the agenda and the effective implementation of state policies, 
                                                             
29 See, for example, Lipset (1960) illustrated how economic development creates a large(r) middle class 
which fosters democratic consolidation 
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more often in a dilatory manner (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, Moore, & (eds.), 2008). As a result of this, 
there are pressures upon the incumbent political forces to design their policies with a relatively more 
short-term results orientation that may also undermine the strategic objectives that a developmental 
stance is geared towards, in a bid to consolidate their support and legitimacy (especially applicable in 
the ‘electoral cycle’ scheme of things). However, if we look at the aggregate trends prior to the 
current phase of global democratic transitions it can be seen that the democratic regimes and 
autocratic regimes did not have a substantial ‘results-gap’ in the average growth rates of total 
incomes, even though few authoritarian regimes did register outlying high growth rates  (Przeworski, 
Limongi, & Cheibub, 2000). 
 
The analysis in this section shall first engage with the nexus of democracy and development, and 
the recurring causality debate. Subsequently, it will engage with the idea of Democratic 
Developmental States (and through analytical extrapolation, Democratic Developmentalism). 
 
Development and Democracy: Exploring the Nexus 
While the relationship between democracy and development continues to be debated, especially 
in terms of the direction of causality, there are some assertions arguing that promoting democracy 
and development are mutually exclusive or a ‘cruel dilemma’ (Bhagwati, 1995 & 2002), and others 
consider them as complementary or reinforcing facets that operate in a symbiotic relationship. 
Democracy and development continue to be notions with constantly evolving connotations; does it 
simply occur as a result of economic growth of GDP, or are we to consider the broader notion of 
Human Development? The latter is of particular relevance to this research, given that Human 
Development goes beyond the narrow factor oriented economic approach and instead encompasses 
the broader notions of human prosperity. Admittedly, this remains a vague conceptualization so this 
research follows on Tsai (2006) operationalization of Human Development as ‘redistribution of 
collectively (in national terms) produced of goods, across income, education and healthcare avenues’. 
It must, nevertheless, be noted that while the scope of the two conceptualizations of development 
may vary, none enjoys an absolute stature as an understanding of development. For instance, high 
GDP growth does not result in broad-based development implications for the masses if the growth 
benefits are skewed in favor of a narrow segment of the populace. Similarly, human development 
initiatives remain a function of resources at the state’s disposal so in case of limited economic 
growth, the size of the redistributive pool shall also be limited. 
 
The analysis in this section is guided by the assertion by Kohli (1986) that the way authority in a 
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polity is exercised defines the parameters that the incumbent regime can operate within with regard 
to economic policy development and implementation. The underlying idea is the primacy of political 
environment in defining the development trajectories whereby the nature of the political regime 
explains the different elements of the developmental trajectory; why the state seeks development, 
why it is limited/successful in realizing those objectives, and also what type of development policy is 
pursued. Intuitively, democracy remains an ideal political regime type for growth and development, 
yet there is also evidence to the contrary, especially in the East and South East Asian cases. This 
section analyses the democracy-development connection by examining the following: 
 
i)         Why is democracy the ideal political environment requisite for development? 
 
ii)         Why do some authoritarian or limited democratic contexts fare better at development? 
 
iii)        Does the nature of regime really matter for Development? 
 
 
a)          Why is democracy the ideal political environment requisite for development? 
 
Considering the divisiveness in the literature on the democracy-development nexus, the available 
literature is of limited effect in yielding consistent explanations on why democracy affects the 
development outcomes. While the scope of the debate is quite expansive, the analysis here shall be 
limited to the main arguments that are consistent with the scope of this research. 
The oft-cited argument in favor of democracy, especially with the dominant development 
discourses on governance and institutional dimensions of development, is that democratic political 
contexts can ensure good governance which in turn promotes development (Leftwich, 2001). While 
both are non-equivalent concepts, the fact that both democracy and the good governance 
conceptualizations revere the notions of accountability, responsiveness, inclusion and transparency, 
lends the ‘mutually reinforcing’ argument some credence (Grindle, 2004, 2011). In a democratic 
context,  the  accountability  pressures  emanating  from  the  electoral  mechanisms  is  perhaps  the 
biggest advantage that democratic dispensations have over its limited variants and even autocratic 
dispensations. The pressures of being removed from incumbency or not being re-elected in 
subsequent  terms,  theoretically  fosters  the  responsiveness  of  governments  to  the  constituents. 
Related to this is the institutionalization of electoral systems and political cycles, so a ‘change in the 
guard’ has very little distortionary effects on the economy owing to the institutionalized recurrence 
of political transition (Przeworski, Limongi, & Cheibub, 2000).   This is a feature that autocratic 
regimes lack, and any attempt by the constituents to enforce a political transition comes at a greater 
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cost and distortion to the economic system. Distancing form purely theoretical discourse, it has to 
be noted that in reality while the democratic systems are more viable in avoiding prolonged periods 
of mis-governance, they can not guarantee avoiding sub-par development policies. 
 
Another premise on the democratic promise for development is that democracies have a greater 
efficiency in resource allocation, given the informational advantages that come with the pressures to 
be responsive to the electorate constituents (Pzreworski, 2002). In this context, it is not only the 
responsiveness of the government to the needs of the constituents that is important, but also the 
ability and capacity of the governments to respond to them effectively as compared to other less 
‘deliberative’ political systems, which establishes a strong linkage between democracy and its 
conduciveness for development. Furthermore, democratic political systems once functioning 
effectively are also conducive for broadbased and sustained process of inclusive redistribution of 
resources. Going beyond just the economic development parameters, effective and efficient 
redistributive mechanisms are also considered to have positive implications on the Human 
development, especially when the resource reallocation occurs in the social sectors such as health 
and education. However, the main issue regardless of the political system or the nature of the 
incumbent regime in this regard, is the ability or the willingness of the incumbents to ‘credibly 
commit’ to such redistributive norms. Whether or not they can, remains debated. Some of the 
arguments in the literature consider such a ‘commitment’ to be a rational course of action for the 
governments in developing economies as the economically poor segments and those with limited 
access to basic social needs, also happen to constitute a major segment of the populace. A 
commitment to and delivery of such redistributive benefits in such contexts, is thus politically 
expedient in addition to being positively developmental. However, the actual commitment of the 
governments to such avenues remains limited as per empirical evidence across both policy and 
academic research, primarily due to the absence of effective political pressures on the government, 
of which patronage and persistence of traditional power structures remains the most important 
reason (Pfiffner,2004). 
 
An associated explanation of this has to do with the stage of democratization that the country is 
on. In the contexts characterized by ongoing democratic transitions, clientelism and traditional 
political networks continue to wield influence but the closer it gets to democratic consolidation, 
these inequalities are mitigated. This has been referred to as a possible ‘Political Kuznets Curve’ 
(Chong, 2001 ). The idea is that in the transitory phase or early democratization stages, the polities 
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undergoing the transition shall produce a surge in income inequality (and thus by extension social 
and political inequalities as well), before it smoothens out. Acemoglu & Robinson (2002) theorize 
the existence of a possible Kuznets curve as ‘capitalist industrialization tends to increase inequality, 
but this inequality contains the seeds of its own destruction, because it induces a change in the 
political regime toward a more redistributive system’’. 
 
Another main theoretical advocacy is that democratic political contexts also provide a stable 
environment for the economy. One part of this argument is related to the notion of institutionalized 
change discussed earlier in this section, but the main basis for this assertion lies in the argument that 
democratic  contexts  are  better  equipped  to  safeguard  property  rights  and  enforce  contracts 
[Beetham (1997), Polterovich (2007)]. This research contends that the enforcement of property 
rights has less to do with ‘democracy’ per se, and more a function of the rule of law. Yet, it can be 
argued that this linkage is well founded as democratic regimes are oriented towards constitutional 
supremacy, of which enforcement and protection of property rights remains a subset (Olson, 1993). 
However, while the theoretical linkage is plausible, actual evidence illustrates that democracy can not 
necessarily be considered as an surety of rights enforcement (contractual and proprietary), especially 
in the contexts characterized by democratization because of the political elites’ self-concessionary 
and rent seeking behavior [Bermeo (2009), Przeworski, Limongi, & Cheibub (2000)]. In the contexts 
of consolidated democracies, however, due to the presence of strong accountability mechanisms 
such a surety has a higher probability. 
 
Why do some authoritarian or limited democratic contexts fare better at development? 
The interesting paradox in the debate on democracy and development’s linkage is evident in 
the case of the East and South East Asian states whereby limited democracy and a relatively 
autocratic developmental orientation led to these states registering phenomenal socio-economic 
development. Given that the complexity of the political systems in these regions, and recognizing 
the plurality of the developmental models, this section shall engage with some distinct characteristics 
that applied to most of the polities in the region instead of focusing on the economic policy milieu 
exclusively. While some of these concepts have been touched upon in the Section III, this section 
shall consider how likely each of these outcomes are as a product of the authoritarian process of 
governance as well as how the political environment was connected to the development outcomes 
across these contexts. 
 
One main characteristic of the South East Asian and East Asian states has been the high level of 
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state capacity. The case of China, South Korea and Taiwan are particular examples in this regard as 
their economic growth and socio-economic development policies were framed against a backdrop of 
state-led protectionism and a market-oriented economic growth that was augmented by strong 
structural enforcement by the state. One of the key reforms in this regard was the Land Reform at 
the very outset of their developmental policy stance, which was aimed at creating a relatively equal 
structure of resource ownership in the society [Beetham (1997), Bhalla (1997)]. Drawing on Bhalla 
(1997), the case of South Korea in particular was the most significant illustration of this policy 
bearing fruit as economic growth (% growth in GDP per capita) was also accompanied by a 
corresponding improvement in the Human Development, including but not limited to Human 
Capital development as well. This in turn augmented the GDP growth in what is referred to as a 
‘virtuous cycle’.  State capacity, as discussed in Section 3.1, also has its linkage with authoritarianism. 
 
Another related attribute of the successful developmental states with limited democratic norms 
at best has been a higher degree of state autonomy. State Autonomy pertains to the degree to which 
the state has influence over indigenous policy design, implementation and continuity. In the contexts 
where the political space is less pluralized and is characterized by a single party and/or autocrat, the 
longevity  of  developmental  policy  framework  has  more  chances  of  evading  retraction  or 
modifications from changes in incumbency. The case of Indonesia under President Suharto (1967- 
1998), South Korea under Park 1961-1979, Pakistan under Ayub Khan (1959-1969), are examples in 
support of this assertion as in each of these contexts significant GDP growth was witnessed as 
developmental plans were put into action with little opposition and over a longer term than in the 
democratic electoral cycles. An associated example, building on what was discussed in Section 3.3 (a) 
is that of Park regime in South Korea where the government implemented coercive savings policies 
that also included the suppression of consumption oriented investments (by firms and hence 
consumers). Such policies would have most likely failed in their implementation, had the nature of 
the regime been more democratic and thus the coercive abilities of more autocratic regimes provides 
a higher guarantee for effective implementation. 
 
Drawing on the discussion in the preceding sub-section, political stability (disregarding the 
nature of the regime for now) is an important factor for development. Political stability is linked to 
both state capacity and state autonomy discussed above primarily in terms of how they accrue. The 
flipside of the autonomy and capacity enhancement is that most often this occurs in the absence of 
or the expense of an active civil society (as evident in the case of China). Looking at the case of the 
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East Asian economies (China, South Korea and Indonesia, in particular), the stability of the political 
system was achieved even under distinctly autocratic contexts, where the regime stability was a 
product of an inclusive economic progress. Basing on the lessons illustrated by the East Asian 
contexts, one can conclusively argue that where improvements in both economic growth as well as 
human development are registered in a process of transformative inclusive development, the 
incumbent governments regardless of their nature as well as the repressiveness have a higher 
probability of stability. However, this depends critically on another factor, which is the commitment 
of the governing elite to the developmental objectives. However, a higher degree of state stability 
and  autonomy  is  counterproductive,  if  not  characterized  by  a  committed  developmental  elite 
whereby the orientation of the incumbent executive is in line with the developmental objectives, as 
compared to narrow self-interests. 
 
Thus, why certain autocratic contexts are more successful than many democracies in the 
developing world is actually an observable function of high state capacity and autonomy in a stable 
political background, an overarching commitment to a developmental orientation by the incumbent 
political executives, all operating in tandem. This has been an attribute, primarily in the context of 
the Asian economic miracles where a simultaneous existence of each of these factors resulted not 
only in significant economic development (in GDP terms) but also sustained improvements in the 
Human Development realm. While it has to be acknowledged that this cannot be taken as a sure-fire 
way of ensuring socio-economic development, the evidence serves at best a normative direction 
whereby the role of state subject to the attributes discussed above, is highly providential in framing a 
trajectory for socio-economic development.  The  common  pattern  that  emerges  from  the 
experiences of the successful autocratic dispensations is that social repression (not always vicious) 
enhanced state capacity and autonomy, triggering off a virtuous cycle whereby the legitimacy to 
govern was driven more by the observable gains in economic and human development realms than 
by the liberal political ideals and constitutional premises. The ‘built –in stabilizers’ in such systems 
exert significant pressure upon the incumbents to be more developmentally oriented for their own 
regime stability in particular and political stability in general. 
 
c)          Does the nature of regime really matter for development? 
 
While the preceding two subsections engaged with the developmental outcomes of successful 
democratic and autocratic cases, this section shall build upon the arguments surmised earlier to 
examine if the reasons for the growth and development across the two ends of the regime spectrum 
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mutually exclusive? The main virtue of the authoritarian developmental contexts was the high level 
of state autonomy, whereas in the case of democratic contexts it is actually the converse – 
responsiveness and accountability to the citizens.  While autonomy of the state entitles the 
incumbents a degree of independence to pursue rapid development with little articulation of 
contentions on the long term development strategies, the contrary case of democratic solidarity and 
consolidation exerts progressive pressures upon the incumbents through deliberative, responsive 
and accountable developmental policy frameworks. Furthermore, while the electoral pressures (as an 
accountability  instrument)  upon  the  incumbents  to  ensure  wellbeing  of citizens  is  hailed  as  a 
strength  of  democratic  systems,  the  (relative)  longevity  of  the  autocratic  regimes  ensures 
unobstructed and consistent policy implementation is presented as a virtue of the autocratic systems. 
Going by these theorizations and arguments, the debate on what political system is most conducive 
to development remains inconclusive. 
 
Democratic contexts generally are inhibitive in terms of any radical change, unlike the 
authoritarian regimes, as they need to arrive at least at a minimally necessary consensus amongst all 
representatives of the populace before any policy or framework can take root. This consensus, in 
line with the real-politik, can rarely be (if ever) unanimous but often involves significant bargaining 
with the political parties and agencies that are non-incumbent in the executive but are either on the 
opposition in the legislatures or represent large scathes of the population or even act as an influential 
articulation forum for the constituents (e.g. civil society organizations). The incumbent party 
emerging victorious from the electoral rounds cannot unilaterally promulgate and put into effect, 
policy frameworks of its own preference unless some consensus is reached with the other actors in 
the political and social space, failure to do wish exposes them to a dissatisfied electorates. This form 
of pressures are considered as the Horizontal Accountability, whereby the more the plurality in the 
political space, the higher the horizontal accountability.  
While it makes the governing process more accountable and responsive to a broader set of 
citizen expectations, it can also lead way to elite rent- seeking behavior, especially in the contexts in a 
political transition, whereby the political elites with little  vertical  accountability  to  their  electoral  
base  negotiate  rents  horizontally  to  favor  certain policies. Nevertheless, subject to strong and 
effective vertical downward accountability mechanisms, democratic regimes can be considered to be 
favorable to incremental development instead of radical development trajectories [Leftwich (2005), 
Polterovich (2007)]. While there is a high degree of intuitive credence that can be attributed to this 
assertion,   this cannot be taken as a rule of the thumb as there is evidence that two mono-party 
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democratic contexts(having most of the liberal democracy features barring greater plurality), namely 
Botswana and Singapore have seen radical and positive developmental shifts. In both the countries, 
one major party has been at the helm of the affairs for most part of the country’s existence; 
Botswana Democratic Party since 1966 and the People’s Action Party in Singapore since 1959. This 
signifies that if there is a legitimate and committed political elite, with an almost unanimous 
support base, radical developmental reforms can still be instituted and taken to effect. Thus, only a 
particular form of liberal democracy can be conducive to radical development, which in turn is a 
function of the extent of socio-cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the populace as mono-party rules 
can be of little success in radical development trajectories in the contexts where multiple  
cleavages exist e.g. Ethiopia,  India or Melanesian states. 
The obvious connection to explore now is that what gains can be expected from the democratic 
 
‘incrementalism’ in developmental stance. As covered in 4.1 (a), incorporation of liberal democratic 
norms guarantees accountability, responsiveness, participation, amongst other facets of what is 
considered as ‘good governance’ although some of these facets of good governance can also be seen 
in limited democracies or autocracies, as the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, Botswana illustrate in Fig 
1. Figure 1, illustrates this growth variance (a proxy for the broader developmental notion) across 
the regime types for 167 countries. Using the Polity IV dataset for the Democracy scores and log 
GDP/capita (1960-2012) for these countries, it can be seen that there is a greater smoothening out 
of growth variances as the state of democracy improves30.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 The figure was taken from an NYU Development Research Institute discussion series. Democracy measure is derived from 
the Polity IV scores :(0-10 where 0 is total democracy and 10 is total democracy. Growth rates are a geometric mean (log 
values) for the period 1960-2012 of the GDP/capita growth per annum compiled from the World Development Indicator. 
However, an argument was also made in the same discussion on how basing it solely on the nature of regime downplays the 
role of other influential factors such as sectoral composition of growth, dependence on commodity exports, civil wars and 
other similar dimensions that could have a similar dispersion of development outcomes.  
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Figure 6: Growth variance according to Regime Types 
Source: NYU Development Research Institute 
As compared to the autocratic regimes, democratic regimes tend to be more conducive to the 
development of socio-political institutions as they derive their legitimacy through constitutional 
mechanisms, regime and political stability. Admittedly, making legitimacy a function of socio-
economic development is not a viable concept as effective and inclusive developmental strategies 
may not be as palpable in one context as they could be in another, given that a host of socio-cultural 
factors and a historical institutional inertia is of a far greater effect in dictating the outcomes and the 
pace of the reform. Furthermore, institutionalized support to the regime in the form of 
constitutional cover enhances political stability as well as a certain  degree  of  regime  stability,  
indirectly  facilitating  steady  and  sustained  development (Przeworski, Limongi, & Cheibub, 2000). 
Thus, the main difference between the type of regime and the extent of development is that while 
autocratic forms are more likely to obtain rapid and transformative developmental outcomes, they 
are also vulnerable to ‘policy disasters’ (Higgott & Nesadurai, 2002), democratic forms of 
governments can be built on incremental and stable grounds whereby the amplitude of growth might 
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be lesser but the stability and sustainability is much higher. 
An associated feature that needs to be acknowledged is that the advantages of regime type are 
associated with the degree of their consolidation. Even in democratic contexts, in real politik scheme 
of thinking, the elite continues to be entitled to privileges compared to the rest of the society, a 
feature that takes far perverse forms in transitionary democracies especially if characterized by 
endemic exclusionary structures, a characteristic of many developing countries of the world.  The 
same strand of thought retains its credibility once considering the ‘good governance’ imperatives e.g. 
enforcing property rights and effective resource allocation [Tsai, (2006), Addison, (2002)]. Effective, 
efficient and responsive resource allocation may come as a consequence of the democratic 
consolidation. In the case of autocracies, the virtues related with autonomy, stability and 
transformative development remain a function of the degree of power consolidation, legitimacy, 
longevity and stability. 
 
The temporal dimensions of the regimes in place are also of huge importance in terms of the 
stability of the political system, and through extrapolation, the developmental implications as well. 
This research diverges from most of the empirical examinations that consider development as a 
function of the immediate or short-term political background. Instead, it puts forth the argument of 
institutional inertia argument to state that whether a polity is autocratic or democratic at a given time 
has an influence on its developmental trajectory. The idea is that since the effects of consolidation or 
transition of political institutions begin to surface, not in the immediate but medium to long-term 
and the temporal effects are cumulative. Therefore, any analysis on the broader political stability or 
the developmental aspects of a certain regime/ political system must take into account the 
accumulated effect instead of the current nature. 
 
While  the  debate  on  the  relevance  of  the  regime  nature  to  the  developmental  trajectory 
continues, there are a few broader conclusions that can be drawn from the literature and the analysis 
in the earlier paragraphs. While democracy can be considered as more probable in fostering good 
governance, which in the absence of the requisite state autonomy and capacity may not yield high 
and sustained socio-economic development. The developmental implications of the regime type are 
more aptly functions of the degree of consolidation of each regime type. The advantages of 
consolidated democratic systems and consolidated autocratic systems (like those of the Confucian 
Authoritarian examples of East Asia) are easy to realize but in the transitionary contexts there is a 
substantial ground that needs to be covered. The distinct advantages of either of the regime types 
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can  be  considered  to  merge  somewhat  in  the  contexts  where  democratic  dispensations  are 
characterized by limited plurality in the political space (e.g. democratic regimes in a mono-party 
context), but there are few observable examples of such a system with high developmental impact in 
the real world. Thus, the question should be directed not at which of the regime types is more 
conducive to highly transformative socio-economic development, but instead at what regime type 
offers greater sustainability to the process of socio-economic development. Looking at the cases 
where high economic development has been registered (East and South East Asian economies 
primarily) under authoritarian regimes, it must be enquired whether the policy frameworks and 
political organization behind such ‘economic miracles’ really desirable and worth replicating across 
the  globe  especially  when  they  come  without  a  credibly  guaranteed  corresponding  social 
development (as argued, albeit apriori in the case of democracies)? The answer to that remains 
ambiguous at best and negative at least. Therefore, while the rapidly transformative attributes of 
autocracies, subject of course to state capacity, elite commitment and autonomy, are well-founded 
arguments,  the  gradual  incrementalism  that  democratic  dispensations  entail  is  of  a  greater 
importance and value to the sustainable socio-economic development. 
 
Democratic Developmentalism 
Few  states   in  the  developing world  have   been   able  to  sustain     even the  most  basic 
elements  of democracy, and of these only a few have been able to generate and sustain high per 
annum growth of their   GNP  per  capita   over  the  last  thirty   years, or to lift  the  bulk of  their 
people    out    of   poverty,   hardship,    and    vulnerability:   they include Botswana,   Singapore, 
Malaysia,  and  Mauritius (UNRISD, 2008).  These contexts present themselves as an example of 
developmental democracies as they are characterized by a developmental orientation as well as a 
democratic (at least procedurally) government.  Building on the preceding section of regime nature 
and developmental impact, it can be observed that while there are good explanatory accounts of why 
some non- democratic or limited democratic contexts (in East and South East Asia primarily) have  
been  able to manage rapid  and  sustained economic growth over  time, there is very scant literature 
or account of why some of the democratic states have been able to do the same. This section 
examines what particular conditions enable a democratic state to generate the capabilities requisite 
for its transformation into a successful developmental state. 
Intuitively, a democratic developmental state can be one that has a sustained medium to high 
economic growth rate (minimum 4% annual GDP per capita) over the medium to long term (5-10 
years), while also being characterized by the democratic norms (Edigheji, 2005). Democratic norms, 
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for standardization  purposes,  are  being  considered  in  the  minimal  ‘Schumpeterian’  concept  of 
democracy31: established national political system in which people, political organizations, and social 
groups  have  the  liberty  to  pursue  their  interests  in  a  peaceful,  institutionalized  process  of 
competition, negotiation and cooperation. In real terms, this pertains to the free and fair electoral 
cycles,  smooth  transitions  of  incumbency,  pluralized  political  space  with  low  barriers  of 
participation, and the protection of civil and political rights and liberties. The observable trends in 
the literature on the issue thus far has been that electoral democracy with competitive political 
parties is yet to play an important role in fostering democratic developmental states primarily owing 
to inadequate institutionalization and perverse clientilistic traditions (World , 2008). In addition, the 
process of democratic deliberation is crucial in creating a broader social consensus around the 
developmental plan. However, this requires the existence of a more substantive form of democracy 
than mere electoral democracy. 
The experiences of successful developmental states thus far, illustrate that the ideological 
commitment of a ‘developmentally oriented political elite’ alone is not enough, but such a 
commitment must also be embedded in the broader societal aspirations. Intuitively speaking, a 
national development vision is particularly effective (as the case of Bolivia under Morales post 2006 
illustrates) when there is a broad consensus around it, and vice versa (as observable in the case of 
Ethiopia after the Zanawi government incorporated a National Development Strategy). However, 
keeping the intuitive concepts aside, this section examines two propositions which, once considered 
in tandem, illustrate the main structural barrier that makes the establishment and sustenance of 
democratic developmental states an arduous affair. The first proposition  borrows on Leftwich 
argument that a consolidated and stable democracy (in the minimalist representative form, as is the 
case with most of the developing economies) is a conservative system of power (Leftwich, 2005). 
The idea is that in such a form of democracy the processes of decision making as well as the policy 
outputs  are  ‘conservative’  as  they  are  a  function  of  inter-elite  accommodation,  concessionary 
consensus building, and the incrementalism (as discussed in the previous section), and are rarely 
rooted  in  popular  participation.  The  second  proposition  is  that  developmentalism  (as  a  more 
terminal policy framework than merely short term growth orientation) is radical and distortive in 
terms of changing the utilization and appropriation of resources directed at a structural 
                                                             
31 The Schumpeterian minimalist conceptualization of democracy is an ‘institutional arrangement  for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means  of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter 1965: 269) 
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transformation of the polity. As a consequence of such a transformation, there is a corresponding 
transformation in the socio-political aspirations and interests that challenge the already existing ones. 
This  is  where  the  fundamental  structural  barrier  to  the   establishment  of  a   Democratic 
Developmental State comes in, that is that the imperatives developmental consolidation and 
democratic consolidation rarely, if ever, converge. It is important to mention that this assertion does 
not disavow the imperfections and distortive effects of democratic politics, but if the consensus- 
building and accommodation dynamics underlying the democratic processes are sidelined, the very 
edifice of the democratic system may be threatened (as has been witnessed frequently in the case of 
Pakistan where most of the military takeovers found their roots in the inadequacy of political 
bargaining). 
 
Thus, for a democratic developmentalism to take root, a balance must be achieved between the 
rules and processes of stable democratic politics (accommodation, consensualism, incrementalism, 
negotiation, and other bargaining and contestation mechanisms) which lie in contrast to the 
developmental requisites of substantive changes to the economic and social structure of the context 
(and by extrapolation the interest structures existing within the polities). It is this structural barrier 
that must be mitigated by democratic regimes (at low and high levels of consolidation, alike) if they 
are to emerge as successful democratic developmental states. 
 
The notions of the establishment and sustainability of DDS is inextricably linked to the notion of 
democratization. The processes of democratization are a heterogeneous affair across the contexts, 
and the available literature on the comparative experiences illustrates that the main impetus of 
democratization (in terms of the impulse as well as agents) have sometimes been predominantly 
internal (as in the case of Bolivia, Taiwan, South Korea, India, Philippines among others) and 
sometimes been external (as in the case of most developing countries in SSA, as a result of donor 
and bilateral agency(ies) advocacies) (UNRISD, 2008). The most commonly observable trend has 
been a varying mix of both internal and external articulation as observed in the Post-Communist 
CIS states or in South Asia (Pakistan, in particular). The internal pressures for democratization have 
sometimes been bottoms up (Bolivia, Venezuala, Philippines, as notable examples), but mostly it has 
been a result of elite negotiations and bargains devoid of any potent impulse or articulation from the 
broader citizenry. Regardless of where the impetus of the democratization reform came from, or the 
nature of the agents of reform, any transitory phase needs to be consolidated if it has to be 
sustained.  
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According to Przeworski et.al (2000), democratization is a ‘process of institutionalizing uncertainity, of 
subjecting all interests to uncertainity’ , and while this is theoretically a good way to approach the notion 
of democratization, this research argues that democratic consolidation will be limited at best, unless 
the extent of uncertainity in the political system and the associated dynamics are systematically 
reduced. Prioritizing bargaining and inter-elite negotiations is essential for democratic consolidation, 
and where a functional consensus is actually achieved, the uncertainty underlying reform processes 
and the policy framework is reduced. While this remains a fairly intuitive concept, the complexity of 
‘real politik’ needs to be examined in terms of what particular conditions favor the process of 
democratic consolidation? A review of the available literature on the issue presents a variety of 
imperative political conditions(Ansell & Samuels, 2010; Eaton, 2008; White, 1998), however this 
research identifies three main imperatives as under: 
 
          Legitimacy 
 
While  being  a  highly  subjective  concept  to  examine  and  quantify,  the  main  idea  behind 
legitimacy is the acceptance of the authority by the populace. Legitimacy, in turn, is rooted in three 
further realms; geographical (Constituents’ acceptance of the state’s territorial ambit), constitutional 
(constituents’ acceptance of the formal rules of organization, distribution and exercise of political 
power) and political (constituents’ acknowledgment that government incumbency is rooted in free 
and fair electoral rounds). In the absence of these forms of legitimacy, there is always a latent 
potential for state and political instability, including violent secessionist movement or civil conflicts 
that have been witnessed and continue to be witnessed in most parts of the developing world 
(Chechnya, Former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Eriteria, Pakistan and Bangladesh, amongst others.). 
Weak democratic systems have a higher degree of vulnerability to such fissures in the state and 
social  stratification,  which  substantially  inhibits  the  prospects  of  the  establishment  and/or 
sustenance of democratic developmentalism. 
          Consensus and Constitutionalism 
 
Democratic   consolidation   deems imperative an agreement upon the accepted ‘rules of the 
political game’(North, 1990) by all the actors in the political space and the social groups, ideally 
incorporated into clear constitutional provisions. The organization, conduct and outcomes of 
electoral rounds need to be clearly demarcated and held subservient to the constitutional provisions. 
Furthermore, the organs of the state, most importantly the military be held subservient to the state 
executive with constitutional demarcation of its role and punitive deterrent provisions for its role in 
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the regime changes (at the behest of losers of the electoral rounds or as a function of its own whim 
to obtain incumbency), thereby mitigating any threats to the democratic institutional evolution. 
 
          Policy restraint by winners 
 
A key element of democratic consolidation is that the winners of the electoral rounds have to 
evade the tendency to exclusively pursue their own policy agenda at the expense of the unsuccessful 
political organization(s), agency(ies), social group(s), or sectorally rooted influences (military, private 
capital etc). There is a latent probability, as has been observed in the episodes of political instability 
and regime transitions in the developing world, that the social, economic and political stakeholders 
who yielded limited or no benefit from the electoral processes fear losing out on the interests they 
have in the system and may collude together to destabilize the established political order. The less 
there is to risk in the event of a loss, the lesser the probability of such agents to destabilize the 
established order. However, the onus of stability does not rest exclusively with those losing in the 
electoral rounds but also upon the victors, who must realize that their incumbency remains exposed 
to certain limits and the existence of plurality in the political space requires some power and 
authority to be shared across the political space. Thus, for democratic consolidation to occur, the 
incumbents must not monopolistically pursue contentious policy agendas without factoring in the 
risk exposure of the losing quarters. 
 
While critical to the process of democratic consolidation, these three imperatives are arduous 
pursuits in their own right, especially in evolving political contexts as is the case with much of the 
developing countries, especially the two this research engages with. In the contexts characterized by 
endemic poverty and socio-economic inequalities, democratic consolidation can be a tall order to 
meet because of the underlying clientilistic political ethos coupled with the traditional forms of 
authority inhibiting any substantive impulses to participate in the political space (P. Bardhan, 2005; 
P. K. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; García-Guadilla & Pérez, 2002).  
2.5 DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTALISM 
Having examined the concepts, requisites of establishing a democratic developmental state and 
the imperatives of governance quality improvements, some of the recurrent imperatives across all 
these discussions have been accountability, responsiveness, participation, inclusion, and effective 
public service delivery. While the centrality of politics in development has been an oft-cited 
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concept, and the reinvigorated role of the state is not only unprecedented but complex. Thus, any 
discourse on building  state  capacity  for  broad-based  and  inclusive  development  as  well  as  a  
socio-political inclusion is rooted primarily in the composition of the political agents in any given 
context, and the political agency does not pertain exclusively to central level of state but also local. 
This centrality of politics, with an increasing focus upon the local political space, has been argued 
vociferously in the literature  with  little  account  of  how  to  establish  growth  and  development  
oriented  political structures and incentive-compatibility of broader political interests with the 
developmental agenda (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).   Yet there is an increasing advocacy of the 
applicability of the economic theoreies of competition and incentive-compatibility that can be 
applied to understand the competitive  dynamics  of  the  political  agents  and  the  incentive  
structures  once  they  are  in incumbency. 
This section, building upon the earlier discussion on decentralization in Chapter 1, presents an 
analysis of how successful economic development and democratization are more probable in the 
context of a decentralized democracy. The main intellectual impetus for decentralization extols its 
virtues for democratic, accountable and responsive governance, and its economic effects mainly on 
the lines of efficiency (in the delivery of core public services and goods. Given that the provision of 
public goods does not take place under competitive market conditions, and thus it is the state’s 
responsibility to ensure responsiveness of the provision to the aggregated preferences of the 
constituents to the maximum extent possible. However, given the heterogeneity of individual 
preferences across the constituent base, the extent to which the state’s tax and service provision mix 
reflects the aggregated preferences remains inadequate at best. Thus, in a context of decentralized 
governance, where the administrative and fiscal dimensions of public service delivery and 
resource mobilization is rooted in relatively more homogenous constituencies, the ‘responsiveness 
deficit’ between the community preferences and the policy milieu is mitigated thereby enhancing 
allocative efficiency, and through analytical extrapolation, social welfare. While this is a strong 
advocacy of the pro-efficiency virtues of decentralized governance, the flip side of it has that it can 
reinforce or even exacerbate existing regional inequalities and service delivery inefficiencies. While 
decentralization in no way exclusively implies absolute autonomy, the role of the central government 
(especially in terms of central fiscal transfers) continues to be important for regional equalization. 
 
Furthermore, considering the pro-centralization line of argument, local public service provision 
could also be more inefficient in terms of the cost of acquiring the information and the resource 
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mobilization; which can be far less costly endeavors under a centralized agency because of the 
‘economies  of  scale’  effect  (Triesman,  2000).   
In theoretical terms, it is fairly intuitive and easy to argue that central government has its 
agents placed in each community to acquire aggregated information of community preferences and 
relay back to the centre at low cost. This data is then used by the centre, which produces all public 
goods and allocates the goods in the solicited amounts and qualities to the different localities. The 
main assumption in this model is that economies of scale exist (due to mass production and 
provision) and the costs of information gathering and back-forth delivery are lower than that of a 
decentralized setup. Assuming these hold, which in a static context may be a plausible stance but at 
best contentious in a more dynamic context, a case for centralized governance is quite 
convincing. 
However, as this research has argued, the possibility of a centralized governance system being 
effectively representative and responsive of the constituents’ preferences is inextricably linked to the 
structure of the governmental organizations and the underlying incentives as well as the incentives 
they produce. An associated argument can thus be that viewing the issue of governance structuring 
purely from the ‘economic efficiency’ lens is more probable to ignore the influential explanatory 
variables and thus any ‘causal’ conclusions emerging from a narrow analysis of the economic aspects 
engaging exclusively with the economic costs and benefits, would be more conflated. 
Perhaps a more cogent case for decentralized governance can be built by engaging in a 
broader analysis of its governance virtues i.e. accountability, responsiveness, political participation, 
diversity in the policy mix and enabling a citizen stake in the polity. The responsiveness and 
accountability are perhaps the most influential arguments in the governance realm too, and can be 
considered as the political equivalent of economic efficiency. The proximity of the government 
to its constituents under a decentralized setup not only enables greater accountability (assuming 
minimal imperfections in the local electoral mechanisms) because of observation ease, but also 
fosters a greater responsiveness of the political incumbents to the needs of their constituents. Both 
these facets, reinforce the degree of congruence and consistency of the public policy design and 
delivery to the constituents’ preferences. Intuitively and theoretically, this is a credible assertion 
however this continues to be an apriori strand of argumentation because there is also evidence in the 
literature about the susceptibility of local political space reinforcing elite capture or special interest- 
articulation(P. K. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Dauda, 2006; Guarneros-Meza & Geddes, 2010). 
Thus, the extent to which responsiveness and accountability can be maximized under decentralized 
89 
 
governance structures depends on the type of decentralization pursued, the sequencing of the 
reforms.  
 
Getting back briefly to the possibility of decentralized governance becoming a tool for 
reinforcing centralized governance, there is limited evidence that it does (Akai, Hosoi, & 
Nishimura, 2009a; Andrews & Vries, 2007; Burki et al., 1999; García-Guadilla & Pérez, 2002). The 
decentralization of authority to local levels is argued to promote political participation as it enables a 
proximate political platform to the constituents while also fostering accountability which in addition 
to improving government responsiveness also promotes greater political stability due to bottom- 
up pressure. Thus, the probability of an effectively designed decentralization reform that yields local 
governance structures capable of effective gauging of constituent preferences as well as having 
strong incentives to attend to them, in a higher degree than in a centralized setup, is a strong enough 
impetus for the debate in the favor of decentralized governance even in a developmental backdrop.  
 Revisiting the prior discussion on the productive efficiency of centralized provision of public 
services vis-à-vis a decentralized local provision, the latter can have a greater allocative efficiency 
primarily because the incentives of the local government agents are more closely aligned to the 
interests of their constituency as compared to the former. However, this depends critically on the 
extent to which the local agents are effectively accountable to the constituents and the degree to which 
local participation is reflected in the electoral representation. This is a fairly intuitive considering that 
the central government agents have a broader constituency, interests and incentives to respond to, 
thus local government is by default more targeted and responsive to its core constituency. 
 
This argument brings forth the critical role of institutions, incentives and accountability in the 
provision of ‘local’ public services, which in itself is a critical building block of a political economy 
model’ (presented in the preceding chapter) of decentralization, local government and optimal local 
service provision (Faguet, 2002; Falleti & Lynch, 2009). While details of these models are beyond the 
current scope of discussion, they extol exclusively the degree of local governments’ autonomy which 
is a function of local discretion over domestic resource pools, the nature of democracy at the local 
level ( in terms of effective representation and accountability), the accuracy of information that the 
voters possess (for effective accountability through electoral rounds amongst others), and finally the 
existence of enforcement institutions or mechanisms (constitutional provisions, legal provisions) that 
regulate the activities of the local political agents to prevent the abuse of authority or 
misappropriation. These are of a good contribution in terms of putting forth a framework of 
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analyzing the political economy dimensions of decentralization and local governance.  
However, not only are all these facets variable cross-contextually speaking, but the ‘autonomy’ of 
the local governance structures may not necessarily be linked to all of these factors, e.g. local 
discretion of domestic resource pools may only be of importance in resource-rich contexts (Bolivia, 
Venezuala, Botswana, among others), but are linked also to the process of reform as a consequence 
of which such governance structures come into existence as illustrated earlier in Chapter 1. 
Governance reforms, in general and decentralization in particular, have significant implications for 
the public sector organization as well as its deliverables, and more so in the case of developing 
countries. The main reason for this complexity is because of the weak institutional frameworks, 
information mechanisms and capacity constraints. While the broader debate on decentralization 
is expansive given the current context, the analysis from hereon shall deal with the implications of 
the decentralization  reforms  in  the  context  of  establishing  a  democratic  developmental  policy 
framework. The analysis henceforth shall also serve as a prelude to the case analysis that follows in 
the two subsequent chapters. The primary focus in this section shall be on decentralization reforms’ 
impact on inter-regional equality and the broader notion of economic stability implicit in the analysis 
of which, are the notions of accountability, responsiveness and efficiency. 
 
Implications for Equity 
While there are numerous hypotheses and arguments in favor of this linkage, the degree and 
nature of the impact depends critically on the institutional framework and policy design processes 
including reform agents, interest articulation mechanisms and the sequential aspects of 
decentralization. In a context where the fiscal decentralization is the main reform agenda with the 
central government designs a fiscal distribution mechanism that does not redistribute resources to 
poorer regions of the polity, the reform is going to exacerbate existing inequalities instead of 
mitigating them. Contrarily, if the regions or the provinces do not redistribute their fiscal pools 
within their constituent jurisdictions, the extent and quality of ‘localized’ public service provision shall 
be suboptimal. Other equity promoting mechanisms include the fiscal transfer mechanisms, 
horizontal (across the same level) and vertical (downstream transfers from superior levels of 
government). Contingent upon the preferences of the political actors at the central and/or 
subnational governments, a framework for inter-governmental transfers (vertical or horizontal) with 
equalization components can be devised to ensure a comparable level of public service delivery (in 
quality and scale) throughout the polity. How such intergovernmental transfers/ grants are designed 
depends in turn on the existing state of inter-regional equality as well as a function of political 
91 
 
consociationalism and consensus (Akai, Hosoi, & Nishimura, 2009b; Garman, Haggard, & Willis, 
2001; Rodden, 2001). Such transfers can assume various forms in their design as illustrated by 
Figure 3, and their design and monitoring further determines the extent to which decentralization 
fosters inter-regional equality of public service provision at various levels of state organization i.e. 
regional/provincial, towns and municipalities, and households. 
 
 
 
 
 
The grants/ transfers can take two distinct forms; earmarked and non-earmarked. The former 
pertains to a grant or transfer that is disbursed conditionally for a specific purpose whereas the latter 
is an unconditional disbursement with no binding on the absorption of the fiscal resources by the 
subnational government. These grants, conditional or unconditional can further be categorized into 
discretionary or obligatory/ mandatory. The mandatory grants have legally mandated rules on the 
size and mechanisms of the disbursement and are usually a product of centrally sponsored revenue 
sharing agreements, both horizontally and vertically. Most of the grants and transfers made are of 
this  nature.  The  discretionary  grants  on  the  contrary  are  not  mandated  by  legal  bindings  or 
sponsored by the centre, but instead made on a ‘voluntary’/discretionary basis either vertically or 
horizontally, on an ad-hoc but not necessarily recurrent basis. 
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The  earmarked  mandatory  grants  can  take  the  form  of  matching  or  nonmatching  grants. 
Matching contributions augment subnational revenue contributions to the fiscal pools and are linked 
to the budgeted or actual expenditures for which the grants are earmarked. Any differences between 
the revenue contribution and its subsequent transfer back to the subnational level and the 
expenditure responsibilities of the subnational government will be bridged using these grants. 
Contrarily, all grants that are not disbursed in augmentation of subnational budget for the earmarked 
area are known as the non-matching grants. These forms of mandatory grants may also be a 
function of contingencies or even performance indicators. 
Non-earmarked mandatory transfers can be in the form of general purpose or block grants. Such 
 
grants are aimed at increasing the subnational fiscal revenue pool without yielding any change to the 
relative prices of service provision. General purpose, as evident, has no binding upon the recipient 
to use it for a pre-specified absorption. A block grant on the contrary, is made with a specific 
purpose(s) but because of being non-earmarked the recipient has full discretion over the use of the 
grant within the thematic parameters of the grant (different from the earmarked grants in terms of 
the scope and the extent of discretion the grantor has on the utilization of the funds). 
Using revenue sharing and fiscal transfer mechanisms sponsored by the centre for equalization 
purposes amongst the subnational governments, enables a redistributive regime that has significant 
implications not only for reducing inequalities but also fostering state cohesion. This is a crucial 
ingredient to the development and sustainability of a national developmental framework, where 
greater subnational stakeholding enhances the developmental capacity of the state. Fiscal 
equalization, when linked to strong accountability and performance indicators as the determinants of 
the disbursements enable not only policy consistency but also relative homogeniety in the quality of 
public service provision across the national space, with collaborative rather than competitive 
subnational policy framework. In the presence of significant regional inequalities, invoking 
competitive subnational economic policy framework shall exacerbate rather than mitigate the 
inequalities contrary to the Tiebout hypothesis. Once a certain degree of standardization in the fiscal 
capacities of each of the subnational constituencies is achieved, competitive economic policy 
frameworks in terms of tax- services mix can be pursued by the subnational governments and the 
ensuing competitiveness shall deliver the accountability, responsiveness, efficiency and innovation 
requisites that will reinforce the developmental trajectory by extending a bottom’s up reinforcement 
instead of a top-down stipulation. 
The degree to which decentralization has a potent bearing on the equity dimension across the 
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polity (transcending the relatively macro interregional equality by including also the socio-economic 
inequalities) is also a function of the degree of local accountability structures and the degree of 
political participation by the poor segments of the citizenry. If the local political space is inclusive 
such that poor people have limited constraints for active participation in the political space, there is 
an increased probability of responsiveness and accountability pressures upon the political leaders. 
Any democratic political system, at the local or national level is of limited substantive value in the 
absence of genuine political participation by all segments of the society. For example, India has a 
long-standing democratic tradition with a considerable degree of local governance apparatus as well 
yet the influential role of the caste system in social stature and political participation excludes a large 
segment of the population from an active stake in the political system or the governance process. 
Contrarily, in the contexts where there is strong local participation, e.g. Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, 
there is evidence of targeted poverty expenditures due to greater articulation by the local 
governments [Tsai (2006)]. 
 
Implications for Economic Stability 
 
Linked primarily to the fiscal decentralization reforms, there is now an emerging consensus on 
how to design decentralization reforms (fiscal primarily, but also administrative and political) owing 
to various instances of excessive ‘deficit-financing’ and ‘soft budget constraints’ of the sub national 
governments(Akai et al., 2009b; Rodden, 2001; Rodden & Wibbels, 2011). The evidence in both 
academic and policy debates on this issue boils down to one main factor; greater expenditure 
responsibilities decentralized to subnational levels than fiscal resources. Given that the control over 
the fiscal resources is an important tool for deriving influence, the centrally led decentralization 
reform processes across most developing countries has focused more on the expenditure and 
functional decentralization to the subnational governments without equipping with the fiscal base 
requisite to meet those obligations. As a consequence of this, the subnational governments have 
either had to obtain more grants or transfers from the centre or horizontally, or in some cases on 
the  basis  of  sovereign  guarantees  from  international  sources  as  well.  Contrarily,  there  is  also 
evidence of a greater assignment of revenues than expenditure responsibilities which has instead 
resulted in suboptimal fiscal effort at the subnational level and inhibiting local domestic resource 
mobilization, both of which ultimately scale up in a national level fiscal crisis. This has been a 
recurrent feature in the case of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia(Latin American Program, 2012; 
Stein et al., 1998; Wylde, 2012). 
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Assuming effective subnational democracy in place, it can be considered that there will be 
heterogenous preferences of the constituents across the different subnational groupings, and each 
subnational government may have a diverse set of preferences to match. Considering this against the 
DDS backdrop, if a subnational government has its agenda substantially different from the central 
government, there will be coordination problem between the two tiers. The soft budget constraints in 
the case of the subnational governments further complicates the scenario where provisions for 
central subsidization are in place. Where soft budget constraints are allowed to prevail with central 
transfer financing, the central government has a difficult task of coordinating the national fiscal and 
monetary policies (influenced by the borrowing by the subnational governments often under 
sovereign guarantees), thus exposing the national economy to instability. 
The purely economic literature looks at this construct through the monetary and fiscal policy 
(appraised collectively through the use of the inflation variables) perspective [Triesman (2000), 
Asfaha(2007),  Bräutigam,  Fjeldstad,  Moore  eds(2008),  IMF(2013),  Stiglitz  &  Emran  (2007)],  a 
feature this research is constrained to contest on conceptual grounds. The conclusions generally are 
that decentralization (fiscal and administrative (functional)) can prove to have negative implications for 
inflation (due to higher public debts and money supply) and fiscal deficits (owing to deficit financing). 
However, if one considers that in assessing any possible impact of decentralization on macroeconomic 
stability, existing institutional and political arrangements of the context being appraised must be taken 
into account. These institutional and political factors can include the quality of the government, level 
of democracy, level of political stability or the level of corruption. Building upon the model produced 
by Zafarullah et.al.(2012), an estimation of these factors on macroeconomic variables reveals that 
decentralization, subject to the right kind of political and institutional adjustments can be conducive to 
macroeconomic stability (considered as inflation and fiscal deficit indicators)32. The estimation covers 
62 countries for the period 1972-2001, with the observations structured as panel observations of 5 
year averages, with the data pertaining to decentralization coming from the IMF GFS, and the 
institutional and political framework data coming from the Polity IV database. The results of the 
estimation illustrate that for fiscal decentralization to have a positive bearing on the extent of 
macroeconomic stability, a good political and institutional backdrop is imperative. 
If the fiscal decentralization is effectively institutionalized i.e. clear revenue sharing mechanisms and 
expenditure responsibilities are stipulated then there would be lesser competition between the 
                                                             
32 See Macroeconomic instability and fiscal decentralization : an empirical analysis. Ahmad Zafarullah Abdul Jalil; 
Mukaramah Harun; Siti Hadijah Che Mat (2012). 
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subnational jurisdictions for fiscal resources hence reinforcing macroeconomic stability. Such an 
institutionalization finds its roots in a stable political setup whereby a consensus is established on the 
fiscal sharing and distribution models between the political entities of the national and subnational 
jurisdictions, the influential sponsoring role of the consensus building process being the 
responsibility of the centre. Thus by analytical extrapolation, where political systems are instable and 
institutionalization poor as often the case with non-democratic or heavily contested political spaces 
in developing countries, without making a concerted effort to address these two issues, no benefit or 
stability on the macroeconomic front can be ensured. 
Without engaging further on the debate, as it has been covered in the preceding chapter, the 
focus shall instead be placed on how to grapple with the pitfalls of the decentralization (fiscal 
mainly) for macroeconomic stability. Given the DDS backdrop and the preceding assertion that 
attention to the underlying political and institutional dynamics need to be made conducive shall be 
of a greater effect in realizing a more stable macroeconomic impact, the analysis from hereon shall 
engage with the elements in the reform process that must be taken into cognizance.  These are listed 
and subsequently discussed as follows. 
 
 
i)        Enabling a Reform-conducive Framework 
 
Building a conducive environment for the sustainability as well as the effectiveness of 
decentralization reforms finds its roots in the constitutional and legal mandates that stipulate the 
extent of subnational autonomy, rights, responsibilities and frame of action for the subnational 
governments. While this puts forth a foundation on which the decentralization reforms need to be 
anchored, this does not exclusively and independently guarantee the success of the reform process. 
There have been various instances recorded in the literature, both academic and policy, where 
distinct constitutional provisions and legal frameworks were defined yet the decentralization reforms 
were of limited effectiveness in realizing their core objectives. However, this section shall draw upon 
the examples of two developing countries (Ethiopia and Uganda) that have been often cited as good 
examples of establishing a sustainable enabling environment for decentralization in general, but 
more particularly the administrative and fiscal dimensions, given the ‘finance to follow function’ 
arguments of ensuring economic stability in decentralization reforms [UNRISD (2008)]. 
Central to all considerations of fostering a conducive environment for decentralization reforms, is 
the extent to which there is a strong domestic impulse to decentralize. The impulse or the 
rationale to decentralize is strongest in the contexts where ethnic or social cleavages exist, and the 
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diversity in the national context deems imperative a more diverse stakeholding in the governance 
infrastructure. In addition, the fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralization in many 
developing economies are brought about amidst bureaucratized, relatively conflicting, and 
inadequately coordinated mechanisms whereby the centre also has a direct stake in the process of 
decentralization as it aims to retain as much influence as possible whilst also entailing ‘devolution’ of 
one sort or the other. The functional disengagement and ‘pass-on’ to the subservient subnational 
tiers  when  coupled  with  the  inadequacy  of  subnational  revenue,  has  been  one  of  the  main 
observable reasons for the adverse outcomes of decentralization. In a DDS framework, the central 
government needs to ensure that ‘finance must follow function’ maxim is held true. While the 
broader economic management as scale-dependent public services remain under the centre, the 
provision of ‘local’ public goods (such as municipal infrastructure, water and sanitaition, primary 
health and education) must be augmented by an adequate fiscal base for optimal delivery. 
Finally,  a  rapid  instead  of  incremental  process  of  reform  exacerbates  the  governance 
complexities instead of ameliorating them. The institutional and policy frameworks to support the 
reform serve as a ‘structural’ and not substantive benchmark. An example of a strong enabling 
environment, which was also a product of an organic articulation rather than an externally driven 
impulse, is that of Bolivia. While it will be discussed in a greater detail in the subsequent chapter, the 
LPP (Law of Popular Participation) is a cogent example of establishing robust and sustainable 
institutions within which the reforms can be brought to form. Another aspect that must also be 
taken into account is the enforcement or actionability of the constitutionally mandated provisions. 
For instance, the South African constitution promulgated in 1996, established a strong functional 
role for the local governments that till now has been an issue of significant contention and even 
more recently so, as the South African political context deliberates on a developmental policy 
framework. The conclusion that can be drawn thus is that a strong enabling framework must 
precede and complement the decentralization reform process, with the caveat that it is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition to ensure effective reforms. 
 
 
ii)        Balancing Subnational Functions and Revenues 
 
 
 
While the inhibition of the central agencies to decentralize is frequently cited in the literature, the 
main explanation of this resistance is the central political actors’ desire to retain political influence 
and mileage that comes with the control over delivery of certain public functions. This has been the 
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main reason behind suboptimal choice of which functions to decentralize and at what pace. For 
instance, rapid decentralization of education and public infrastructure development functions to the 
local governments without ensuring an adequate capacity at the subnational level (either fiscally or 
administratively), can be used as a tool by the central agency to dilute political competition at the 
local level. Given that the local governments have greater accountability pressures, and their 
performance  is  given  precedence  over  any  consideration  of  their  capacities  to  discharge  the 
mandated   functions,   a   decentralization-averse   centre   has   an   incentive   to   reinforce   their 
shortcomings to regain political or administrative control of some public goods. 
The second facet of the balance depends on the fiscal resources that need to be devolved to the 
subnational governments. A key observation in this regard has been that the central government led 
reform processes for fiscal decentralization generally assign the subnational revenue generation 
responsibilities to bases that are relatively immobile thus taking out any prospects of the spatial 
efficiency effects to be realized or be competitive with the central revenue bases (Moore, 2004). In 
this regard, four key issues stand out; a) gaps between the subnational revenues and expenditure 
responsibilities; b) non-efficient subnational revenue bases where the cost of revenue collection 
outshines the revenue collection; c) implementation deficiencies similar to the functional aspects 
discussed above; and d) individual local revenue bases have design deficiencies (in terms of static 
bases e.g. property taxes, complex subnational bureaucratic structures and inefficient collection 
mechanisms). The analysis that follows shall explore the issues related to transfers, indigenous local 
revenue mobilization design and implementation, in a broader sense as well as against the DDS 
policy framework. 
In the context of local revenue generation, it is essential that the local governments need to 
focus on high yield and low cost local sources of revenue instead of spreading their tax base over 
many sources that are typically resorted to for local mobilization (Bahl & Linn, Urban Public 
Finance in Developing Countries, 2002). Examples of such high yield and relatively stable tax bases 
for local  revenue  could  be  the  property  taxes  and user  charges  of  local  public  infrastructure. 
Property taxation while being a viable source of finance has some typical constraints for effective 
exploitation especially in terms of its implementation. One of the reasons for such problems is the 
typical ‘quid-pro-quo’ involved in matters of taxation; tax contribution is a function of the taxpayers’ 
satisfaction with the provision of public services. Also, the imposition of the property tax, if it has to 
garner enough scale, would need to be broadbased which would include the middle and the lower 
middle income segments of the local space. Also associated to the valuation mechanisms are also 
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procedural complexities given that the tax base is stagnant over long periods, thus the constraints to 
their periodic revision and collection affect the ‘buoyancy of the tax source’’. 
The second potential source of stable local fiscal revenue can be the imposition of user-charges on 
locally owned infrastructure and also some royalty payments on locally generated resource rents, if 
applicable. However, there are also some institutional constraints in the imposition of such 
charges especially in the context of increases. These could come in the form of political sensitivities, 
difficulty in ascertaining the marginal cost effects, and also any potentially regressive effects on 
equity. In the contexts where royalties on locally based extractive industries are admissible, local 
governments  need  to  establish  a  clear  revenue/royalty  entitlement  formula  with  the  central 
collection to ensure some guaranteed retention before the central transfers are instituted. However, 
this is an issue of concern as this might exacerbate regional inequalities especially where resource 
endowments are not evenly distributed across regions. In a DDS policy framework, where regional 
fiscal equalization and equity is an important requisite to an effective developmental policy design 
and implementation, this can be an issue of critical importance. 
 
 
iii)        Developing an effective intergovernmental transfer system 
 
The establishment of intergovernmental transfer mechanisms is an important institutional 
arrangement in a decentralized polity in general and a DDS policy framework in particular. The main 
rationales for the establishment of such mechanisms are augmenting local/subnational resource 
pools to enable delivery of assigned functions, meet national redistributive objectives, and 
encouraging and supporting responsive local expenditures on certain public goods/services. 
However, there are several common issues and problems that surface across virtually all contexts 
involving the design of the transfer mechanisms. Unconditional or discretionary non-earmarked 
grants as discussed earlier, for example,  are  perhaps the  best form of  transfer  to  subnational 
governments in terms of redistribution. Conditional or earmarked grants, on the other hand are 
relatively are a more viable way of encouraging subnational expenditures on earmarked public 
services. If designed appropriately, both conditional and unconditional transfers can be of good 
effect in yielding not only a scaled provision of the public services but also improve the quality and 
responsiveness of the subnational public service delivery. 
Transfers to subnational governments while also forging inter-regional equity is a complex 
phenomenon primarily because of the associated technical and political considerations in defining a 
revenue sharing formula while also retaining appropriate incentives for subnational resource 
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mobilization.  Equal resource allocations do not necessarily result in equal results, as the degree of 
inequalities within the beneficiary jurisdictions face may differ hence the impact of the transfers 
would also be varied. While there is also an increased advocacy for the ‘Finance to follow function’, 
a developmentally oriented central agency needs to determine the adequate balance between the 
functional and fiscal dimensions. Too much fiscal decentralization to subnational levels can have 
adverse economic implications (as discussed above), however all downside risks ought to be 
compared against the gains that a stable subnational revenue base offers. The modus operandi for 
the design and implementation of such transfer programs should thus be rooted in incrementalism; 
starting off from modest transfers with any subsequent scaling up contingent on the central 
evaluation of the subnational performance in resource absorption and service delivery outcomes. 
 
 
iv)  Developing subnational access to pluralized sources of capital 
 
 
 
While  the  local  governments in  most developing  countries  continue  to  depend  on  central 
transfers with very little of their revenue pool being financed by local mobilization, there is also an 
emerging  trend  into  expose  the  subnational  governments  to  alternative  finance  and  capital 
generation sources. Some decentralized governments (states, large municipalities, provinces) are 
granted  direct access  to  commercial  sources  of  finance  (banks  and  bond  markets)  e.g.  Brazil, 
Colombia,  whereas in  some  developing contexts such  as India  the  access is  relatively  limited. 
Moreover, in some developing countries such as Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, the subnational 
borrowing modalities can take the form of special government accounts or special purpose lending 
institutions for a clearly defined developmental or disbursal framework. This issue is on a slightly 
different  tangent  to  the  preceding  discussions  on  revenue  and  functional  intergovernmental 
transfers, where most of the local government finance requisites come under the transfer 
arrangements emerging under complex institutional and political arrangements that are at best, 
limited in allowing optimal discretion to subnational levels. 
As a means of providing the subnational governments with a more diversified pool of options to 
solicit financial capital from the traditional sources (grants and subsidized loans and grants)  to local 
and international private/multilateral avenues for loans or grant solicitation for self-financing 
earmarked projects.  A spinoff advantage of linking them up to a diversified pool of options also 
fosters greater accountability and efficiency in the utilization and absorption of the funds secured as 
compared to the more relaxed variants of intergovernmental transfers. Such a linking cannot be 
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brought about without the central patronage, as the sovereign guarantee is normally not afforded to 
the subnational governance structures. Similar to the requisites of grants disbursal, the central 
government in the interest of diligence has to keep the domestic fiscal context in cognizance to 
ensure that  subnational  fiscal  behaviour  does not pose  any  detriment  to  the  broader national 
economic stability. Only in the contexts where decentralized governance structures are well 
embedded and strong (for instance in Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, South Africa), the development 
of direct subnational access to capital markets is more viable. However, the centre must maintain 
constant  oversight  and  diligence  over  the  subnational  borrowing  by  establishing  clear  limits, 
standards and conditional guarantees of support in the event of bailout requests. 
In the contexts where the institutionalization of the local governance structures in the domestic 
political space is weak, or where there is a functional-fiscal divide between, a special purpose 
earmarked institutional entity e.g. a municipal development bank may be a more viable approach 
than a direct access to the capital markets. Since these institutions are initially sponsored 
predominantly   by   the   central   governments   either   through   indigenous   domestic   resource 
mobilization or through external flows from bi/multilateral sources. In such a context, the centre 
enjoys considerable discretion over the activities of the local governments though there must be 
countervailing checks to minimize any prospects of abuse of power.  Under such an arrangement, 
with the centre having a greater discretion, there is also a greater prospect of linking the grants-loan 
mechanisms. In most of the developing countries, the loan and grant disbursals are done mutually 
exclusively, except in some instances where grants are used as incentive mechanisms to encourage 
prudent subnational absorption. Instituting an integrated grants-loans mechanism when devising 
subnational fiscal and functional empowerment has the potential of improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of resource use. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECENTRALIZATION AND  DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BOLIVIA 
3.1 CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 
The preceding chapters have attempted to put forth the advocacies both for and against 
decentralization and its implications for democracy and development independently as well as 
collectively in the form of a democratic developmental state. If there is a single term to define 
decentralization reform experiences in both, form and impact, it would be heterogeneity; no 
single optimal process or sequence of reforms and thus a wide spread in the degree of effective 
decentralization as well. The growing awareness in the literature, both policy and academic, 
highlights the existing mismatch between the decentralization normative objectives and how it 
is implemented in practice thus skewing the results in the contrary direction; strained fiscal 
fronts, poor accountability outcomes, erratic trends in service delivery qualities. Central to any 
such reform process, as discussed earlier, are the political economy factors and how the 
interests and incentives of the stakeholders determine the form, sequence and outcomes of 
these reforms. This chapter attempts to provide an expository analysis of the decentralization 
reforms in Bolivia, by analyzing the actors, incentive structures, bargaining dynamics and the 
resulting outcomes for democracy and development in Bolivia. The Bolivian model of 
decentralization, as this chapter illustrates subnational domination in the design and 
implementation of the decentralization reform and exhibits strongly positive outcomes in terms 
of democracy, institutionalization, public service delivery responsiveness and efficiency while 
being less positive in core economic outcomes. The evaluation of the Bolivian case is largely 
from the perspective of second round of decentralization that were initiated in 2006, and the 
degrees to which it finds its roots in the 1994 LPP in terms of institutional and governance 
realms. 
Classified amongst the poorest countries in the Latin American & Caribbean region, 
while also being one of the richest in terms of natural resource endowments (hydrocarbons) 
and soil conduciveness to productive agriculture, Bolivia is characterized by significant 
economic, ethnic, and social inequalities that have often been contentious33. The indigenous 
                                                             
33 A current example of this is the inter-regional conflict between the highlands (where the defacto 
capital, La Paz is situated) and the south eastern lowlands (Media Luna) which is a host to highly 
productive agriculture as well as substantial hydrocarbon resources. 
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population of Bolivia, also a demographic majority34, has been one of the most consistently 
discriminated groups historically. Bolivia has the distinction of being the country that has 
witnessed the most number of coup d’etats in its post-independence political history than any 
other country in the world (Morales 1992). The 1952 Bolivian Revolution saw the Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement’s (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario --MNR) accession to the 
government. Upon assuming the incumbency, the MNR set out to affirm its populist mandate 
by nationalizing large mining and export industries, redistribution of agricultural land, and the 
introduction of social transfer schemes. However, the radical reforms that the MNR under the 
leadership of Paz Estenssoro tried to introduce led to significant economic imbalances due to 
inflation and inadequate investment in productive economic sectors. The economic problems 
as well as the political instability led to the MNR government’s deposition and a military 
government took over and in the later half of the 1960s and much of the 1970s, the focus 
shifted to the maintenance of internal order, and the introduction of a ‘revolutionary 
nationalism’ program.  
The Banzer era (1971-78), a populist military regime supported by the MNR, witnessed 
substantial economic growth driven largely by the Bolivian commodity export demand. The 
governance coalition with the MNR was short lived and in 1974, following the demise of the 
coalition with the MNR, the labor movements intensified which led the Banzer regime to resort 
to repressive means of preserving their incumbency. Owing to growing external and internal 
pressures, the first round of negotiated transition to civilian government took place in 1982, 
with the UDP (Unidad Democratica y Popular) coalition gaining incumbency with Zuazo 
assuming Presidency. Following a phase of hyperinflation, consistently high fiscal and balance 
of payments deficits and an intense social backlash against the economic mayhem, new electoral 
rounds were called. These elections saw the resurgence of former General Banzer and the MNR 
leader Estenssoro, with the latter emerging as the victor for the fourth time owing to a coalition 
with the left-wing party MIR (Moviemento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria). Upon gaining 
incumbency, Estenssoro in a stark departure from his preceding tenures, instituted one of the 
most austere economic stabilization programs ever implemented in the LAC region (Sachs, 
1987). 
This new policy framework under Estenssoro, labelled as the NEP (Nueva Politica 
Economica), included divestiture of state interests from the non-performing public sector 
                                                             
34 The demographic census in 2009 recognizes 36 groups of indigenous groups concentrated largely in 
Quecha (30% of the total population) and Aymara (approximately 25% of total population) 
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enterprises, privatization and deregulation to attract private and foreign capital investments, in 
addition to the inflation containing strategies. While the NEP was successful in grappling with 
the hyper-inflation, the austerity regime resulted in substantial suppression of the real wages 
which exacerbated the already high levels of poverty (Kohl, 2002). The era after 1985 is also 
known as one of ‘pacted democracy’ in Bolivia, where Estenssoro and Banzer negotiated a political 
agreement for power-sharing in order to grapple the political fragmentation and push through 
the neoliberal reforms and austerity policies. This pacted democracy played a vital role in 
ensuring not only a policy consistency but also in the resolution of the political impasses in the 
1989 and 1993 electoral rounds. The period from 1989-1993 saw a continuation of the 
liberalization and austerity framework while registering a modest economic recovery which was 
rooted partly in the resurgent prices of tin (the main export at the time) in the global market 
and the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in Bolivia. The 1993 elections resulted in 
Estenssorro’s MNR coming back into the power, this time under the leadership of Sanchez de 
Lozada, whose policy stance was a continuation of the preceding ones albeit more focused on 
creating viable environment for private capital engagement in the hydrocarbons sector35.  
While the ‘pacted democracy’ did have positive implications for the Bolivian economic 
stabilization as well as enabling a degree of consolidation of civilian democracy, it also had an 
exclusionary bias as most of the demographically dominant indigenous groups felt excluded and 
marginalzied in socioeconomic and political spheres, to a larger extent by the outcomes of the 
neoliberal reforms (Kruse, 1994). The 1990s saw the indigenous social movements increasingly 
challenging the agreements established by the political elites of the country. While the process 
merely surfaced during the early 1990s, it gained more momentum as the years went on and by 
2000, the indigenous peoples movement got considerably well-organized and well-articulated 
that resulted in the ouster of President Lozada in 2003 and his successor President Mesa in 
2005. The last few years of the 1990s saw the rise of Evo Morales, who was of an indigenous 
ethnic origin and also a union leader of the coca growers, as a leading representative of the 
diverse social movements against the political status-quo  
Following the ouster of President Mesa in 2005, a fresh round of elections was 
conducted in which Evo Morales assumed the Presidency. Since he assumed office, Morales has 
                                                             
35 Massive concessions were put forth to attract private capital in the form of 30-year operating 
contracts. Foreign capital inflows as a consequence doubled the capital of the state-owned energy 
companies and massive gas exploration. This surge in the investment and capital flows into the 
hydrcarbons sector resulted in as much as a fivefold increase in the annual resource royalties generated 
by the Bolivian state to about US$ 500 million per annum in 2000 (IMF, 2001). 
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been instituting wider-ranged reforms in the political structure of Bolivia through constitutional 
reform as well as in the socio-economic realms. The constitutional reform project under 
Morales began in 2006, with an elected Constituent Assembly tasked with the formulation of a 
new constitution. Following various rounds of deliberations and revisions, the new constitution 
was formally instituted in 2009 after a public referendum whereby a 61% majority voted in its 
favor. The resultant transformation of the state structure and the socio-economic policy 
framework established a ‘plurinational state’; an amalgamation of the institutional dynamics of 
liberal and representative democracy with the mechanisms of direct democracy and unmediated 
participation by civil society organizations (Albro, 2010). The fundamental departure that the 
2009 Constitution took from the prior constitutional framework was the equal status of state 
law and indigenous systems of justice. The liberal state model is applied by the recognition of 
indigenous (socially embedded) forms of local governance, and the constituents’ civil and 
political rights are augmented by a broadbased stipulation of socio-economic and collective 
rights of the indigenous populace. The economic agenda under the Morales government is also 
a pluralistic with private enterprise and state involvement in the economic space, albeit more 
skewed towards the latter, coupled with a communitarian and socially oriented economic 
organization. As a profound process of structural transformation, both in socio-economic and 
political terms, it enjoys broad support amongst the Bolivian populace (mainly the previously 
excluded groups) but continues to be heavily contested by the traditional elites and stakeholders 
in the dominant sectors of the economy. Given the fragmented and weak political opposition at 
the central level, much of this contestation emerges from the regional autonomy movements 
particularly in the southeastern lowlands (Media Luna as mentioned earlier) led by the elected 
governors and the ‘civic committees’. While this shall be discussed in a greater detail in the 
sections following in this chapter, Bolivia presents perhaps the most appropriate model in terms 
analyzing the notions of decentralization, democratization and developmentalism individually as 
well as in tandem.  
From a developmental standpoint, the Morales government has stipulated a national 
development strategy, under the title of Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia Digna, Soberana, 
Productiva y Democrática para Vivir Bien, Lineamientos Estratégicos (National Development Plan: 
Dignified, Sovereign, Productive, and Democratic Bolivia to Live Well, Strategic Directions)36, 
                                                             
36 This chapter shall use National Development Plan (NDP) as a translated version of the Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo (PND), from hereon. 
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instituted in 2006 which remains enforced in phases lasting five years. Currently, the NDP is in 
the second phase of its implementation and as part of this plan, the Morales government 
maximized state’s control on its extractives industry by stipulating new contracts for the 
international enterprises engaged in the hydrocarbons industry, while also increasing the 
influence of the state owned YPFB (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos) as well as 
increasing the taxes on companies working in the extractives sector. The objective was to 
increase the size of the fiscal pool by directing most of the resource rents to the national 
exchequer and use them to deliver social services and benefits, as well as expanding the size of 
public investment. From a democratic point of view, the substantial subnational political 
empowerment emanating initially from the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP – Ley de 
Participación Popular) and further consolidated in the post 2006 decentralization reforms, have 
enabled competitive politics at the local level with effectively responsive and accountable local 
governance structures.  
The subsequent section shall put forth a transformation analysis of Bolivian state for 
the period 2006-2014, which would enable a composite view of the trends exhibited in terms of 
political transformation, economic transformation and the management of the transformation 
processes. The sections that follow shall contextualize these results and trends identified in the 
Bolivian decentralization reforms; reform dynamics, key actors, incentive structures, and 
sequential prioritization. While the focus of this research remains on the post 2006 
decentralization reforms and their implications, it also considers in some detail the 1994 LPP as 
the current reforms are rooted institutionally and contextually in the structures established 
under the LPP. Given the underlying interests of the various national and subnational actors in 
the Bolivian socio-economic and political space, this chapter will draw on the political economy 
of decentralization literature to analyze the sequential developments and use some of the 
existing conclusions on the current scope of analysis as an explanatory methodological tool. 
Given the importance of political parties as actors in Bolivia, the partisan dynamics are central 
to understanding their incentive maximizing behavior. For instance, O’Neill (1998) presents the 
importance of the inter-temporal considerations of political parties; which are critical factors in 
understanding when and if decentralization reforms can truly be implemented. This argument is 
exhibited in the first round of reforms in 1994 by the MNR and continues to be of explanatory 
value in the ongoing reforms under MAS. Similarly,  Haggard et.al. (1999)discuss how the 
106 
 
incentives of the incumbents in the executive and the legislature are shaped by the partisan 
interests. 
Another strand of arguments is presented by Hellman (1998), although the analysis 
focused on the partiality of reform in a different context but it has value for the discussion on 
decentralization reforms as well. The analysis in this paper argues that the winners of the first 
round of reforms shall in their interest retention, pose obstacles for the subsequent rounds. 
This is of considerable explanatory value in the case of Bolivia, as the roles and responsibilities 
for the subnational governments in general continue to be largely disjointed. Such situations 
according to Herbst (2001), can result in accountability inadequacies and thus lead to self-
reinforcing governance traps. As the fiscal aspects of decentralization continue to cloud the 
decentralization reforms across Latin America in general, but Bolivia in particular, Rodden et.al. 
(2003) and Webb (2004) argue that the enforcement of hard budget constraints on the 
subnational governments deems imperative a balance of ex-ante controls and ex-post 
consequences, and are critically dependent on the enforcement capacity of the centre. Equally 
important in the case of Bolivia is the strand of literature on rentier states and mineral rich 
contexts, whereby amongst others Ahmad et.al. (2011), Bahl et.al. (2004), and Morgandi (2008), 
present the intricacies of revenue sharing mechanisms across inter-governmental contexts and 
their effects on the equity and efficiency of the governments across these tiers. 
3.2 LPP – THE FIRST PHASE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN BOLIVIA  
The Ley de Participacion Popular (hereon referred to as LPP), came as a consequence 
of a long effort to decentralize government and expand its scale and penetration across the 
Bolivian polity, particularly in the marginalized rural communities that also constituted a 
demographic majority [CIPCA (1991), Molina Monasterios (1997)]. While the LPP was 
developed by a group of technocrats mandated by the then President Gonzales Sanchez de 
Lozada, and pushed through as a top down reform initiative, its implications were profound, it 
did not follow on the hypothesized centrally preferred sequence of AFP, but instead did a bit of 
all simultaneously. The LPP when first announced in January 1994 was received by widescale 
opposition but was nevertheless promulgated by the Congress as a Law in April 1994 and 
brought into effect from July. The magnitude of change in the balance of resource allocation 
and political power that came about as a consequence of the LPP was enormous as shall be 
seen subsequently. The four main facets of the LPP were: 
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1) The  share  of  national  fiscal  revenue  pool  transferred  from  the  central  to 
municipal governments was established at 20%. Prior to this promulgation, the fiscal 
apportionments were made on an ad-hoc basis that was heavily influenced by political 
dynamics. However, under this law this 20% was to be further distributed on a strict per 
capita basis 
2) All public services in the realm of basic healthcare, primary education, roads, irrigation,   
culture   and   sports   infrastructure,   were   functionally   accorded   to   the 
municipalities with the administration, maintenance, investment and equipment 
requisites being a local responsibilities. 
3) Establishment of Oversight Committees (Comites de Vigilancia) to oversee the 
absorption of the fiscal resources devolved under the LPP, and to propose new 
projects. These groups were comprised of members from local communities and/or 
grass-roots organizations  who  could  have  the  fiscal  flows  to  the  municipality  
blocked  if  they considered a misappropriation in their allocation at the local level. 
4) 198 new municipalities were created, and existing ones expanded to include suburbs and 
surrounding rural areas. 
The envisaged outcomes of the LPP were that effective participation would be 
manifested at the municipal level in terms of the mandatory planning documents including the 
annual plans, and  the  municipal  development  plans.  The local community level capacity 
building under the LPP envisaged a collaboration with the CSOs and NGOs based within the 
local space. 
Impact of the LPP 
This reform did usher a new era for the local governance of a vast majority of the 
Bolivian towns and cities, whereby for the first time each town/city had its own local 
government accountable to its constituents instead of the central state’s prior status of an 
‘absentee landlord’. Furthermore, in the antecedent times, all allocations for urban development 
were accorded to municipal capitals or indirectly through the regional development 
corporations organized at the departmental level. As a result, about 86% of the total national 
fiscal devolution was captured by three cities with only 14% available for the rest of the country 
(See Table4).  The promulgation of this law was heavily criticized in terms of being a central 
dictation and the transfer of responsibilities (both revenue and expenditure) were considered as 
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an abdication of its duties by the central state.  (Ayalaa, Bostos, Viana, Molina, Mayorga, & 
Exeni, 2011).  
Table 4: Intergovernmental Finance Distribution Pre- and Post LPP 1994 
City | Year 
Central to Subnational Revenue 
Sharing (Bs'000s) 
Total Central Transfers 
Absorbed (%) 
1993 1995 % Change 1993 1995 
La Paz 114,292 61,976 -46% 51% 10% 
Cochabamba 25,856 38,442 49% 12% 6% 
Santa Cruz  51,278 63,076 23% 23% 10% 
Total (3 cities) 191,426 163,494 -15% 86% 27% 
Rest of Bolivia 32,099 444,786 1286% 14% 73% 
Total 223,525 608,280 172% 
  
Source: Faguet (2002) 
While the above illustrates the distribution of fiscal resources in the preceding and 
subsequent period of the LPP, it would perhaps be more important to illustrate how the 
sectoral composition of the public investment by the central and subnational levels. The figures 
below show the differences in the sectoral investments by the subnational and the central 
governments in 1993-1994 and 1995-1996. The central investments illustrate the pre-LPP time 
and the subnational/local investments illustrate the investments in the aftermath of the LPP. 
The difference in the magnitude of investment across all these functionally devolved structures 
is significant. Prior to the LPP, the central government’s investment were the highest in the 
transport, hydrocarbons, energy and multi-sectoral realms. The aggregate  investment  across  
these  4  sectors  amounted  to  73%  of  the  total  public investment in the period immediately 
preceding 1994. However, after the functional and fiscal decentralization under the LPP in 
1994, the local governments’ investment preferences are exhibited in their sectoral investment 
proportions. The highest investment was in education, followed by urban development, and 
water and sanitation with the aggregate investment across these three sectors tallying to 79% of 
the total subnational investments. This further illustrates the difference in the priorities between 
the central and subnational governments in Bolivia. 
 
109 
 
 
Source: Faguet 2002 
While the above was intended to give a macro-level picture of the subnational 
discretionary expansion, the focus shall now shift upon the impact of the LPP in specific 
realms37. In particular, the impact shall be evaluated in terms of: a) Government Efficiency and 
Developmental Planning, b) Political Accountability. 
a) Government Efficiency and Developmental Planning 
While the advocacies in support of administrative decentralization in particular, and 
decentralization in general, extol its reductionary effects on the size and costs of governance in 
addition to the efficiency gains in the social spending (Rondinelli, McCullough,  &  Johnson,  
1989),  the  Bolivian  experience  presents  a  stark  contrast. Following the LPP, the overall size 
of the government expanded as the local bureaucracies had to be staffed and led to a creation 
of 30,000 new jobs in the subnational governments across Bolivia (Booth, Suzanne Clisby, & 
Widmark, 1996). The growth of the bureaucratic structures has two major implications for the 
subnational tiers of government:; 
                                                             
37 This discussion here builds on the unstructured discussions/ interviews I had with representatives of 
municipal governments and central government representatives as part of another project on the Politics of 
Domestic Resource Mobilization, and some literature obtained in the process. 
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i) The availability of fiscal revenues for local absorption becomes a function of 
standardization and well-established rules, and  
ii) The subnational governments need to develop their own revenue  sources  to  
sustain  the  structures  rather  than  relying  exclusively  on  central transfers.  
Especially concerning with the latter, such expansion in the role of the municipal 
governments led to the diversification of their  own revenue base which resulted in additional 
taxes and thus faced resistance in the local constituent base. Furthermore, increasing the central 
revenue sharing with the subnational governments along with additional functional devolution 
resulted in an adverse outcome for most of the municipalities  that  did  not  have  the  
adequate  administrative  capacity  to  deliver  the assigned functions that were previously under 
the departmental or the national mandate. 
The increase in revenue sharing by the central government failed to address the already 
divergent capacities in the subnational space, as some of the more urban municipalities who had 
a greater revenue generation capacity compared to their rural peers were more effective in 
pluralizing their revenue pools through local sources. For instance, in La Paz, less than 20% of 
the municipal revenues came from the central transfers whereas in most of the rural 
municipalities 100% came from the central transfers (Faguet 2002). While this remains 
consistent with the stylized differences between the urban and rural areas (Lipton, 1980), this 
remained an issue of concern and to a certain degree, continues to be in the ongoing phase as 
well. The rural municipalities are also the main source of labor and food production, and the 
transfers did not do much justice to them. 
While the explicit focus of the LPP was to meet decentralization and not the 
developmental objectives, there were conceptions amongst its proponents that the transfer of 
resources to the local and municipal levels would have developmental implications as well. 
Despite the numerous projects that were initiated to integrate the economic and municipal 
development, they remained largely limited in effect. 
b) Political Accountability 
In the aftermath of the LPP promulgation, the clientilistic politics and financial 
misdemeanor still persisted in both, the public and private sector. In 1997, a report concluded 
that if corruption could be curtailed the GDP could grow by 60% (Economists, 1997). In the 
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aftermath of its promulgation, the advocacies against the LPP asserted that this would 
“decentralize corruption” and local capture by the established political and economic elites. 
This CDC report further reported the commonly accepted figures for the kickbacks ranging 
from 10-25% in the procurement of services at the municipal level. Furthermore, in 2003, the 
accounts of 25 municipalities were frozen by the national treasury on account of inadequate 
fiscal reporting whereas another 185 municipalities had not filed one or more financial reports 
(IMF, 2004). The failure of the LPP, however, was only to extent of not ameliorating 
corruption instead of causing it. However, there were still positive trends emerging in terms of 
local mobilization against corruption as a subset of the overall social mobilization by the 
indigenous groups. 
The LPP was also somewhat successful in changing the course of the resistance to the 
broader national neoliberal reforms by enabling progressive resource allocations enough to 
dilute their rigor (Kohl, 2002). Up until 1985, where all opposition to the neoliberal reform led   
programs   took   national   and   class-based   forms   e.g.   the   Bolivian   Workers’ 
Confederation  (Bolivia  Confederación  de  Trabajadores) would  issue  protest calls that would 
result in national shutdowns. With greater focus being placed on the local politics and 
governance under the LPP, the opposition oriented its focus on the grassroots territorial 
organizations and municipal contestation for resource allocations instead of being engaged on 
the national issues. However, it must be noted that while such locally based social movements 
and opposition movements have had some notable successes e.g. Cochabamaba Water Wars, 
such successes could not always be scaled up to national level gains (Finnegan, 2002). The 
indigenous movements that have since the early 1990s been quite an impetus behind all spinoff 
movements did not, for the most part, register the same gains in the local realm in terms of 
dislodging or pressurizing local elites, as they did on the national front. 
In conclusion, the LPP was a significant departure from the closed access political and 
socio-economic state model that had existed in Bolivia, yet it had major shortcomings in its 
implementation due to limited enfranchisement of the general populace in its design. 
Allegorically similar to how introduction of formal democratic institutions does not guarantee 
the substantive aspects of democracy; the LPP was also constrained in delivering broad-based 
and substantive results. The main positive legacy of the LPP was been that it, for the first time, 
enabled participation by the previously excluded groups of the populace, in bringing the process 
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of resource allocation and its subsequent absorption within the scope  of  influence  of  the  
public,  and  perhaps,  most  importantly  in  shaping  the expectations  of  the  government  
that  a  majority  of  the  Bolivians  established  in  its aftermath.  The LPP and the associated 
decentralization reforms led to an increased recognition and importance of the subnational 
domains as alternative platforms to the traditional political actors.  
3.3 THE SECOND PHASE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN BOLIVIA 
The second phase of decentralization began in 2006 as the MAS government assumed 
incumbency, with a stronger emphasis on the deepening the regional autonomy primarily in 
terms of enabling fiscal capacities of the subnational structures keeping in view their increased 
political articulation.  
The current round of decentralization was at its outset, characterized with two 
significant developments: election of Department Governors (Prefectos), and the expansion in 
the fiscal transfers by employing 2/3rd of the additional fiscal revenue generated under the 
Hydrocarbon Law (referred to as HL from hereon). The election of the Prefectos at the outset 
was a significant event as the elected Prefectos derived their mandate from the department 
constituents rather than the head of the state or the central government. In terms of the 
expansion in the divisible fiscal pool, this was a significant event as a substantial additional 
contribution, to the tune of US $ 240 million in 2006 (IMF Article IV, 2006) was not matched 
by any expansion in the functional obligations of the prefectures/ departmental governments. 
Enacting these two at the very outset of the tenure as well as constitution-making process 
served the purpose of credible signaling of the MAS government’s commitment to regional 
autonomy and participatory governance. However, the main pitfall of this was that the 
bargaining capacity of the centre was significantly reduced.  
 Following on the legacy of the LPP, it is evident that the normative goals behind the 
decentralization reforms will be of limited effect if they are not being enacted in a basic 
framework of fiscal transparency and responsibility; one that overcomes horizontal imbalances 
while also ensuring that the ‘finance must follow function’. In general, the second phase of 
decentralization builds on the preceding LPP in terms of deepening political decentralization 
but most importantly bridge up the fiscal capacities of the subnational governments to deliver 
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well on their functional responsibilities and complement the national developmental policy 
framework. 
Intergovernmental Arrangements in ‘Plurinational’ Bolivia 
The organization of the state under the new constitution promulgated in 2009 retains 
the unitary nature of the state that is further divided into 9 departments that comprise of a total 
of 330 municipalities 38 . As covered earlier, the Departmental governments fall under the  
supervision  of  the  Governors  (prefecto)  who  gain  incumbency  through  a  popular 
election with a subsequent endorsement of the centre. This constitutionally defined ‘hybrid’ 
nature of the Prefectos, manifests a vertical duality of representation and accountability to the 
departmental constituents as well as the central government. Each department also has its own 
Departmental Council that is popularly elected, mandated primarily with defining a 
departmental policy framework that incorporates the aggregate preferences and requisites of the 
constituent municipalities, but most importantly approving the departmental budgets.  
However, departmental budgets are not clearly delineated39. A majority of the departmental 
budgets are absorbed in secondary infrastructure, electricity supply, irrigation, and other 
physical works. The departments have no authorization to raise their own tax revenues, even 
though they can raise it through service or usage fees, and most of their revenue basically comes 
through the central transfers. At the lowest level are the municipalities that are headed by 
popularly elected mayors and have municipal councils in place. Their scope of activity pertains 
to the provision of urban services with an envisaged role of complete discretion over the health 
and education sectors within their respective jurisdictions, although this has been limited to 
‘management’ till now because of capacity constraints.   
The municipalities are authorized to diversify their fiscal pool by raising indigenous 
revenues through local sources e.g. property or automobile taxes. In addition, the new 
Constitution also recognizes two additional autonomous entities; indigenous autonomies and 
regions. The former comprises of municipalities based on ethnic considerations and traditional 
rights, while the latter (Regions) are established on demand of adjacent municipalities. Both 
these entities are funded through the central allocations to the departments. There is also a 
                                                             
38 The terms “department” and “departmental government” are used interchangeably, except as 
otherwise noted. The term “subnational governments” refers to both departments and municipalities. 
39 Department governments participate in the elaboration and partly also in the execution of a number 
of ministerial budgets of the central government. 
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provincial level which operates between the departments and municipalities, and it serves as a 
platform for the political representation of the prefect; however it has no expenditure 
responsibilities or revenue privileges. 
With the political legal structures addressed, it would be more advantageous given the 
focus of this chapter to look at the fiscal indicators of the subnational governments to gauge 
the extent of change in the subnational fiscal behaviors after the expansion in the divisible pool. 
The table below presents these trends in terms of three indicators that measure the extent of 
expenditure decentralization, revenue decentralization, and finally the extent of transfer 
dependence. In the light of the new constitutional framework and the expanded fiscal transfers 
to the subnational levels, the subnational expenditures constitute a progressively higher 
proportion of the total public expenditures while also becoming more dependent on central 
transfers (particularly in the case of municipalities. However, if viewed in the regional 
perspective the role of Bolivian subnational governments in terms of scale and functional 
responsibilities may not be as significant as Brazil or Argentina (both federal countries), but in 
terms of depth of the decentralization reforms (political, fiscal and administrative forms of 
decentralization in reinforcing simultaneous existence) it fares much better. 
Table 5 :     Fiscal Decentralization Indicators 2006 -2010  (in %age)  
Departments/ Prefecturas 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Expenditure Decentralization Ratios 16.4 15.7 11.0 15.7 11 
Tax Decentralization Ratios  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Transfers Dependency Ratios 96 96.3 93.7 92.9 92.1 
Excl. Wages and Salaries for Health and Education  90 93 89.4 88.4 5.4 
Municipalities 
Expenditure Decentralization Ratios 17.1 14.9 19.6 20.6 20.3 
Tax Decentralization Ratios  5.5 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.1 
Transfers Dependency Ratios 65.9 68.7 77.3 74.1 75.5 
Subnational Governments 
Expenditure Decentralization Ratios 24.4 24.9 36.1 36.3 31.3 
Tax Decentralization Ratios  5.8 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.3 
Transfers Dependency Ratios 82.6 85.5 86.8 84.7 83.8 
Excl. Wages and Salaries for Health and Education  74 79.7 82.7 80.4 79 
Notes: Expenditure Decentralization= Expenditure of Gov. Level/ Total Public Expenditure | Tax Decentralization = 
Tax of Gov Level/ Total Government Tax Revenue| Transfer Dependence = Transfer Receipts/ Total Fiscal Pool of the 
Specific Gov   
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics/ Art IV upto 2010, National Accounts (Various) 
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3.4 MAIN ACTORS AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES IN PHASE 2 OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Given the rise of the MAS party from subnational political space to the central level, the 
main political mandate of the new Morales regime was to initiate a process of substantive 
political change that at its outset focused on forging a new constitution and state structure. An 
important point to note here is that the preference and order of decentralization reforms 
pursued by the MAS government were reflective of the Subnational Dominance Path as 
elucidated in the Sequential Theory, primarily because all these preferences were developed and 
amply articulated by MAS at the subnational level before they assumed the national stage.   
Political decentralization was the top of the agenda of the Bolivian decentralization 
following 2006, with even greater pressure coming from the subnational level for greater 
autonomy40. Furthermore, with the elections of the Prefectos of the nine departments at the 
outset of the reform process incorporated a new set of bargaining agents contesting for greater 
shares of the national divisible pool. While structurally they remain under the President, the fact 
that they have been elected through popular direct election entitles them  to a  much higher 
leverage  once  articulating  their claims and credibly  bargaining  with  the  centre.  The 
interesting case of this round of decentralization has been that right after the elections of 2006, 
the promulgation of the Hydrocarbon Law, a previously united subnational front saw the bigger 
Departments developing their individual preferences and motivations to participate in the 
decentralization game, thus defining new norms of the political context in which the bargaining 
over the resource pool takes place. 
The driving forces behind Bolivia’s ongoing decentralization effort are not its needs for 
service delivery improvements, reduction of regional inequalities or greater fiscal responsibility, 
despite their importance. They are instead competing pressures for control and distribution of 
revenues originating from the country’s natural resources, particularly revenues from hydro 
carbons and land usage. The overall agenda of regional autonomy is mainly a result of the 
articulations of the Media Luna departments, comprising of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando. 
As mentioned earlier, the wealth of these regions in terms of agriculture and hydrocarbon 
                                                             
40 Along with issues of land distribution, indigenous rights, distribution and use of hydrocarbons 
revenue, the issue of greater regional autonomy was the key element of this new social contract in 
Bolivia. 
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endowments is significantly higher than the other regions of Bolivia, which has been at the 
heart of their objective of greater local retention of the revenues coming from these sectors. In 
terms of GDP/capita, Santa Cruz is the wealthiest jurisdiction and hence assumes the dominant 
role in the ML. In addition to the economic attributes of the ML regions, there is also a strong 
regional identity especially in Santa Cruz, which transcends all notions of political or other 
group based allegiances. The main demand of the Santa Cruz region, for instance, has been the 
withholding of 2/3rd of the locally generated tax and customs revenue, with only 1/3rd 
transferred to the central divisible pool. This continues to be a highly contested subject between 
the centre and Santa Cruz in particular (as well as ML regions in general), since it is difficult to 
distinguish between the local and central taxes generated in a certain territory as the central 
taxation does not involve only the territorial collection but also the taxation generated from the 
economic activity of households and enterprises located in that territory.  
To interpret the incentives and of all the relevant political actors in the current 
decentralization game, the game framework outlined in Chapter 1 can be used.  
All regions yield a total product, a proportion of which is taxed by the Central 
Government who exercises full discretion over its use for redistribution or retention. In the 
status quo the tax rate is 0 < 𝑇 < 1.The total income generated for this tax rate is 𝑌. The total 
tax revenue that the CG receives equals 𝑇𝑌 , while the disposable income of the regions 
collectively is 𝑌(1 − T).   In each period, the CG has two strategies. It either maintains the 
status quo, which means that the tax rate does not change or it can retaliate by increasing the 
tax rate to T𝑛𝑝 so that T𝑛𝑝 > 𝑇.   For the tax rate T𝑛𝑝, the income generated is Y𝑛𝑝 and the 
disposable surplus/income of the regions is Y𝑛𝑝(1 − T𝑛𝑝 ).  
From the perspective of the regions, they have two strategies. They can either concede 
to the tax rate proposed by the CG or they can retaliate and demand for T𝑝 such that  
0<T𝑝 < 𝑇 < T𝑛𝑝 < 1. 
The total income generated for this tax rate is Y𝑝. At all times, the cost of retaliation of 
the regions is µ, where 0 < 𝜇 < 1 , whereas the cost of increasing T for the CG is r where 
0<r<1. Every region has its own share of contribution to the total disposable income 
individually given by  ∅(𝑌 − 𝑌𝑇) where 0 < ∅ < 1. In the previous setup, it was assumed that 
at t=0, all regions operate collectively and no contestation over individual shares exists. 
However, if there is a disparate contribution of the regions to the collective output yield Y, then 
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there are different constraints that face individual regions in their bargaining processes with the 
CG. The higher the ∅, the greater would be the bargaining power with the CG as the potential 
increase in surplus due to favorable bargaining results would still be higher than the cost of 
retaliation 𝜇. 
The main preference of the central government here is assumed to be redistributive and 
would be to retain a section of the receipts from taxes for central expenditures and policies, and 
transfer the remainder back to the Departments and the Municipalities. Looking at the trends 
of Departmental Contribution in the National GDP, it can be seen that the 4 ML Departments 
contribute 80% of the total GDP.  
 
Table 6: Departmental Share of Bolivia National GDP 
Department  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Mean 
2005-
14 
Chuquisaca 4.4 4.58 4.44 4.63 
    
4.49  
    
4.47  
    
4.35  
    
4.52  
    
4.84  
    
4.97  4.57 
La Paz 24.51 24.06 24.57 24.52 25.16 25.13 25.31 25.2 24.96 25.2 24.86 
Cochabamba 16.85 16.06 15.89 15.3 15.24 14.91 14.25 14.21 14.12 14.2 15.10 
Oruro 4.92 4.85 4.97 5.5 5.61 5.89 5.97 5.07 4.89 4.77 5.24 
Potosí 4.54 5.5 5.41 6.4 6.85 7.16 7.44 5.86 5.48 5.43 6.01 
Tarija 11.24 11.79 12.76 12.26 11.61 11.32 12.07 13.52 14.29 13.69 12.46 
Santa Cruz 29.54 29.09 28.22 27.67 27.2 27.28 27.05 28.22 28.11 28.48 28.09 
Beni 3.05 3.21 2.77 2.77 2.95 2.9 2.64 2.51 2.43 2.41 2.76 
Pando 0.94 0.86 0.97 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.9 0.87 0.86 0.91 
Source: Compiled from INE 2016  
 
Going back to the game setup, the four ML regions could pursue their interest 
maximization by forming a sub-coalition to expropriate the other members of the initial 
coalition, since they have a greater aggregate power than the remaining members.  
∅𝑀𝐿 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑌 − 𝑌𝑇)     >    ∅𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑌 − 𝑌𝑇) 
 
The Central Government Preference would be to aim for regional fiscal equalization, 
and to ensure that an adequate level of public services is extended to all population. The ML 
regions, as per the game framework outlined in Chapter 1, retaliate from the established fiscal 
status quo, demanding a greater retention of the locally generated revenue. Regardless of the 
political motivations and the ‘hard to satiate’ demands of these regions, the guiding premise 
remains that the administrative centre in La Paz has limited responsiveness to the local needs of 
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Santa Cruz coupled with the perceptions of the central government and politics being too 
distant, inefficient and corrupt, and the redistributive  fiscal  regime  of  the  centre  shall  come  
at  the  expense  of  the  local development plans.  
The other departments in the ML, including Beni and Pando, have limited 
representation in the national political space hence their scope of influence is constrained vis-à-
vis Santa Cruz in the preference articulation to the centre. Their stance on the autonomy 
demands shall be consistent to that of Santa Cruz as long as they register improvements in their 
fiscal and political positions, but their scope of influence on Santa Cruz itself remains limited. 
The slightly less politically influential, but significantly influential in terms of the fiscal 
contributions in the ML region, is Taija which has a substantial hydrocarbon endowment base 
and thus has a direct stake in the higher subnational retention of the rents. 
Apart from the ML, the main four highland departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosi and 
Chuquisaca are against the demands of greater autonomy put forth by the Media Luna 
departments. These regions, in addition to having a majority of the indigenous peoples, also 
happen to be the main support base for the incumbent political party, MAS. The anti-
exploitation political rhetoric of the MAS was influential in its assumption of executive 
incumbency with a view to maximize the power of a central state. While there continues to be a 
strong impulse in the debate on regional autonomies and further decentralization, the MAS 
strategy to constitutionally cover the creation of ‘regions’ has been considered as its attempt to 
dilute the departmental powers and strength through a ‘divide and rule’ strategy (Eaton, 2009). 
The MAS orientation for greater equality and socio-economic inclusion also faces inhibitive 
pressures from the enhanced regional autonomy, as it seeks to gain a greater central share of the 
hydrocarbon revenues from Tarija for redistributive transfers, while also instituting a land 
reform in the Santa Cruz department.  
In terms of the political capacity and the ‘collective action’ ability across the Bolivian 
national space, the MAS is perhaps the strongest political force in the Bolivian political space by 
virtue of its strong and stable electoral support base as well as its coalitions with various 
indigenous social movements that span all departments. It is also important to note that in 
terms of putting forth a united front against the interest articulation of the ML departments, the 
highland departments have limitations especially in terms of resisting co-optation attempts by 
the ML or to reject credible incentive commitments by the ML. Amongst the highland 
departments, Oruro and Potosi have less unambiguous stance on their support or opposition of 
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the regional autonomy demands.  This is partly also because of the probability of losing out if 
the outcome of the decentralization process is redistributive fiscal regime from the centre as per 
the constitutionally defined requisites of revenue distribution scales. Perhaps the most 
important departmental player in this context is the department of Cochabamba, which is in 
geographically between the highlands and the ML. While its stance has moved from a prior 
opposing one to one that concedes to the demands of regional autonomy, its influence and 
political stature is not significant enough to act as a mediator in this contestation. 
The aforementioned highlights the divergent interests of the nine new bargaining 
entities given their distinct objective functions, and the fact that they do not have the unilateral 
position of proposing and would generally operate on a response function to what the central 
initiative stipulates. The only instance of the departmental unison in interest articulation was in 
2005 at the time when the HL was being deliberated as it was in the collective interest of all 
subnational entities. While this division does exist at the inter- departmental level, these are not 
manifested in the municipal levels. The incumbent executive in particular, with the political 
backing of MAS and its allies, considers the municipalities as an avenue to coopt in their 
interests. Decentralizing fiscal resources directly to the municipalities could potentially 
undermine the departmental contestation for autonomy, following on with the political tactics 
detailed in Dickovick (2006). The reason is that the municipalities consider the departmental 
autonomy as an infringement on their scope of authority as they have existed (the degree of 
effectiveness not withholding) even prior to the LPP. While the municipalities never had as 
much autonomy and discretion prior and after the LPP and thus the attribution of ‘agency’ 
status is not appropriate, they are in possession of the ‘first mover’ advantage in the realm of 
subnational governance in Bolivia. The only avenue where the interests of the municipalities 
and the departmental governments coincide is the automatic revenue sharing mechanisms 
stipulated in the new constitution, whereby any change in the national or departmental taxation 
would have a direct effect on their revenue flows. 
3.5 CONSOLIDATING DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BOLIVIA 
With the political decentralization already completed in structural terms in 1994, and further 
consolidated in terms of substantive aspects in the period following 2006 with the HL and the 
departmental elections, as well as constitutionally guaranteed status of municipalities and 
departments coming under the 2009 Constitution, the current decentralization agenda is 
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dominated by the fiscal dimensions. In line with what this research set out to illustrate, the 
Bolivian decentralization reform saw its basic impulse in 1994 as well as post 2006 in 
subnational domination in framing the narrative and the sequential aspects of the reform 
evolution endorse the PFA sequence argument as well.  
The functional or administrative decentralization accompanied every round of 
decentralization reform in Bolivia, the first round was dominated by political decentralization 
(in a structural sense) with an unprecedented administrative decentralization to the subnational 
governments. Despite being a centrally stipulated reform, the LPP did articulate the centre’s 
preferential sequencing in administrative/functional decentralization but the main trigger for 
the LPP remained the increased interest articulation of the populace at the grassroots, hence the 
political decentralization became the primary output of the LPP. The second round, in effect 
from 2006 onwards has focused on expanding and consolidating the subnational political space 
while moving on to forge a new fiscal pact with the subnational governments to ensure their 
capacity to deliver on the functions previously assigned. The impulse for enhancing the political 
consolidation in the MAS government can be linked to the subnational roots of the MAS, as it 
gained much of its political stature in the subnational political space before emerging on the 
national horizons. 
This section shall engage with this centrality of fiscal reforms to consolidate decentralization 
as well as the inclusive development goals of the MAS government, and analyze the dominant 
articulations and contestations within the purview of fiscal decentralization reform. Implicit, yet 
central to this analysis is the use of these intergovernmental fiscal arrangements to enact a stable 
and sustainable socio-political order that positively reinforces the developmental framework as 
well. This section shall first analyze the National Development Plan with the aim of 
contextualizing the developmental policy framework in effect, and subsequently analyze the 
main issues in the current decentralization phase to build a cohesive state structure that delivers 
on the visions of the NDP. 
i. The Bolivian National Development Plan (2007) 
The PND Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y 
Democrática para Vivir Bien, Lineamientos Estratégicos (National Development Plan: 
Dignified,  Sovereign,  Productive,  and  Democratic  Bolivia  to  Live  Well,  Strategic 
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Directions) introduced in 2006 and formally instituted under a Presidential decree in 2007, 
details the political and economic agenda of the incumbent Morales government. This plan was 
initially promulgated for the period 2006-2011 as a medium term plan, subject to revisions every 
five years, conditional upon the retention of political consensus and incumbency 41 . As a 
stipulation of the strategic vision for Bolivia, the main objective of this plan and those 
stemming from it, remains transcending the entrenched political economic model  based  on  
primary  exports  and  socio-political  exclusion  of  a  majority  of  the populace. The main 
focus areas of the NDP span across four main realms; Dignity, Sovereignty, Productivity, and 
Democracy.  
ii. The Fiscal and Institutional Imperatives for Consolidated Decentralization 
As mentioned earlier, the sustainability and the degree of developmental success under 
the NDP and the new constitutional framework is critically dependent on how the 
intergovernmental institutions and resource distribution mechanisms are established. Especially 
in the aftermath of the new constitutional framework that stipulates a greater subnational 
political and administrative role, the importance of the fiscal decentralization is extremely high. 
Thus, for any mutually reinforcing ‘decentralization-developmentalism’ connection to take roots 
in Bolivia, an institutional and fiscal agreement between the centre and the subnational 
governments is imperative in terms of how revenues from strategic sectors and central transfers 
need to be framed, roles and responsibilities for each level of government, local taxation, and 
the institution of non-inhibitive ‘hard budget constraints’ on subnational governments for 
overall fiscal responsibility and macroeconomic stability. 
iii. The Primacy of Resource Rents 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the agreements that culminated into the 
promulgation of the National Hydrocarbons Law in 2006 represented a preamble to the ‘new 
social contract’ primarily in terms of broader sharing of the national resource pool in a broad-
based and inclusive manner. The subsequent nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, as 
well as the production tax imposed in the HL, constitutes the largest sectoral contribution to 
the national fiscal pool especially uptil 2014 with high commodity prices (IMF, 2008). The HL 
finds its roots in the articulation of virtually all socio-political groups in the Bolivian polity, 
                                                             
41 http://www.planificacion.gob.bo/pdes/ 
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including the marginalized indigenous majority as well as the resource rich regions in the Media 
Luna. In comparison to other aspects of the decentralization reforms in Bolivia, this law created 
opportunities for bargaining in a new resource pie at no detriment to the existing resource 
pools of the actors in the political and socio-economic space, and all stakeholders gained from 
it (including the central government). 
Being a product of a predominantly subnational articulation process, this law also came 
about as a victory for the regional interests which provided a further impetus for the ‘regional 
autonomy’ movement in the subsequent years which still continues. The complex bargaining 
and contestation around the revenue sharing of the hydrocarbon rents has been discussed in 
some detail in the preceding section but one main impetus to the increased subnational 
contestation of the resource rents was the central government led reduction in the divisible 
surplus by 30% inorder to create the fiscal space for instituting the Renta Dignidad  project 
(INE, 2010).  This  was  the  first  change  made  to  the  HL  by  the  centre  which 
significantly reduced the fiscal base of the subnational governments (primarily the departments), 
however there were other modifications of the same effect to the HL in the years following 
2006 (IMF, 2008 & 2012). The shares of fiscal distribution have changed over the course of the 
law’s implementation and with the NDP in the background, and since 2008 onwards the share 
of municipalities in the hydrocarbon transfers has been higher than that of the departments, 
even after taking the additional 30% by the centre into account. This preferential status of the 
municipalities over the departments has been explained in Section IV, as they present a more 
potent prospect of political support for the MAS to switch the bargaining more in the favor of 
the central government. 
While the incidence of such political expediencies does fall in the realm of rationality in 
terms of the interest articulation and bargaining strategies of the actors, the incentives of each 
participating actor in the process are also shaped by the nature of the resource itself. The 
revenues coming from hydrocarbon sources have a certain degree of uncertainty given their 
linkage to global commodity markets and the vulnerability to price fluctuations amid changing 
international macroeconomic dynamics. As a result of this volatility and the discretionary 
adjustments by the central government, in 2008, the central transfers to departments amounted 
to US$ 78 million against the budgeted US$ 263 million and for the municipalities US$ 267 
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million against a budgeted US$ 160 million42. Given such circumstance, it is probable that such 
changes shall lead to a more short-term bargaining horizon by the relevant actors and inhibit 
any credible medium-long term inter-temporal transfer commitments. 
The previous bargaining was targeted at getting increased shares from an increasing resource 
pool, and thus it is probable that any future impulses for austerity budgeting in the wake of 
declining hydrocarbon revenues will have political implications for the centre vis-à-vis the 
subnational governments. This equation is further complicated by the fact that preferential 
allocations to the municipalities by the centre have already created consistent interests with the 
centre and any recessionary changes shall have a depletive effect on the municipal level political 
consolidation of the centre. Given this context, since 2010 new avenues for negotiation have 
been brought to the fore that aim at a percentage based transfer in addition to the budgeted 
amounts annually. While this is still an ongoing process to the extent that this research has 
discovered, the objective is to ensure that the new formula would be equity-enhancing and 
compensate for any subnational expenditure gaps after they have been rationalized according to 
the context, and awarded on per capita basis similar to the transfer formulas existing for centre-
municipal transfers. 
For the new formula to be more conducive to the departments, the centre has offered 
some concessions in terms of the departmental expenditure discretions. In 2006, in the 
aftermath of the HL promulgation, the departments only had expenditure discretion over 8% 
of the received transfers, and the gradual reduction in the earmarked transfers from the centre 
have led to the departmental expenditure discretions to around 19% of the total transfer 
receipts by 2010. A simultaneous concern for the centre is the articulation of the resource rich 
departments to retain a greater share of the revenues produced in their jurisdiction, which is a 
politically and economically warranted claim, but acceding to these articulations may have 
implications for the inter-regional equity  especially  the  downside  risks  for  the  non-resource  
rich  departments.  The concessions offered by the centre in this regard have been significantly 
mismatched on grounds of equity. As of 2010, the transfers from the hydrocarbon resource 
pool allocated on the  basis of per capita have been US$ 45 per capita to Potosi department 
(with a poverty rate of 79.7%), as compared to the Pando department’s receipt of US$ 466 per 
                                                             
42 Comparing the initial allocation for 2008 based on Decree no 28421 (1.848 million Bolivianos) with 
the 2008 allocation (554 million Bolivianos) underlying the Decree no. 29322 as well as taking into 
account the reduction for Renta Dignidad. Data: FIAM (2008) 
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capita despite having a lower (yet sizeable) poverty rate of 72.4%. Table 7 below illustrates the 
departmental revenues as of 2010: 
          Table 7:  Departmental Revenue in US$/capita (2010) 
Department Poverty Rate Hydrocarbon 
Transfers 
Royalties Revenue Sharing  Total  
Potosi  79.7% 45 64.9 56.6 66.5 
Beni 76.0% 81.6 38.8 55.8 176.2 
Pando 72.4% 466 113.4 78.3 57.6 
Chuquisaca 70.1% 61.9 27.7 53.6 43.2 
Oruro 67.8% 79.1 30.2 57.9 67.1 
La Paz 66.2% 23.4 2.5 50.8 6.7 
Cochabamba 55.0% 27.8 19.2 49.1 6.1 
Tarija 50.8% 95.2 366.4 51.6 13.3 
Santa Cruz  38.0% 23.1 17.6 46.2 6.8 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics 2011|Poverty rates based on 2004 estimation of Bolivian 
Ministry of Statistics| Transfers also include municipalities as exclusive departmental allocations could not 
be found.  
Another feature on the ongoing bargaining has been to redefine the divisible pool by 
considering the aggregate fiscal receipts of the central government and then allocate them to the 
subnational governments. The positive aspects of such a redefinition would be that the 
departmental contestations based exclusively on hydrocarbons would be mitigated as well as 
increasing the probability of departmental acceptance of the transfers, given that they would 
now be smoother as compared to an exclusive reliance on the volatile hydrocarbon revenues. 
Nevertheless, it still remains a function to the departmental ability and willingness to consider 
the consequences of such an adjustment on a relatively longer time horizon, but if this model of 
transfers is accepted than not only does it enable them to develop inter-temporal policy 
outlooks and also credibly commit to them because of reduced uncertainity arising out of 
consensual agreement. 
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iv. Defining Roles and Functional Obligations 
In  addition  to  the  contestations  on  the  magnitude  of  fiscal  shares  from  the 
hydrocarbon pool, the initial articulation for autonomy put forth by the Santa Cruz department 
argued for complete functional decentralization of all public service responsibilities (barring 
those with proven scale effects of central provision e.g. national defence). While this was an 
ambitious claim to make in the first place, the idea behind it was that with greater functional 
responsibilities the departmental bargaining power over fiscal resources shall be higher given 
the ‘finance to follow function’ maxim of optimal fiscal decentralization. This claim was 
considerably rescinded but there is still a persistence in the departmental demands for greater 
functional responsibilities than currently assigned. Its implications for the consolidation of the 
decentralization and developmental framework are not those of conflict (as in the case of 
hydrocarbon transfers), but the effects are instead on the vertical division of authority across 
the governmental levels.  
In the current framework, the expenditure responsibilities are disjoint and fragmented 
across the various governmental levels. While such forms of functional decentralization allow 
for greater responsiveness and autonomy of the different governmental levels, it significantly   
weakens   the   accountability   requisites   which   has   adverse   governance outcomes. This 
obscurity of roles and responsibilities is further complicated by the hybrid nature of the 
departments themselves (as elaborated earlier in Section IV) – they are accountable to the 
elected Prefecto but also depend on the central government ministries as they prescribe the 
operational and strategic modalities.  
Taking note of this, in 2008, a regulation was issued in conjunction with the HL, the 
enforcement of which has been inadequate, that earmarked the absorption of resources for 
sector-specific investments, and also redefine the responsibilities of each level of the 
government mandated with their delivery( UNRISD, 2013). The 2009 Constitution further 
increased the obscurity surrounding the distinct role and responsibilities of the governments by 
defining four forms of responsibilities; a) concurrent, b) shared, c) delegated, and d) exclusive. 
Which sectoral responsibility needs to be categorized as what according to these forms has led 
to a ‘passing the buck’ behavior amongst the governmental tiers. The new constitution’s 
provisions allowing the establishment of ‘regions’ and ‘autonomies’ further complicates the 
responsibility debate as new jurisdictions have been added without explicit specifications of 
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their mandates. It must be noted that the allocation of responsibilities is not purely a ‘legal’ 
concern but instead is an issue of negotiation of control over the inputs required for service 
delivery, and since the discretion over the production factors is not always negotiable, there is a 
tendency to ‘coordinate’ the service delivery rather than engaging in the delineation (Bolton & 
Farrell, 1991). 
The resolution of this assignment problem is well-suited for central government’s action 
which can adopt a ‘result-based’ management approach as seen in the case of Brazil and 
Argentina (Ahmad, Brosio, & Shah, 2011). In the context of Bolivia, this result orientation can 
be linked to the central developmental framework’s social inclusion objectives, whereby a 
central concession to the departmental demands of functional expansion is publicly and 
institutionally established, thus marking departmental exclusivity in the responsibility of 
providing that particular service. Such an arrangement not only grants the departments the 
expanded discretion over the assigned functions, but also leads to a a dual accountability; to the 
centre and to its local constituents. The evaluation of the service delivery quality can be tracked 
using service quality indicators, administered either as social audits or specialized audits by the 
centrally deputed agency. A probable consequence of such an arrangement could be asymmetry, 
as the central government will have to negotiate the functional expansions with each 
department but the positive consequence would be a greater clarity in the precise 
responsibilities. 
Such a strategy needs to be incremental in its institution and could thus increase the 
probability of moving away from the ‘coordinated’ delivery mechanisms to clearly divided 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the political pressures due to the bi-directional vertical 
accountability  of  the  departments  could  also  enable  shifting  the  costs  of  production 
factors as well as service provision exclusively to the level of government assigned with it. 
However, transfer of cost responsibility must be made in the context of hard budget constraints 
upon the subnational governments to retain pressures for greater efficiency while  also  
mitigating  the  chances  of  the  costs  being  shifted  back  to  the  central government. Albeit 
a slightly longer term strategy, the imposition of the budget constraints must be accompanied 
by pluralized revenue mix at the subnational level as well, which is discussed in the following 
part. 
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v. Diversifying Subnational Revenue Mix 
Amongst the articulations by the ML regions for greater autonomy, there have been 
claims under the broader notion of autonomy for either withholding locally collected national 
taxes or the regional discretion over their administration. The objective, with the arduous nature 
of actually implementing this claim in practice, remained diversifying the local fiscal pool and 
reducing dependence on central transfers - a critical concern across all decentralized systems. If 
conceded to, such an arrangement where a richer subnational government retains a larger share 
of the locally generated fiscal revenue, would have inhibitive effects on the redistributive 
capacity of the central government thereby exacerbating the inter-regional inequalities as well. 
However, it also needs to be mentioned that this claim by ML (with Santa Cruz as the main 
protagonist) made an allowance for inter-departmental redistribution, whereby from the 2/3rd  
of the locally generated central tax retained by the department, 10% would be set aside for 
inter-regional redistribution. Another form of inequality can also come as a consequence of this 
claim being accepted, and that has to do with the inability or capacity constraints of other 
departments to establish ‘buoyant’ tax bases within their jurisdiction. A related aspect is also the 
departmental willingness to bear the ‘political cost’ of taxation, and a natural equilibrium exists 
with the central government bearing this cost (Sobel & S., 1998 Vol. 96, No. 1/2). 
In addition to the complexities outlined above, there are also some technical dimensions 
that make this process particularly tough in the Bolivian context. Despite the fact that the fiscal 
position of Bolivia since 2006 has been remarkably solid (see Fig. 2), the macroeconomic 
environment remains vulnerable to external shocks because of significant dependence on 
hydrocarbons, which makes it especially hard to identify which tax sources can be decentralized 
to regional governments without exacerbating the central government’s (and thus national) 
fiscal vulnerability. This is of an even greater concern in the Bolivian context, where the tax 
regime has a narrow base of potentially buoyant tax avenues like individual taxation. Given the 
populist roots of the incumbent government coupled with substantial fiscal base provided by 
the hydrocarbon revenues, there has been little impulse to broaden the tax base or alter the tax 
rates which in the case of personal income taxes have remained at 13% for the period 2007-
2014 (IMF, 2014). Any change in the taxation revenues would also have a direct bearing on the 
municipalities as their revenue pools are predominantly linked to the central transfers. As 
mentioned earlier, the revenue sharing mechanisms emanating from the HL as well as the 2009 
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constitution, retain and reinforce the municipal privileges from the earlier LPP. Another layer 
of complexity was added to the equation with the subsequent entry of the departments in the 
state organizational structure with no distinctly mandated tax bases, the municipalities were 
granted new tax bases that would have been more suitable if administered by the departments 
because of the scale effect, e.g. automobile taxes, property taxes or infrastructure usage fees. 
Given the divergent incentives in the subnational political space of Bolivia, the only 
prospect  of  subnational  taxation  would  be  tax-sharing  whereby  the  departments  can 
exploit the tax bases in conjunction with the national government or the municipalities e.g. 
municipalities collect the recurrent property ownership taxes but any taxation on the sale or 
change of property ownership goes to the departmental pool. The possible downsides of such 
an arrangement is that the municipalities and the departments may end up over- consuming the 
common resource pool or in a bid to expand their respective or collective share, impose tax 
rates higher than the efficient level (in the light of the Laffer Curve effects mentioned in 
Chapter 2), or even more so, leave everything unchanged and expect the gaps to be subsidized 
by the centre which in turn would have to raise additional taxation and thus bear its political 
cost. Given this milieu of contrasting incentives and the possible permutations of subnational 
fiscal diversification options discussed here, this research is constrained in providing or 
suggesting an optimal way forward. Nevertheless, the issue remains central to the consolidation 
of decentralization in Bolivia as a whole as well as an inclusive developmental policy 
framework. 
vi. Establishing an Institutional Framework for Fiscal Prudence  
In  the  broader  debate  on  decentralization,  one  issue  that  recurrently  appears  a 
potential risk of decentralization is fiscal imprudence by the subnational governments which 
complicates the overall macroeconomic stability of the country. Bolstering fiscal responsibility 
is  an  issue  of  high  importance  for  Bolivia,  especially  as it  confronts  a downward trend in 
commodity prices, that were the main source of state revenue and the finance  devolution  to 
the  subservient  tiers.  In  the  case  of Bolivia,  despite  its recent resilience  on  the 
macroeconomic  front,  growing  articulations  for  greater  regional autonomy from the 
departments as well as a broader developmental framework that aims for a broad-based socio-
economic transformation, have exposed the country not only to the substantive nature of the 
task at hand but also the scale of resources required to make it  happen.    While  most of the  
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dynamics  and  options available  for consolidating  the political and administrative 
decentralization through fiscal decentralization whilst reinforcing  the  central  developmental  
outlook  have  been  discussed  in  the  preceding sections the focus here shall be upon the 
institutional mechanisms in place to avoid subnational fiscal imprudence. 
Under the new constitution, with the state organization spelled out, corresponding 
institutional arrangements have also been established to govern subnational fiscal affairs 
including their solicitations. The main features are as follows: 
 Long Term Debts can be acquired by the subnational governments through the national 
treasury system, Sistema de Tesoreria del Estado. External debt finance has a sovereign 
guarantee provided by the central government. However, a congressional/legislative 
assent is a pre-requisite before an external debt can be acquired by the central or the 
subnational government. 
 Short-term domestic debt can raised laterally across the municipalities/prefectos so long 
as it is sanctioned by the National Ministry of Finance. 
 Debt regulation for all subnational governments (municipal and departmental) for all 
sources of debt is the 20/200 rule, i.e.  the maximum limit of debt servicing is 20% of 
their current revenue, with the total debt stock value not exceeding 200% of the current 
revenue. 
 Municipalities and Departments can access funds through the Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional (FNDR)/ National Fund for Regional Development, for 
investment purposes only and not to meet current expenditure gaps. 
Given this institutional and legal stipulations, an element of concern in the current 
articulation of regional autonomy is that the rationalization of subnational limits to acquiring 
debt financing has not featured in the narrative. The reason why this is an issue of concern is 
the probability of the departments reneging on their debt commitments if they are granted 
autonomy, leaving the central government to deliver on the debt settlements. Up until 2010, 
most departmental governments have exhibited the appropriation of a high share of their 
revenue pools to debt-servicing and in some cases the  debt stock  is considerably  high.  Table  
5  presents a  composite  view of the  debt portfolio holdings by the departmental governments 
exclusively: 
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Table 8: Departmental Debt Portfolio Estimates (2010-11) 
  
 
Revenues 
 
 
Debt Service 
 
 
Debt Stock 
Debt 
service 
Debt 
Stock Department (US$ millions) 2010 2010 Ratio Ratio 
La Paz 31.34 13.14 58.09 42% 185% 
Oruro 19.3 6.5 29.43 34% 152% 
Potosi 18.86 5.03 54.73 27% 290% 
Cochabamba 43.45 5.12 63 12% 145% 
Chuquisaca 20.66 4.21 43.83 20% 212% 
Tarija 107.94 7.63 86.25 7% 80% 
Santa Cruz 69.4 12.6 103.62 18% 149% 
Beni 30.38 7.12 53.12 23% 175% 
Pando 21.93 3.54 14.11 16% 64% 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics 2011 
From Table 5, it can be seen that the debt-stock and the debt-servicing ratios are mostly 
on the higher side, with Potosi and Chuquisaca being the clear outliers in terms of debts-
tock/revenue ratio. In terms of debt servicing/revenue ratios, La Paz (paradoxically also the 
administrative capital), Oruro, Potosi and Beni are in contravention of the established rule. 
While this partly signals the inadequacy of credible enforcement by the central government, an 
explanation for such high ratios can also be the presence of long term debts acquired prior to 
the rule imposition. In this case, this presents another legal challenge as the status of the 
prefectures had been ambiguous once they were established in 2005/6; as their legal status was 
that of deconcentrated central government institutions. This implies that their debt obligations 
automatically fall into the central government’s realm of responsibility, despite the fact that the 
management and absorption of the debt was under a high degree of departmental discretion. 
The way forward in this case, in addition to a credible enforcement of the established 
rules by the central government e.g. linking subsequent transfers to the department’s ability to 
manage its debt portfolio within the prescribed limits, could be a gradual phase- out of the debt 
obligations through the unspent transfer balances held by the departments. Given  the  short  
term  horizons  against  the  backdrop  of  volatile  resource  flows  (as explained earlier), the 
phase outs should not be done on multi-year basis, but instead a short term cutoff needs to be 
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stipulated by the centre within which the surplus balances from HL transfers as well as other 
revenue transfer contributions be devoted to debt servicing. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The decentralization reforms in Bolivia in their second phase have assumed the form of 
a bargaining game, the complexity of which was significantly bolstered by the new bargaining 
entries at the departmental level. In the current round of decentralization reforms, a polarity of 
interests has been observed between the ML regions and the highlands. While none of these 
groups have the capacity or the consensus to operate and bargain in unison with the central 
government, their disaggregated and divergent interests lead to a complex political context 
against which the overall decentralization needs to be consolidated in a manner that reinforces 
the developmental policy framework put into effect by  MAS  government.  At an aggregate 
level, the Bolivian polity has registered notable improvements across democratic, economic and 
management realms. It is by no means an adverse scenario to have a high degree of subnational 
interest articulation and bargaining, and it is actually a merit of the decentralization reform 
experience of Bolivia that the reform took a subnational domination route where the 
responsiveness of public governance and service delivery has undoubtedly improved. Yet, the 
manner in which all competing contestations and subnational bargaining is managed shall not 
only dictate the efficacy of the reform process but also the extent to which Bolivia as a polity 
can break away from its historical roots of socio-economic underdevelopment. 
In terms of reform consolidation, the interest articulation and bargaining strategies of 
the central government under Morales are also noteworthy. With its posturing depicting the 
departmental autonomy as a centripetal force to its objectives (mainly in the ML), the central 
government has instituted cooptation mechanisms for the municipal level governments to 
dilute the rigor of the departmental interests. The consequence of this can be that this 
bargaining may eliminate some inefficiency, both allocative and productive; it might end up 
reinforcing some of the same. The actors in the subnational and the national political space are 
playing ‘nested games’ (Tsebelis, 1990) in terms of resource pool division, diversification of 
local fiscal pool through taxation and indigenous revenue mobilization, expenditure and 
functional assignments, and the subnational debts. The probable culmination of which shall be 
an intergovernmental framework with efficiency constraints. This remains the main challenge 
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before the objectives of reform consolidation as well as socio-economic transformation that 
Bolivia envisages under the ongoing NDP. 
The case of Bolivia also presents a good exhibit of the partial decentralization debate; 
whereby the early winners of decentralization are the most likely sources of resistance for any 
subsequent attempts. Since it is an ongoing process, the prediction of outcomes would be 
inaccurate at best. This research sought to illustrate the sequential dimensions emerging under a 
subnational domination path, and in the course of examining the Bolivian case it also put forth 
a contribution to the existing literature on decentralization in terms of the institutional 
dilemmas that could emerge as a consequence of the reform consolidation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FEDERALISM & DECENTRALIZATION IN P AKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELO PMENT  
 
4.1 CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 
The virtues of federalism and subnational empowerment have surfaced recurrently in 
political as well as economic theories from the times of Madison & Hamilton to Musgrave 
(1961) to Oates (2006) and Weingast (2009). The common denominator remains that in 
ethnically and socially heterogenous contexts, state policy is most conducive to the preferences 
of its constituents when a multi-tiered governance structure exists, with each level having a 
distinct mandate. Higher levels of government (at the central level) are more suited for the 
provision of nationwide public goods (such as defence) to retain the benefits of homogeniety 
in standards, non-excludability and scale effects, while the lower levels of the government 
(regional/provincial or local/municipal) are better suited in the provision of locally responsive 
public goods (waste management, local infrastructure, water and sanitation, amongst others). 
Distinct mandates, clearly defined functions, and adherence to the stipulated parameters by 
each tier of the government also enable a greater degree of targeted accountability by the 
citizen. As compared to a high concentration of power in a potentially exploitative centre, 
federalism enables diluted power among multiple tiers of government, which may also be 
mutually competitive horizontally and dependent vertically. From a purely political standpoint, 
such a dilution in the concentration of power illustrates a path to peace, order and stability 
especially in contexts marred by deep socio-political cleavages. From a purely economic point 
of view, the decentralized federal systems enable a higher responsiveness of the government to 
constituents rooted in greater preference revelation and access to information, as well as the 
benefits arising as a consequence of intergovernmental competition. 
Federalism transcends mere administrative rearrangements, and involves substantive 
political rearrangement that results in limiting central autonomy in policy design, 
implementation and enforcement. Building upon the Hamiltonian paradox, while limited 
central autonomy augurs well for subnational empowerment and federalism, it also results in 
limiting the strategic control of the centre. This could be a detrimental feature, as decentralized 
entities may face higher costs of coordination as well as provision owing to scale constraints. 
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Furthermore, when the reform is not responsively structured and the relevant interests in the 
decentralized scheme are averse to renegotiation on a circumstantial basis, decentralization 
under federalism may instead result in hampering efficiency, accountability and exacerbating 
instability of the federation itself. This may be a consequence of greater incentives by 
individual subnational governance structures to expand their expenditures beyond their 
contribution and externalize the costs to the others or the superior governmental level(s), 
resulting in an overgrazing of the common fiscal resources which could have significant 
macroeconomic implications.  
With this in context, this case study examines the experience of federalism in Pakistan, 
which has been characterized by ‘potholes, detours and prospects’ alike (Shah, 2010). The 
Hamiltonian paradox discussed earlier has also been a recurrent observation in Pakistan, given 
a consistent divergence of the de-facto and de-jure in governance – run predominantly as a 
unitary state despite being formally a federal state. The 18th Constitutional Amendment in 
2009/10 has been a key development in substantive decentralization and federalism in 
Pakistan, diluting the influence of a traditionally powerful centre in the favor of the provincial 
or subnational governments.  
Considering the second main trajectory of the sequential theory of decentralization – 
national dominance path, the case of Pakistan holds great resonance. There have been 
multiple substantive attempts at decentralization in Pakistan since its independence in 1947, 
primarily through the different administrative structures of the government; national to 
provincial, national to local, and provincial to local. While all these three manifestations differ 
with each other, the main similarity between each of them remained in the underlying 
motivation. The first three attempts at governance reform through decentralization had been 
made by a non-representative, autocratic, unelected centre whereas the current reform process 
(instituted in 2009/10 and still in a consolidation phase) is the first one to be instituted under 
elected governments. The paradox, as stated earlier, surrounding the decentralization in 
Pakistan is that the three military regimes directly in government for 34 years, have actively 
pursued decentralization and devolution of power, whereas all elected governments have 
deliberately subdued subnational politics and governance. This paradoxical situation between 
authoritarian and democratic politics in Pakistan, presents an interesting avenue for research 
not only in terms of decentralization and local governance but also in terms of the bargaining 
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strategies employed by the ruling elite43, and more broadly on the strength of the federation 
itself.  The decentralization reforms whenever pursued have always followed a national 
dominance path, where the protagonists of the reform have used it as a tool for further 
centralization of powers in the non-representative centre (Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir, 2005).  
4.2 EVOLUTION OF THE STATE STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN   
The state of Pakistan was envisaged as a federal state at the time of its inception. This 
was partly attributable to the fact that prior to independence, the founding party continued to 
articulate demands for increased provincial autonomy under the British rule. In addition, the 
modalities employed under the Partition Plan (1946) required that the Muslim majority 
provinces and the Muslim members of provincial legislatures were to choose whether to 
remain within the Indian federation after decolonization or come together to form a 
federation of Pakistan. The need for federal system was also an imperative, given that the 
nation was essentially created on an ideological basis and not ethnic, linguistic or social basis. 
While being a strong point of articulation, it was important for the state to focus on addressing 
the heterogeneity of ethnicities, customs, language and social norms, to assure the stability of 
the newly created polity. Following its independence, the Government of India Act 1935 was 
adopted as the interim constitutional order with minor changes, while a Constituent Assembly 
was tasked with creating a new constitution. It must be noted that the Government of India 
Act 1935, as a colonial instrument, created a federal system but the distribution of authority 
and powers was skewed towards the centre which was held by the British. The Republic of 
India was also established at the same time as Pakistan in 1947, but its constitutional 
experience was on a different trajectory right at the outset – instead of provisionally invoking 
the Government of India Act 1935, the Indian Independence Act 1947 was instituted as a 
provisional constitution that took all conducive provisions from the various Indian Councils 
Acts (1858, 1861, 1892, 1909) and the Government of India Acts 1919 & 1935 (Waseem, 
2006).  
While the first constitution for India was promulgated in 1950, Pakistan saw its first 
constitution coming out in 1956. A main reason for this was the political instability post 1952 
which saw four governments changing in a 4 year period hampering the consistency required 
for the constitutional process to get truly off the ground. The first Constitution was 
                                                             
43 More details can be found in Aslam, G (2010) 
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promulgated in 1956, which explicitly declared Pakistan as a federal state, however the 
centripetal impulses of power distribution persisted (Shah, 2011). Owing to the political crises 
that ensued in its aftermath, this constitution was abrogated in 1958 and a martial law was 
imposed. This marked the beginning of the political instability that has marred the 
establishment of a stable political culture in Pakistan, as military governments have since ruled 
the country for an aggregate period of more than three decades.  
The first military takeover of the government occurred in 1958 with the imposition of 
martial law by General Ayub Khan. Under his regime, the promulgation of the second 
constitution took place in 1962 which was prepared by a non-representative bureaucratic 
body. In the aftermath of its promulgation, a legislative assembly was established and 
presidential elections were held in which General Ayub Khan retained his position. Following 
his resignation in 1969 and an intermittent transition under another military dictator, a 
democratically elected government took office under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the Prime 
Minister in 1971. This period of democratic rule lasted until 1977 when it was overthrown by 
another military chief Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, however the most important event in this democratic 
phase was the promulgation and ratification of a new constitution by a representative 
government in 1973. The Zia regime lasted from 1977 until 1988, whereby political parties 
were barred from actively participating in the political space until 1986 and a legislative 
assembly based on non-partisan elections assumed office in 1985. Democratic rule returned to 
the fore after 1988 until 1999, during which time the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML) alternated in incumbency for short periods. None of these two parties were able to 
complete their terms in both rounds of their incumbency. A military coup in October 1999 
dislodged the government of PML and the government was headed by the then military chief, 
General Pervez Musharraf as the Chief Executive. Upon assuming the government, the 
Musharraf regime held the 1973 constitution in abeyance, and in its stead, introduced the 
Provisional Constitutional Order as the governing framework of the state. 
Holding the constitution in abeyance was not directed at the abrogation of the 
constitution, and hence the military regime had to receive a nod of ‘legitimacy’ from the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declared the coup d’etat as legitimate and necessary and 
gave General Musharraf a period of three years to transfer the government back under 
democratic civilian rule. In 2002, in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling, Musharraf 
conducted a referendum for Presidency in which he was the sole contender which enabled 
him to earn an additional 5 years constitutionally mandated term as President. Soon after his 
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referendum, President Musharraf called for general elections to elect the national and 
provincial legislatures, in October 2002. Prior to the elections, the Musharraf regime also 
instituted a Legal Framework Order (LFO, 2001) as an addendum to the PCO that ensured 
that the power would lie with the Presidency, regardless of the outcome of the elections for 
the provincial and national legislatures. The LFO also expanded the adult suffrage by lowering 
the voting age to 18 years as compared to a prior 22 years, which was subsequently also 
ratified after the 1973 constitution was put into effect in the aftermath of the elections. In 
2008, as a result of fresh elections at the national and provincial levels, the government was 
assumed again by the civilian democratic parties, with the PPP emerging as the victor and 
Musharraf still retained the presidency until August 2008, when he resigned owing to the 
threats of impeachment. The PPP government that assumed office in 2008 was the first ever 
civilian government to complete its constitutionally mandated tenure of 5 years in 2013 in the 
country’s 66 year history.  
The administrative structure of Pakistan is composed of four provinces, two 
autonomous and disputed territories, one federal capital territory, and a group of Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Details of these are as follows:  
Table  : Administrative Structure of Pakistan 
Administrative Unit Status Population  % of Total Population 
Azad Jammu & Kashmir Autonomous/Disputed 2,972,501 2% 
Balochistan Federating Unit 13,162,222 7% 
FATA Federally Administered 3,930,419 2% 
Gilgit Baltistan Autonomous 1,441,523 1% 
Islamabad  Capital Territory 1,151,868 1% 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Federating Unit 26,896,829 14% 
Punjab Federating Unit 91,379,615 47% 
Sindh Federating Unit 55,245,497 28% 
Source: Compiled using data from Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan 
4.3 PARADOX OF SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 
 While the evolution of federalism from the constitutional/legal point of view has been 
briefly reviewed, it is also important to observe any structural reforms in governance that 
enhanced subnational influence/participation. Interestingly, the political history of Pakistan 
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shows a “paradoxically countercyclical pattern for subnational (especially, local) democracy” 
(Cheema, Khan, & Myerson, 2013). Thrice in the history of Pakistan, electoral democracy has 
been introduced at the local (Municipal) levels (1962, 1985, and 2001), which have either been 
rolled back or “replaced with unelected administrators” (Cheema, Khan, & Myerson, 2013) 
once the civilian governments return. The most recent establishment of democratic local 
governments under the LGO 2001 during the Musharraf regime were, and predictably so, 
rolled back by the revived civilian democratic government at the central and provincial levels. 
At the time of its promulgation, the local governments established under the LGO were 
granted a seven year protection to let the system gain some root, at the culmination of which 
the provincial governments were to decide upon their future (UNDP, 2010). As a result, a 
complete civilian tenure in government (2008-2013) elapsed without the establishment of local 
democratic governments, and was instead characterized by a re-bureaucratization at the local 
levels.  
With this in context, we need to examine why decentralized political governance at the 
local levels has been a cause championed by the military regimes and less so by the civilian 
governments in Pakistan. A popular assertion, which this research also concedes to in the 
context of Pakistan, is that the elected local governments are established to dilute the political 
strength of the established political parties and to lend greater legitimacy and a consolidated 
alternative political base to the incumbent military regime (Cheema et al. 2006). Elected local 
governments could offer a non-representative central government a vital political connection 
to the constituencies throughout the nation, whereby the local incumbents have a direct 
articulation channel with the centre which in its own interests of consolidation has an 
incentive to be of a greater responsiveness [Cheema et. al. (2006), Myerson (2009)]. An 
illustration of this can be found in the 2001 reforms, where the non-representative centre 
confronted a strong entrenchment of party politics in the broader political space, especially at 
the central and provincial levels. The incentives of the centre were thus truly reflected in the 
award of progressively greater authority to local governments vis-à-vis the provincial 
governments.  
The devolution of authority under the LGO took the form of greater devolution from 
the provinces to the local governments, with the central scope of authority very negligibly 
changed. Across all of the local governance reforms thus far in the history of Pakistan, a 
common feature has been the non-partisanship of the local elections. This remained the case 
with the 2001 LGO as well, and though the partisan interests exhibit a considerable degree of 
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resilience in their presence (even though covert), the degree of leverage they had over the 
centre or the local governments themselves is considerably reduced as compared to partisan 
local governments. The rules against the partisan local elections are also an influential 
bargaining and incentive-maximization strategy for the non-representative centre, as it can go 
for a selective enforcement of the rules. This feature of the local governance structures 
established under the military regimes offers some explanation of the civilian democratic 
governments’ aversion to allow the local governance structures to exist. Rather intuitive, the 
mainstream political parties in Pakistan (PML and PPP) saw the local governments established 
under the LGO 2001 as representative of the ‘dictatorial’ interests and according to their 
perceptions, the local governments represented a class of defecting politicians that were 
detrimental to their political interests.  
In democratizing contexts (apt in the case of Pakistan, but also selectively applicable in 
other contexts) the rational incentives of the established political interests incumbent at the 
provincial and central level of governments may be skewed against the establishment of 
democratic local governments, as they are seen as a competition for power and patronage 
(Cheema, 2006). Illustrative of this assertion, is the conduct of the elected representatives of 
the political parties at the central and provincial legislatures in Pakistan, who have committed 
to the reform local democratic governments and even passed legislations in this regard but the 
implementation continues to be deferred on different pretexts.  
Some political parties, like the MQM (Muttahida Quomi Movement / National Allied 
Movement) who have a regionally and ethnically concentrated political base in the urban 
regions of the Sindh province (of vital economic significance to Pakistan), to persist with their 
demands for local governments as it would enable a stronger bargaining position for them to 
seek ‘political rents’ in the form of ministerial incumbencies at the central level. The temporal 
pattern of MQM’s articulation substantiates the assertion of ‘political rent-seeking behavior’ as 
it always brings up the Local Government debate (often through street agitations and even 
violent actions) whenever politically expedient or whenever their narrow political interests 
were being challenged by the Provincial Government led by the PPP (with a predominantly 
rural political base, but with desires of gaining greater political and fiscal influence in the urban 
areas).  
Given these factors, the aversion of the civilian dispensations to elected local 
governments to the establishment of elected local governments can be understood in addition 
to why it assumes more of a ‘bargaining power’ tool rather than its more substantive 
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implications of democratization, accountability and responsiveness. Much of this resistance to 
electoral democracy at the local levels also finds its roots in the ‘limited access’/elitist structure 
and organization of the established political parties in the Pakistani political space (Hussain & 
Hussain, 2009).  
The political parties in Pakistan are, in their organization and functioning, “highly 
centralized and their national and provincial leadership exercises substantial control on all 
legislative nominations and strategic decision-making” (Cheema, Khan, & Myerson, 2013). 
Built mainly on the basis of elite coalitions and patron-client dynamics, the organizational 
structure of these political parties does not extend down to the grass-roots level, and where it 
does the structures act as reinforcements or executors of the agendas of the higher levels of 
the party. A cross-country Democratic Accountability Survey conducted under the auspices of 
Duke University posits that the Pakistani political parties are characterized by “high levels of 
organizational centralization and average levels of organizational extensiveness” (Kitschelt and 
Palmer, 2010; Cheema, Khan, & Myerson, 2013). The survey observations further reaffirmed 
the similarity of these dimensions across the 5 main political parties in the country (PPP, 
PML-N, JUI, JI, MQM). The barriers to entry in the federal and provincial political space, are 
also reinforced because of the absence of local democratic politics which is both a result of 
and support to, the high dynastic dominance in the political parties in particular and political 
space in general. 
The introduction of local democratic politics and local governance based on genuine 
participation and democratic norms would not only help in the broader notion of democratic 
consolidation but also reduce the barriers of entry in the political space at the national and 
provincial levels. This consolidation could also deter any attempts at a non-democratic 
assumption of incumbency, as historically the political vacuum at the local level has been the 
main source for the political legitimacy of the military regimes. 
4.4 LOCAL GOVERNANCE ORDINANCE 2001 44 
Hailed as one of the most comprehensive local governance reforms and attempts at 
decentralization of governance, it is important to analyze why it failed to gain roots despite its 
acknowledged merits such as liberalizing political space and service delivery improvements 
(World Bank, 2006; Aslam, 2011). The local governance reform was initiated in August 2001 
                                                             
44 This section is based on a series of discussions and interviews. Details in the Annexures.  
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under the Local Government Ordinance (2001), which legally had the stature of a Presidential 
directive under the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), but not safeguarded in the 
national constitution of 1973 that was at that time being held in abeyance. This was a 
fundamental weakness of the reform process right at its outset. The reforms envisaged under 
the LGO were more comprehensive and ambitious, however, they faced stiff opposition from 
the major political parties and the civil society organizations on account of the perceived 
detriment to federalism arising as a consequence of reduced provincial autonomy. This was 
also made a basis for rolling back the LGO in 2008 once the civilian democratically elected 
government gained incumbency, with the formally provided justification that it undermined 
the mandate and capacity of the provincial governments to implement its policies (UNDP, 
2010).  
As a federation divided into four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa), a Federally Administered Tribal Area (on the Afghan Border) and a capital 
territory (Islamabad), the establishment of the local governments was the creation of a third 
layer of the governance structure. This third layer was further disaggregated into three levels; 
districts, tehsil (municipality), and the lowest tier was Union Council. The Union Council 
consists of proximate villages or towns(in urban contexts) in the Tehsil. Each administrative 
tier at the local level had its own council and was headed by a mayor (Nazim, in local terms) 
and a deputy mayor (Naib-nazim). All three levels were to be governed by officials coming 
through a process of elections. In terms of administration, as many as 10 formerly provincial 
departments were transferred functionally to the district and municipality level. The new 
arrangement had the district mayor (Nazim) assume the status of the ‘executive head of the 
district’, with a District Coordination Officer (a member of the bureaucracy) appointed by the 
provincial government reporting to it (Bureau, 2001). Owing to the reporting structure, the 
district mayor was also made responsible for the performance management and stipulating the 
job modalities. Furthermore, the LGO also enabled the local councils to over-rule executive 
decisions, and empowered them to make independent decisions on all matters, with the 
exception of budget approvals. In the case of budget approvals, the local/district executive 
held considerable power over the local council - whereby it could establish standing 
committees to have an oversight over the activities of the local executive (Aslam, 2011). The 
local council also had the discretion to establish standing committees for monitoring of the 
executive’s activities. The monitoring committee had an authority to suggest remedial courses 
142 
 
of action to the local government, including the local executive (District Mayor) (Aslam, 
2011).  
The functional assignment to the local government (administrative decentralization), 
was perhaps the main feature of the local governance systems emerging under the LGO with 
those existing prior to them45. As compared to the preceding institutional framework in the 
subnational space, the provincial government performed a majority of the state functions, but 
under the LGO the elected local government and the provincial government were integrated 
at the district and municipality level, and the provincial administration or bureaucratic 
accountability division was abolished, with the locally serving bureaucracy accountable to the 
elected local government. While the scope of the functional responsibilities of the local 
governments greatly increased post the LGO Devolution, along with the discretion over the 
allocation of expenditures and establishment of priorities, the degree of financial 
decentralization was largely limited. This was because districts governments were not given 
any revenue generation privileges and had to depend on provincial (and by extrapolation, 
central transfers) through the provincial finance commission mechanism. Furthermore, most 
of the devolution of power under the LGO was from the provincial to the district level amidst 
no transfer of powers (administrative, fiscal or political) from the central government to the 
subnational governments (districts and provinces included). 
Prior to the Local Governance Ordinance, there was no significant inter-governmental 
linkage (i.e. between the Central/Provincial Governments and Local Governments), the inter-
governmental conflict possibilities were minimal. However, in the aftermath of the LGO, the 
elected local governments had an expanded set of functional responsibilities that were 
previously provincial responsibilities, as well as a greater degree of control over the provincial 
bureaucracy (Cheema, Khwaja, & Qadir, 2006). Since this devolution was instituted in the 
absence of any elected provincial governments as well as the non-partisan basis of local 
elections, no integrative efforts either structurally or mediatory were made to enhance 
provincial-local coordination, which had operational implications for both. In addition, the 
indirect election of the District Nazim created distortions in the incentive structures, especially 
since the district mayor under the LGO was most powerful actor in the local government 
system as the head of the executive as well as the legislative branch of the local government. 
                                                             
45 The local governments established during the 1980s under the Zia regime were mostly suspended during 
the 1990s so in fact prior to the current devolution there were no elected representatives at the local level and 
their powers were exercised by provincial bureaucrats as local government administrators (Cheema, Khwaja, 
& Qadir, 2006). 
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Local governments in Pakistan enjoyed under the LGO enjoyed considerable 
discretion in the regulation of local matters, expenditure allocation for local goods, and 
procurement processes (Niaz (2010)). However, most of this authority was concentrated in the 
hands of the Nazim (Mayor). In the case of budget approval, for example, the Nazim had the 
authority to propose the budget liable for consideration by the Local Council. This provision 
significantly restricted the discretion of the local council in relation to the non-elected 
bureaucracy and, especially, the Nazim. The incentive compatibility mechanism implicit in this 
arrangement was that the re-election of the mayor would be contingent upon the satisfaction 
of the union councils: a factor that would allow the Union Councilors to exert a greater 
influence over the mayor. However, in a political landscape that is dominated by individuals 
who control the entry into political competition and the intermediation between the state and 
the citizen as mentioned in the prior section, indirect election of the head of the local 
government unit opens up the possibility of capture of these offices by the local elite (Hussain 
& Hussain, 2009).  
Given the dearth of local revenue sources, most of the local fiscal pool was financed 
through the fiscal transfers from the provincial and central governments under the Provincial 
Finance Commission as discussed earlier. While the horizontal distribution of these funds 
across local governments was formula-based (primarily based on population), the vertical 
distribution that determines the retained and allocable amounts was largely at the discretion of 
the province. The local governments also had the platforms of central transfers delivered in 
ear-marked forms. A pitfall of such an arrangement is that the discretionary transfers provide 
“an incentive to the local government to respond to the preferences of the center in order to 
get access to funds, rather than to their constituency” (Yelmaz, 2010). As a result, the central 
governments/ political actors have a greater scope for patronage and clientilistic conduct by 
linking transfers to political considerations. This ends up reinforcing and perpetuating existing, 
sub-optimal power structures and strengthens the patronage relationships, and can become an 
effective channel of rent distribution. 
Finally, the main structural flaw with the decentralization under the LGO was that it 
was developed and instituted in a context when the Constitutional framework was held in 
abeyance. Despite the new governance structure instituted under the LGO (2001) and its 
subsequent ratification by the 17th Constitutional Amendment in 2003, Pakistan continued to 
constitutionally be a “two-level federal state i.e. the local governments are not recognized as an 
established third tier of government by the 1973 Constitution” (Shah,2012). While the 17th 
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Amendment was initially aimed at constitutionally ratifying and sustaining the establishment of 
a third tier of the state at the local levels, it ended up allowing their establishment for a 7 year 
period. During this 7 year period, the provincial governments could make any changes to the 
legislations regarding Local Governments with the approval of the President (Bureau, 2001; 
Shah, 2012). The implicit feature of this was that at the end of the 7 year period, the provincial 
governments were to decide whether or not the local governance structures were to be 
retained, and if so, what revisions to the legislation were to be introduced. This was, in fact, 
the main provision employed by the subsequent civilian government to roll-back the Local 
Governance frameworks under the 18th Amendment. 
4.4  DECENTRALIZATION AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF 18T H  AMENDMENT 
Two most comprehensive decentralization reform processes in the history of Pakistan, 
according to this research, have been the reforms of 2001 and the 18th Constitutional 
Amendment in 2009 that is hailed as the first major step towards making the state federal in 
function and not just the form, with a systematic national dominance sequence of 
decentralization reforms. The decentralization reforms undertaken in 2001 under the title of 
Local Governance Ordinance and the Devolution of Power Plan, were the first 
comprehensive decentralization reforms as they involved changes in the “administrative level 
of decision-making, the accountability of the decision-making authority (political or 
bureaucratic), and the nature and amounts of the available fiscal pool’’ (Cheema, Khawaja and 
Qadir, 2005). The LGO 2001 was a radical one, under an autocratic regime and instituted 
under the Provisional Constitution Order, and thus without a formal constitutional cover. It 
also involved a great deal of decentralization of provincial powers to local levels, without any 
decentralization of the central powers to the subnational tiers (provinces and the local tiers). 
As a consequence, the sustainability of these reforms was low despite yielding delivering 
service delivery improvements and empowerment to local governments46.  
In 2008, this arrangement was rolled back following a democratic transition as the 
Pakistan People’s Party assumed the government. While very important constitutional changes 
were passed in 2009 and 2010 in support of federalism, major reforms were also instituted in 
the areas of finances and administrative/ functional responsibilities of the subnational 
governments (i.e. provincial governments of the federating units). However, the political 
                                                             
46 Aslam, G. and Yilmaz, S. (2011), Impact of decentralization reforms in Pakistan on service delivery—
an empirical study. Public Administration and Development  31: 159–171. doi:10.1002/pad.591 
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decentralization in terms of reinvigorating and reinstituting a sustainable grassroots 
governance infrastructure remained ignored. In the aftermath of these reforms, the 
governments of the federating units/ provinces have infact became more powerful in terms of 
their administrative discretion and fiscal resources. Given the disparities (territorial size, 
demographics, and fiscal and administrative capacities) of the provinces, a process of 
contestation and bargaining is also underway for a revival of further decentralization reforms 
that empower the third tier of the state - municipalities.  
Owing to the inadequate responsiveness of public policy to the citizen demands in the 
aftermath of the constitutional reforms and regional empowerment, the 2013 elections 
(historical elections as it was the first time a transition between two elected governments took 
place following a completion of mandated tenure) saw the reinvigoration of the local 
governance as one of the popular electoral slogans (See Table 11)47. Table x provides an 
overview of the major parties’48 positions at the time of the general election.  
Table 9 : Major Political Parties in Pakistan 
Rank Party Popular Votes General Elections 2013 
1 Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) 14,844,104 
2 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) 7,679,954 
3 Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) 6,977,218 
4 Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) 2,456,153 
5 Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam 1,461,371 
Source: Own compilation based on ECP data (2013) 
 
The electoral results of the 2013 General Election saw PML-N gaining a clear majority 
in the Centre. However, the regional/ provincial results had three different parties gaining 
clear majority in three out of the four federating units whereas a coalition government led by 
the PML-N was formed in the fourth.  
 
 
                                                             
47 A comparative analysis of the election manifestoes of the major political parties in the 2013 General 
Elections, was conducted by Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development And Transparency 
(PLDAT) across issues pertaining to economy, society, political issues and foreign policy. 
http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/Election2013_ManifestoesComparison.pdf  
 
48 The status of the parties is based upon the votes they obtained during the 2013 General Election. See 
Table XX 
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Table 10: Parties forming Provincial Governments 
Province Party in Government 
Balochistan Coalition led by PML-N 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa PTI 
Punjab PML-N 
Sindh PPP 
 
 While being a historic election as it saw a democratically elected government transfer 
the power to another democratically elected government, the 2013 election results were also 
important as they were the resulted in three national level parties campaigning for the centre 
emerging as clear victors in three of the four federating units. The PPP and PML-N have been 
in Governments at the central and regional levels multiple times in the past, their dynastic 
orientation, allegations of graft and misappropriations49, and limitations in delivering on their 
mandates led to the rise of the PTI, a relatively new party gaining new grounds across the 
national electoral space, predominantly in the urban centres. The electoral campaign thus was 
a contest between well-established parties with a prior record of incumbency, and a new party 
promising accountability and change, and with each of these three main parties forming 
governments in three major large provinces ushered in a form of plurality never witnessed 
before, while also having implications for the decentralization and developmental prospects of 
Pakistan.  
 The implications for decentralization have been significant because while all the main 
parties campaigned with the establishment of local governance structures as a key element of 
their manifesto, upon gaining incumbency the enthusiasm for enacting the promised reform 
was much less. As detailed in the findings of Kitschelt and Palmer (2010), the party structure 
for PPP, PML-N as the two main parties was highly centralized and largely patriarchal 
therefore there was a resistance to establishing a local governance system to ensure that their 
political base remains consolidated. PTI, while being relatively less centralized in terms of 
party organization, had similar concerns of losing the gains made at the provincial level and 
central levels by having the opposing parties dilute their support in their new constituencies. 
In accordance with the 18th Amendment, all provincial assemblies nevertheless passed the 
                                                             
49 Hussain & Hussain (2009) 
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Local Government Acts in 2013, with the exception of Balochistan which had passed it in 
2010 (UNDP, 2011).  
Table 11 : Party Position on Decentralization and Local Governments 2013 General Elections 
Party Proposed Programme in Election Manifesto Scope  
ANP ** 
i. Local Government election to be held  
Basic 
ii. Women representation to be ensured in the LG 
iii. Centre to retain control of defence, foreign affairs, currency, 
communications and such other subjects that the federating units 
agree to in the Council of Common Interests 
iv. Implementation of the 18th Constitutional amendment to be 
ensured particularly with regards to oil, gas, water and power, 
energy, health and education 
JUI (F) *** No specific reference is made to the subject in the manifesto None 
MQM ** 
i. Devolved local government system will provide ways for urban-rural 
integration 
Extensive 
ii. The LG system will help to further devolve power, authority and 
resources from District Level to Town level and further down to UC 
and ward levels 
iii. Election for the LG to be held within 3 months of general election 
PML 
(N)*** 
i. Local Government election to be held within six months of the 
general election 
Detailed 
ii. Under Article 140 A of the constitution, every effort will be made to 
secure a certain degree of uniformity in the LG system within and 
among the provinces  
iii. New laws providing for the new LG system in replacement of the 
LGO 2001 system are to be adopted by consensus for optimum 
devolution 
iv. Women will be given representation in the LG system 
PPP*** 
i. Each province shall by law establish a LG system and devolve 
political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to 
the elected representatives of the LG. Article 140 A of the 
constitution to be upheld 
Detailed 
ii. The election commission of Pakistan will oversee the LG elections 
PTI*** 
i. An effective, efficient and representative LG system will be 
established 
Extensive 
ii. Authorities, responsibilities and resources will be devolved 
iii. Peoples participation in the local government will be ensured 
iv. A bottoms-up system will be introduced 
v. Each village will be governed by a Village Council  
vi. All governance functions in the cities and towns will go to the 
municipality and the city government will raise independent revenue 
for city development 
** Predominantly Regional Party       *** Predominantly National Party     
Source: Own Compilation based on PILDAT Survey (2013) 
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Employing the game-theoretical model presented in Chapter 1, albeit with a slight 
revision, the interests and preferences of the three main parties in the subnational space in 
developing and instituting Local Governance Systems can be better analyzed. Given that all 
three of these parties have a national scope and aspirations focused on governing in the 
centre, competitive behavior and the ‘progressive ambition’ would incentivize strategies to 
dilute the support base of the each other with all means at disposal. However, in this case, the 
party already in power at the centre (PML-N) has a greater ability to further its own agenda.  
An analytical proxy of a ‘dictator’ shall be applied to the dominant party i.e. PML-N at 
t=0. The objective is to frame the analysis operating on Schelling’s idea of free activity in a 
strategic interaction context; the dynamics of “bargaining, of arriving at understandings and 
misunderstandings, for accommodation and co-operation and for conjectures about each 
other’s decision processes, value systems and information” (Schelling, 1961). Following on 
Aslam (2010), the analytical focus is on how the surplus is divided, what strategies are 
employed to secure preferred outcomes and greater shares of the surplus, critical factors 
behind their bargaining power and the exogenous factors that have a bearing on the outcome.  
The revisions include some additional strategies available to the players as compared to 
the original framework developed by Aslam (2010); 
a) Maintain status-quo / ‘Play by the rules’: 
The regional governments continue delivering on the assigned mandate without 
getting confrontational based on progressive ambitions and aspirations of gaining 
influence at the centre at t+1. Delivering on the mandate may deliver enough 
political capital in the form of good performance and service delivery record in the 
subsequent general elections.  
b) Changing the opponents payoffs 
This could take one or more of the following forms:  
- Each player uses available resources for preferential allocations to regional 
constituencies where it has a majority. 
- Each player diverts resources to opposition’s constituency to gain greater 
political capital and win it in the next electoral round 
c) ‘Brinkmanship’/ Coercion strategies 
This could take one or more of the following forms: 
- Central government can withhold or scale down discretionary transfers  
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- Non-cooperation in mitigating horizontal imbalances  
- Provincial Governments have the authority to dismiss LG officials, elected and 
appointed.  
If Strategy A is chosen and all players maintain the status-quo and let their 
performance and service delivery determines their fate in the subsequent electoral round, 
there is a greater incentive for each player to deliver on its commitments to its 
constituents. However, under this strategy there is an opportunity cost of forgone political 
capital in the event of the inadequacy of the opposing player in delivering on its 
commitments. 
If strategy B is preferred, and a player chooses to use all its available resources for 
preferential allocations to constituencies where it has a majority in a bid to further 
consolidate its support base, the down-side risk would be increased disparity within the 
region thus further alienating a potential support base.  
Contrarily, under the same strategy if the player chooses to devote a greater share of 
available resources to the constituencies where it doesn’t have a majority or an adequate 
support base with the aim of winning their loyalties, then there is a downside risk of losing 
out support from those constituencies where it has a strong support base as fewer 
resources would be available than expected. 
If Strategy C is preferred then any political capital gained would necessarily come at 
the expense of developmental progress within the region and also have potential negative 
spill-over effects beyond the region; for instance, the strength of the federation.  
 
The choice of either of the confrontational strategies (B or C) shall be constrained by 
the same inequality as in the original framework, i.e. costs and tradeoffs associated with the 
predating on the opposition’s support base are less than the  gains that can be credibly 
expected at t+1.  
With this framework in context, it is easier to evaluate the decentralization and local 
governance frameworks developed by each of the provinces in the aftermath of the general 
elections in 2013. While the Local Governance Acts were promulgated by the provinces in 
2013, their enforcement and implementation through formal local bodies’ election did not take 
place until 2016. The striking feature of the results of these elections, and a confirmation of 
the Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000) hypothesis of local spaces being more prone to 
retrenchment of established interests at higher levels of government, has been that the local 
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elections have been won predominantly by candidates of the same party that is governing at 
the provincial level. For instance, in the province of Punjab, where the PML-N is in power at 
the provincial level, the local elections have seen the party’s candidates win 25 out of the 33 
districts in the province50.  
All four federating provinces had their Local Government Acts promulgated by 2013, 
and some of them were contested in the courts by the opposition parties (UNDP, 2015), 
which lead to the delay in the establishment of the LG structures. A review of all four of the 
Local Governance Acts also illustrates an example of brinksmanship of provincial 
governments, whereby all four provincial governments have retained the authority to suspend 
or dismiss heads of an elected local government51. Another common feature across all four 
LGAs has been the limited devolution of functions or finances to the local governments. 
Provincial Finance Commissions are established under the LGAs which will make transfers to 
the local governments in the province. In addition, the local governments have very limited 
powers to raise their own taxation/ revenue and their fiscal auditing is conducted by the 
provincial governments.  
4.6 DEMOCRATIC & DEVELOPMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 18T H  AMENDMENT 
With the civil-military oscillations in the control of the state, there has been a renewed 
engagement in the national political narrative in the aftermath of the 2008 elections with 
Constitutionalism. Agreed upon by all political parties, the new narrative extols the execution 
of all functions of the state, transitions and distributions of the powers, government 
transitions and inter-governmental dynamics to be governed and conducted under the 
stipulated constitutional framework as promulgated in 1973. Where inadequate, revisions to 
the constitutions can be made following a 2/3rd majority support across all provincial and 
national legislative bodies (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan). Decentralization, 
in the backdrop of this narrative, has assumed administrative and fiscal forms predominantly 
with the political decentralization only occurring at the centre-provincial level. Nevertheless, as 
                                                             
50 http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/366635-PMLN-sweeps-Punjab-in-local-body-polls 
51KPK:  http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/GOKP-2013-Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa-Local-
Government-Act-2013-Print-Version.pdf 
Punjab: 
https://www.af.org.pk/Acts_Fed_Provincial/Punjab%20_Acts_since_2002/Punjab%202015/The%20P
unjab%20Local%20Government%20Act%202013.pdf 
Balochistan: http://www.pabalochistan.gov.pk/uploads/acts/Local%20Govt.%20Act.htm  
Sindh: http://sindhlaws.gov.pk/setup/Publications_SindhCode/PUB-15-000059.pdf 
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a reform in progress and amid increasing articulations of democratic local governance 
returning into the national political narrative post 2013 general elections, there exists a 
possibility of democracy substantively and sustainably re-appearing in the local arenas. 
The first constitution of Pakistan promulgated in 1956, envisaged Pakistan as a 
“decentralized federation with significant fiscal and administrative responsibilities being 
assumed by the lower levels of government” (Shah, 2012). The central government, on the 
contrary, was given a greater discretion over developing its revenue base requisite for direct 
federal expenditures and transfers to ensure standardization of public service delivery and 
redistribution to ensure inter-regional equity. The current constitutional framework when first 
instituted in 1973, enhanced the centralization tendencies in public spending responsibilities, 
and also stipulated service delivery responsibilities across the two tiers of the government 
under Federal Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List (Joint responsibility of 
centre and province). Table 1 provides an overview of the fiscal and functional responsibilities 
of the federal and subnational governments as stipulated in the 1973 Constitution prior to the 
18th Amendment. The objective behind the establishment of these lists was to delineate 
responsibilities as well as enable an interim period whereby with the central equalization 
efforts, the provincial governments build their fiscal and administrative capacities to assume 
these responsibilities fully (Shah, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the centre continued to encroach on the responsibilities and privileges of 
the provinces, the provinces in turn on the local governments, and hence the division of 
responsibilities and the fiscal endowments requisite to deliver on those responsibilities 
emerged as an main issue of contention in Pakistan, owing to which an institutional 
mechanism of National Finance Commission was rolled into action.  
The first deliberated and consensually agreed National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Award in 1991 geared towards granting an “unconditional access” to a greater pool of the 
federal divisible pool (Pasha and Shah, 1996; Shah, 2012). Important facet of this award was 
the initiation of the process of expenditure realignment aimed at granting provinces a greater 
discretion over the ‘concurrent’ responsibilities, but this occurred without any discretion over 
additional or new revenue stream. This resulted in further increasing the reliance of the 
provinces on the central transfers. As per this 1991 award, which continued to be the revenue 
distribution formula till 2001, the federal transfers to the provinces financed a greater portion 
of the provincial operating expenditures and in the case of Balochistan the transfer financing 
amounted to 99% of the provincial expenditure (Shah, 2007). This process was reversed under 
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the LGO and the PCO discussed earlier, where the centre’s pursuit of diluting established 
political support devolved both resource endowments as well as functional responsibilities 
from the provincial to the local governments. While the reforms under the LGO did result in 
service delivery improvements at the local levels, they were considered incomplete in the sense 
that they did not rationalize the federal and provincial powers, and in effect led the centre to 
encroach on both federal and provincial responsibilities (and hence resources) as stipulated in 
the 1973 constitutional framework. 
With the transition back to civilian democratic government in 2008, the consensual 
narrative across the political space was to ‘uphold democratic norms’ by re-strengthening the 
provinces and rolling back the governance reforms under the LGO. The outcome of this 
consensual commitment to also led to the 7th National Finance Commission Award in 2009 
(still in effect as of 2017), whereby the smaller provinces were given a greater share to the 
resource pools in a bid to build inter-provincial harmony and also meet the equalization 
requisites. Under the 7th NFC, an enhanced allocation was given to the smaller provinces. 
Indicators such as population density, poverty levels, and domestic fiscal effort were 
incorporated as determinants of the fiscal revenue sharing formula. 
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Table 12: Functional Distribution across Government Tiers 
Legislative Responsibility Services Actual Allocation of 
Functions 
Federal Government1 
Defense, External Affairs, Posts and Telegraphs, 
Telephones, Radio and T.V., Currency, Foreign 
Exchange, Foreign Aid, Institutes for Research, Nuclear 
Energy, Ports and Aerodromes, Shipping, Air Service, 
Stock Exchange, National Highway, Geological Surveys, 
Meteorological Surveys, Censuses, Railways, Mineral Oil 
& Natural Gas Industries 
Federal Government 
Federal/ Provincial 
Governments2 
Population Planning, Curriculum Development, Syllabus 
Planning, Centers of Excellence, Tourism, Social 
Welfare, Vocational/Technical Training, Employment 
Exchange 
Federal/Provincial 
Governments 
Provincial Government 
Historical Sites and Monuments, Law and Order, Justice, 
Tertiary Health Care and Hospitals, Highways, Urban 
Transport, Secondary and Higher Education, Agricultural 
Extension, Fertilizer and seed distribution, Irrigation, 
Land Reclamation 
Provincial Governments 
Local Governments3 
Primary Education, Curative Health, Preventive Health, 
Water Supply Drainage and Sewage, Farm-to-Market 
Roads, Land Development,  
 
Rural Developments, Link Roads, Intra-Urban 
Roads, Street Lighting, Garbage Collection, Fire 
Fighting, Parks and Playgrounds 
Primarily Provincial with 
Minor Local Government 
Involvement 
 
Local Governments 
1. According to Federal Legislative List 
2. According to Concurrent Legislative List 
3. According Provincial Legislation  
Source: Shah(2009) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (Sch. Including 17th Amendment) 
 
Table 13: Finance Decentralization under the 7th NFC Award  
Total Divisible Pool 56%-57.5% of the following sources of federal 
revenues: 
Personal and corporate income taxes, wealth tax, sales 
tax, excise duties on tea, tobacco, sugar, and other 
excises. 
Amount FY 2010-11: PKR 865.8 billion (US$ 9.62 
billion)  
Formula for provincial allocation Population – 62% weight 
Poverty  – 10.3% weight 
Provincial tax effort – 5% 
Inverse of Provincial Population density – 2.7%weight 
Provincial shares 
In Population 
Punjab: 57.4% 
Sindh: 23.7% 
KPK: 13.8% 
Baluchistan: 5.1% 
Provincial shares in NFC Allocation 
Punjab: 51.7% 
Sindh: 24.6 
KPK: 14.6% 
Baluchistan: 9.1% 
Source: Institute of Public Policy (IPP), 2011, Shah (2011) 
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In terms of its institutional dimensions, the 18th Amendment has substantially 
reformed the institutions established as intergovernmental coordination mechanisms i.e. the 
Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the National Economic Council (NEC). The CCI is 
a coordination and deliberative body headed by the Prime Minister (or a designate), the Chief 
Ministers of all provinces and federal government representatives. While its prior jurisdiction 
was nominal in terms of providing solicited provincial input in federal matters, the 18th 
Amendment enhanced its potency by making it responsible for all matters related to the 
federation52. The NEC, also a constitutionally mandated body for oversight over national 
economic policies, previously composed of the Prime Minister, and Presidentially nominated 
members (with the constraint holding that at least one representative of each province must be 
nominated). In the aftermath of the 18th Amendment, the composition was altered to enable a 
greater influence of the provincial governments such that two provincial members in addition 
to the provincial Chief Minister and four federal government representatives nominated by the 
Prime Minister would now compose the NEC.  
This has enabled a greater deliberative scope for the provincial interest articulation in 
the national policy making, to avert any scope for centralized high-handed policy stipulations. 
Furthermore, this Constitutional amendment also enabled substantive changes in the division 
and devolution of powers between the federal and provincial levels of the government 
whereby the previously entrenched ‘Concurrent List’ was disposed off altogether, and a 
functional reassignment to the Federal Government was done contingent upon the directions 
of the CCI, with all other functions devolved to the provinces. Notwithstanding the functional 
reassignments and devolution, there has been very limited reassignment of taxation 
responsibilities to the provincial governments. The taxation powers remain predominantly 
with the central government, which were further reaffirmed by the provincial governments 
owing to the scale advantage argument (Yelmaz,2010).  
In terms of the provincial exposure to capital mobilization avenues, the 18th 
Amendment also enables the subnational governments to access domestic and international 
                                                             
52 The composition remained the same as before (Prime Minister, all Chief Ministers and three 
nominated Federal Government Representatives), but the scope of responsibility was expanded to 
include ..”decision making, monitoring, supervision, and control responsibilities over the Federal 
Legislative List Part II, which includes the following: railways; minerals, oil, and natural gas; hazardous 
materials; industrial policy; electricity; major ports; federal regulatory authorities; national planning 
and economic coordination; supervision and management of public debt; censuses; provincial police 
powers beyond provincial boundaries; legal matters; regulation of the legal, medical, and other 
professions; standards in education and research; interprovincial coordination; and conflict resolution” 
(IPP, 2011). 
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sources for credit and finance, albeit within the parameters defined by the NEC. These limits 
continue to be revised circumstantially and are not mandated at fixed rates in a legal 
framework as observed in the ‘80-20 rule’ as practiced in Bolivia. In addition to enhanced 
avenues of credit finance, under this amendment the provincial governments were also 
equipped with a relatively more dynamic and buoyant tax base in the form of sales tax on 
services. In 2013, the fiscal proceeds from this tax base alone generated around 0.5% of the 
GDP in fiscal revenues (IPP, 2013 and Government of Pakistan, 2013).  
Table 14: Functional Responsibilities under the 18th Amendment 
Federation/CCI (Joint Federal-Provincial) Tasks—Federal Legislative List Part II 
Electricity Provincial police operations beyond 
provincial boundaries 
Minerals, oil and natural gas Industrial policy 
Railways National Planning and National Economic 
Coordination 
Major Ports Coordination of Scientific and Technological 
Research 
Census All regulatory authorities under a federal law 
Public Debt Standards in higher education and Research, 
scientific and technical institutions 
Federal corporate entities including Water and Power Development 
Authority and Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation 
Interprovincial matters and coordination 
Legal, medical and other professions  
Federal Functions—Federal Legislative List Part I 
Defense International  and inter-provincial trade 
External Affairs and international treaties Nuclear Energy 
Immigration and citizenship Airports, aircraft, air navigation, air and sea 
travel and shipment, lighthouses 
Post and Telecommunications Patents, trademarks, copyrights 
Central banking, Currency, Foreign Exchange, Stock exchanges and futures markets 
Corporate regulation including banking and insurance National highways and strategic roads 
Fishing beyond territorial waters Federal geological surveys and 
meteorological organizations 
Standards of weights and measures Local government in cantonment areas 
Provincial Responsibilities 
All residual functions 
Local Government Responsibilities: By provincial government determination 
 
The current system also established 2015 as a milestone for a transforming the 
governance structures such that the power concentration at the central level is replaced by 
concentration at the subnational level. Under this milestone, all major economic and social 
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functions shall be performed and designed by the provinces. This is exhibited in the shifting 
trends in the financial and functional pools of the provincial governments as illustrated in 
Tables 15. 
Table 15: Summary of Fiscal Decentralization under the 18th Amendment 
Fiscal Year Indicator Federal Share Provincial Share 
FY 2009-10 Revenue collection 94% 6% 
 Revenues retained 65% 35% 
 Expenditure share 66% 34% 
 Residual Fiscal Gap after transfers -1% +1% 
FY 2011-12 Revenue Collection 90% 10% 
 Revenues retained 61% 39% 
 Expenditure share 64% 36% 
 Residual Vertical Fiscal Gap after transfers -3% +3% 
FY 2014-15 Revenue collection 85% 15% 
 Revenues retained 45% 55% 
 Expenditure share 45% 55% 
 Residual Vertical  Fiscal Gap after transfers 0% 0% 
Note: Any allowances for local expenditures come from the provincial pool  
          Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (2011), Shah (2011/2012)  IMF Government Finance Statistics Module  
 
Amongst this functional devolution, there has also been a dispensing away of viable 
central roles like fostering a mutually beneficial economic union, protecting minorities and 
disadvantaged groups, disaster response and risk mitigation, and framing an overall strategic 
developmental orientation. Particularly, in the context of political and economic cohesion, it is 
imperative that natural resource endowments are viewed as national subjects instead of being 
made into provincial realms such that the rents from these resources can be invested at a 
higher scale of effect and equity at the central level. The current framework makes it into a 
provincial subject, which has potential for divisive pressures between the provinces and hence 
expose the federation to risk. This argument finds its roots in the inter-provincial conflict over 
Hydel resource distribution and the Kalabagh Dam construction, as well as the distribution of 
gas and extractive revenues across the provinces. Especially considering the latter, the 
divisiveness is particularly pronounced in Baluchistan which is host to a substantial mineral 
and extractives base yet deriving the least benefit.  
A decentralized system works best if there are potent platforms for interest articulation 
by the citizenry (through effective political decentralization), and a finance-functional 
harmony. Particularly important is to ensure that expenditure decentralization must also be 
accompanied by the taxation/revenue generation decentralization such that reliance on higher 
level transfers is reduced and also create greater incentives for fiscal transparency and 
accountability. 
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Furthermore, the current constitutional framework post the 18th Amendment does 
not revisit the mechanisms in place for central fiscal transfers to provincial governments under 
the NFC award. These NFC awards are guided, as mentioned earlier, by the objectives of 
fiscal equalization horizontally and vertical gap reduction. However, with the functional 
devolution of the social service provision and infrastructural development to the provincial 
levels, the role of the federal government in finance provision and establishment of minimum 
standards is important.  
4.7 CONCLUSION  
The LGO and the 18th Constitutional Amendment have both been substantive attempts 
at subnational empowerment; with the former less than the latter by virtue of the absence of 
the constitutional cover and its autocratic sponsors. Despite having its merits, LGO has little 
formal relevance in the current scheme of decentralization and federalism discourse in 
Pakistan. The 18th Amendment thus emerges as the most recent and comparably expansive 
decentralization reform that has fostered an environment conducive for federalism. Perhaps 
the greatest merit of this round of reform has been the underlying political consensus and its 
constitutional embeddedness. Whether or not the current decentralization from the centre 
to the provincial levels also leads to provincial to local decentralization in the subsequent 
rounds remains to be seen, but in terms of fostering a greater national cohesion and 
deepening democracy it does exhibit potential. In addition, a clearer delineation of the 
functionalities has reduced the scope for arbitrary unwarranted federal intervention in 
provincial subjects, thus reducing the centre-provincial frictions.  
The institutional reinvigoration of the CCI, for example, is another important outcome 
of this amendment, as it creates inter-governmental deliberative platforms that can be used for 
grievance redressal. Furthermore, it also fosters subnational interest articulation that was 
previously inhibited by federal unilateralism. The key shift in the current constitutional 
framework puts the provinces at the core of both policy formulation and its implementation, 
which not only makes the governance structure more proximate to the citizenry but also 
clarifies which levels must be held accountable for any suboptimalities in service delivery. The 
greater proximity of the government to the citizenry enabled by the 18th Amendment may 
also lead to a relatively higher level of citizen participation in the public policy frameworks 
while also creating greater pressures for accountability and responsiveness by the governments 
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to the citizens which would be further enhanced if local levels also came to the fore. The 
amendment’s predominant engagement with the devolution of functionalities and linking the 
fiscal endowments at the expense of any rationalization of the mandates of central and 
provincial functions and discussion on local governance structures or division of the provinces 
into smaller administrative units.  
To an extent, the 18th Amendment may have unintentionally compounded these 
threats by reasserting an obsolete model of two-tier federal governance. Instead of a 
disparately powerful centre, under the 18th Amendment it is a disparately powerful province. 
The extent to which the increased authorities at the provincial levels have led to a 
corresponding improvement in the public service delivery or even grappling with the 
challenges to the state in terms of rule and order, is suboptimal. On the whole, federalism in 
Pakistan may have taken the most substantive of its leaps with the 18th Amendment; there are 
some downside risks that can prove highly detrimental if not dealt with caution. The overall 
focus of all political actors, the central and provincial governments has to foster greater inter-
regional harmony to ensure state stability and cohesion. However, with the enhanced 
provincial autonomy and opposing political parties holding office in three of the four main 
regions, there exist divisive risks too. The 18th Amendment stands well on the grounds of 
democratic consolidation but it cannot be considered a panacea for the governance constraints 
of Pakistan as it is at best an incomplete process – completion of which would deem 
imperative more fundamental reforms that ensure greater public responsiveness but also a 
stable political and economic union due to greater efficiencies and accountability mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER OUTLOOK  
 
The global development narrative is increasingly, and rather appropriately, considering 
the primacy of governance and institutions as a key determinant of the success of policy 
frameworks. There are a variety of policy frameworks and technical solutions that have come 
to the fore as panaceas for the inadequacies of development policy frameworks which have 
delivered on the expected goals in some contexts while failing in others. Thus, the focus has 
to be realigned to why they work where they do, and what are the underlying drivers and 
determinants of effective policies. Decentralization of governance has followed a similar path 
– emerging as a potent tool for enacting state and governance reforms, yet has been marred 
by experiences that remain mixed at best. The extent to which decentralization is conducive 
to enhancing development and democratic transition/ consolidation is still a subject of 
debate. This research contends that the impulse to decentralize finds its roots in many 
different combinations of incentives and power structures – from an autocratic central 
government pre-empting the demand of its constituents and enabling their participation in 
the governance process as in the case of Bolivia under the Ley de Participación Popular, or an 
autocratic government at the centre using decentralization reforms as a tool for dislodging 
existing opposing political organizations by developing a new support base at the subnational 
level as in the case of Pakistan.  
This research has endeavored to examine the role of decentralization in conjunction 
with democracy and development. In doing so, it has focused primarily on the incentives 
of the stakeholders sponsoring and introducing the decentralization reforms, the order and 
sequencing of the reform and most importantly the underlying bargaining between the 
stakeholders during the reform design and implementation. Building upon the sequential 
theories of decentralization and the two distinct reform trajectories postulated by Faletti 
(2009)– a bottoms up subnational dominance path, and a top down national dominance 
path. Given the contrasting objectives of national and subnational actors when 
decentralizing, the preferences of the centre are to devolve administrative and functional 
responsibilities to the lower levels of the state before relinquishing any financial or political 
control. The subnational preference remains greater political autonomy followed by financial 
resources and then deciding which functions and administrative responsibilities can be 
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undertaken.  
A gap that this research has attempted to fill, however imperfectly, is that it explored the 
possible nexus between a decentralization reforms and the establishment of a democratic 
developmental state. Based on a synthesis of various conceptualizations of the 
Developmental State this research identifies it as a state that is committed to a national 
development agenda that has at its core capacity and outreach, and geared towards an 
inclusive growth trajectory that targets poverty alleviation and, effective and efficient public 
service delivery. The main scope of decentralization reforms in the establishment of a 
developmental state is in terms of pluralizing political space at the local levels, enabling a 
more deliberative policy arena, while also fostering greater responsiveness of public service 
delivery and enhanced accountability of the government due to its proximity to the citizenry.  
Given the history of developmental states, such as the East Asian states, the notion of a 
democratic developmental state may seem like an oxymoron and a loose conceptual stitch. 
This is largely attributable to the perceived incompatibility of the key features of the 
individual constructs of democracy and Developmentalism; e.g. autonomy of policy making 
is critical to developmental policy and accountability is a critical requirement of democratic 
norms, but under a DDS making the policy framework accountable may compromise the 
autonomy of developing one. However, when considering developmentalism, the concept 
does not pertain to an absolute form of state but instead implies a process of progression 
and development with a social dimension instead of narrow economic dimensions, 
generating historical paradigms and configurations. It can thus, be considered as a process of 
deep social transformation, rationally operated against a politically committed state, to bridge 
the economic and social progress gaps.  
In validation of the Bresser-Pereira (2016) argument, this research  developmentalism is 
more suited for contexts characterized by structural and distributive imbalances whereby its 
transformative conduct needs to be systematic, socially oriented and politically sustained 
change. Furthermore, developmental state is not a monolith of sorts. According to Joshi 
(2012) three types of developmental states exist; Human resource Developmental State, 
Resource Developmental State, and the Human Developmental State. The case of Bolivia 
fits in the category of a Resource Developmental State where it is using its natural resource 
rents for socio-economic uplift. However, an attempt has been made by this research to 
suggest that the Developmentalism can be complemented by decentralization reforms, 
primarily in terms of pluralizing policy arenas and providing an articulation platform to 
161 
 
diverse groups while retaining consistency with the National Development Plans.  
This research has also attempted to contextualize the decentralization, democracy and 
development nexus in the context of two Lower Middle Income Countries sharing a political 
history in terms of the autocratic regimes and political exclusion for the masses. Both 
countries have different state structure, with Bolivia being a Unitary State and Pakistan being 
a Federation. This on one hand enables the broader study of decentralization and its 
implications for democracy and development across two systems of government and state-
structure, but at the same time enables the analysis of an interesting paradox. The structure 
of the state in Pakistan has been Federal in its form, but unitary in function up until the 
constitutional reform of 2009/10 following which it has been making leaps towards being 
federal in function as well. The structure of the Bolivian state has been unitary both in form 
and in function, and continues to be so after the promulgation of the new constitution in 
2009. However, with the departments getting more autonomy vis-à-vis the centre, and a 
greater space for preference articulation in the decision-making space in the now 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, it is often considered as emerging federation. Finally in the 
context of the case studies, the two countries chosen for the case study are also indicate the 
subnational dominance path (Bolivia) and a national dominance path (Pakistan).  
Limitations and Avenues for further research 
Due to a paucity of resources and time, this research remained predominantly secondary 
with the exception of unstructured interviews and discussions with Country Experts and 
officials involved in the decentralization reforms from both countries during my research 
mobility and my subsequent pursuits. Primary research and focused group discussions in the 
field (especially in Bolivia) could have added a greater value to this research.  
In terms of the outlook, this focus area of this research is still an avenue with very limited 
research, particularly in the area of Democratic Developmentalism and Decentralization. 
There are multiple states including but not limited to, Botswana, Ethiopia, Colombia are 
currently engaged with democratic developmentalism/ neo-developmentalism which will be 
an interesting avenue for me to explore as I go on. Furthermore, this theme is an emerging 
research area particularly in the backdrop of Domestic Resource Mobilization and Financing 
for Development in the developing countries. I would endeavor to acquire more insights 
both theoretically and empirically in this realm.  
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